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ABSTRACT
THE AMBIGUITY OF BEING: MEDIEVAL AND MODERN COOPERATION
ON THE PROBLEM OF THE SUPERNATURAL
Jonathan Robert Heaps
Marquette University, 2019
The recent debate over the supernatural has proved intractable in part because of a
failure to distinguish two irreducible-but-linked problems of the supernatural, one
medieval and one modern. The first is a metaphysical problem concerning the
cooperation of humans with God. Bernard Lonergan’s retrieval of St. Thomas Aquinas’s
solution to this problem indicates that a grasp of divine concursus is integral to a theory
of nature and grace.
A metaphysics of universal cooperation with God implies a pair of ambiguities
about creaturely being. The general ambiguity is that, because the fundamental
explanatory term for creaturely causation is both universal and transcendent, it remains
possible to gain adequate causal knowledge of the world while merely assuming that the
universe is intelligible. The specific ambiguity applies the general ambiguity to human
action. If the ground of every human enterprise is universal and transcendent, then we
may wonder whether this ground makes any difference in our practical projects.
A modern philosophical mentality helps spell out the significance of these
ambiguities. Maurice Blondel and Jean-Paul Sartre present opposed interpretations of the
specific ambiguity. Blondel presupposes the complete explicability of human action,
arguing that the ground of human action is entirely supernatural. Sartre, by contrast,
denies that being needs any explanation, and by extension denies that human action
admits of any transcendent ground. Which posture one takes towards human action will
depend on what pre-philosophical choice one makes about the specific ambiguity.
Even if one takes the positive pole of the ambiguities, there remains a modern
problem of the supernatural. It cannot be reduced to metaphysics, because its appearance
depends on a solution to the medieval problem. Still, an effort to answer the modern
problem by metaphysical means offers two important determinations of the modern
problem. Because human freedom is rational, human actions emerge from a process of
deliberation and are formally constituted by meaning. Thus, discerning what God is doing
in human action is a diachronic and hermeneutical task. Taking the full scope of human
enterprises, the modern problem of the supernatural calls out for a theological
hermeneutics of culture.
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CHAPTER 1: THE PROBLEM(S) OF THE SUPERNATURAL

1. The Theorem of the Supernatural
There is an old computer science joke that goes, “there are 10 kinds of people in
the world: those who understand binary and those who do not.” It is gauche, of course, to
explain one’s joke. Perhaps it will suffice to note that those who do not understand binary
will not only miss the humor here, but also the principle of division separating them from
those who do. A similar problem can afflict discussions of the natural and the
supernatural. When one lacks or mistakes the principle of distinction, one can swiftly lose
the plot, miss the point, and begin to wander into thickets of confusion. The above joke
works because it presupposes the apprehension of a single insight out of which all the
various concepts of our digital world tumble. The card is punched or it is not. The circuit
is open or it is not: yes or no, 0 or 1, and so on. The two basic terms originate in an
alternative grasped by a single insight, a unitary understanding. Without it, I would be
writing this paragraph on a typewriter instead of a laptop computer. The problem of the
supernatural is similarly anchored in a pair of terms issuing from a single insight. Bernard
Lonergan called this single idea “the theorem of the supernatural.”1 Whatever life they
may have had before and after the emergence of this theorem, the terms natural and
supernatural derive their explanatory meaning from an exhaustively dichotomous
alternative grasped by a single insight.

1

Bernard Lonergan, Grace and Freedom: Operative Grace in the Thought of St. Thomas Aquinas,
eds. Frederick E. Crowe and Robert M. Doran, CWL 1 (Toronto: Toronto University Press, 2000), 12, 15,
17, and passim.
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This distinction and its principle are most famously associated with the fraught
pair, “nature and grace.” The theorem of the supernatural names the entitative
disproportion of the former to the latter. Lonergan discovered that much as the digital
binary can move beyond computational cards or tape to more plastic media (circuits,
lasers, etc.), this theorem’s terms can be specified by any matter among which the basic
relationship of disproportion obtains. In Grace and Freedom, Lonergan notes that the
theorem of the supernatural controls not only the distinction between grace and nature,
but also Thomas’s speculative theology of Creator and creatures.2 In Insight, he carries
the theorem yet further, to analogize between the relatively and absolutely supernatural.3
Despite the myriad instances and variations of biological process, all relate to their
underlying chemical processes according to this basic theorem. What occurs
systematically in a living cell, for example, is relatively supernatural to what by the laws
of chemistry occurs merely coincidentally. So it goes too between chemical and physical
processes, to say nothing of the relation between intelligent, deliberative consciousness
and psycho-sensitive consciousness.4 All of these various metaphysical subtleties rest on
the theorem of the supernatural applied in its full generality: two terms, one
hierarchically disproportionate to the other, originating in a unitary principle of
distinction grasped by a single insight.
Just because something is simple does not mean it is easy. The theorem of the
supernatural emerged into Roman Catholic speculative theology at the culmination of a
2

Lonergan, Grace and Freedom, 81–2.

3

“Relatively supernatural” names the emergent relation obtaining between the various
metaphysical strata of emergent probability; see Bernard Lonergan, Insight: A Study of Human
Understanding, eds. Frederick E. Crowe and Robert M. Doran, CWL 3 (Toronto, University of Toronto
Press, 1992), 657–9.
4

Lonergan, Insight, 144–51.
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long intellectual slog. As we will see in Chapter 2, Philip the Chancellor, St. Albert the
Great, and St. Thomas Aquinas set down their speculative accomplishments in the face of
long-standing aporia.5 The theorem of the supernatural arrived on the scene thanks to the
combined force of their considerable intellects brought to bear upon fertile intellectual
materials newly arrived on the European theological scene.6 Such intellectual
achievements are not just the products of single human minds or of single cultures, but
they are also an inheritance from one generation to the next and sometimes from one
culture to the next. But what one inherits, one can fail to appreciate. What one inherits
one can squander.7 In the course of several centuries, the mobility of the theorem of the
supernatural was lost. Its subtle influence on Thomas’s account of divine concursus
ebbed as schoolmen found themselves living within a cosmos newly conceived as matter
in motion.8 Thomas’s elegant hierarchy of coincident causes flattened and so shattered on
the felt of billiards-table physics. So flared the sixteenth-century de auxiliis controversy
about how and if human and divine freedom could operate in the world.9 The ensuing
disagreement famously proved at once so heated and so intractable that only papal
5

Lonergan, Grace and Freedom, 3–20, 193–251.

6

See David Burrell, Towards a Jewish-Christian-Muslim Theology (Malden, MA: WileyBlackwell, 2011).
7

“Not only is the new development accepted by some and rejected by others—there is the
formation of schools—but the new schools then tend to splinter, to have periods of decay and revival. What
is happening in a period of decay within a school? The words of the master are faithfully repeated, but the
meaning has been devaluated and contracted to fit into a narrower horizon, a lower stage of development.”
Bernard Lonergan, Topics in Education: The Cincinnati Lectures of 1959 on the Philosophy of Education,
eds. Frederick E. Crowe and Robert M. Doran, CWL 10 (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1993), 95–
6.
8

For an account of the place astrology held in the period between the medieval hierarchical
cosmos and the infinitely “horizontal” universe of modernity, see Louis K. Dupré, Passage to Modernity:
An Essay in the Hermeneutics of Nature and Culture (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1993), 50–
64.
9

For a recent history of the de auxiliis controversy, see R. J. Matava, Divine Causality and Human
Free Choice: Domingo Báñez, Physical Premotion and the Controversy de Auxiliis Revisited (Boston, MA:
Brill Academic, 2016).
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intervention drew it to a close in 1598. The answers to such questions must be left to
historians, but I find it hard to resist the suspicion that, absent an appreciation for the
theorem of the supernatural applied in its full breadth, Molina and Báñez were left to
construct ad hoc solutions to ever-multiplying conceptual problems until ultimately the
enterprise seized altogether.10 To resolve such a debate is not to pick a winner, but to
question its very terms. Indeed, the failure to question the terms of the problem has
rendered it intractable even still.
In retrospect, those engaged in the de auxiliis controversy were led from the
medieval problem of merit to broader cosmological problems by proto-modern concerns.
The challenge posed to sixteenth-century physics by Thomas’s thirteenth-century
metaphysics presaged a wider fissure to form between the medieval speculative mentality
and modern ideals of scientific knowledge.11 The medieval problem of grace found itself
squarely in this modern horizon with the Surnaturel controversy of the 1940s. In a France
divided between (among other parties) secular Republicanism, old-guard Catholic
monarchism, and the emergence of a scattered-but-lively Social Catholicism, the
quandaries of nature and grace took on a renewed relevance for contemporary fights
about social and political authority in a pluralistic society.12 Whether it was Blondel
arguing with Pedro Descoqs about extrinsicism or Henri de Lubac with Reginald
Garrigou-Lagrange about a natural desire to see God, Catholic philosophers and
theologians argued about where and how God’s redemptive agency—and so authority—
10

See n. 7 above.

11

See Bernard Lonergan, “Dimensions of Meaning” in Collection, eds. Frederick E. Crowe and
Robert M Doran, CWL 4 (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1988), 232–45.
12

See Paul Misner, Social Catholicism in Europe: From the Onset of Industrialization to the First
World War (New York: Crossroad, 1991); Catholic Labor Movements in Europe: Social Thought and
Action, 1914-1965 (Washington, D.C.: The Catholic University of America Press, 2015).
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can be discerned in the world. It was (and remains) tempting to tear “natural” and
“supernatural” from their place in the discourse of speculative theology and, as though at
the edge of Solomon’s sword, to offer the former to the state and the latter to the Church.
Conversely, we might suppose drawing any distinction between nature and grace would
produce a death-dealing vivisection of an integral Christian doctrine (and, by extension,
politics). In the last century, magisterial authorities themselves vacillated with regard to
this alternative, at times condemning opponents of the Action Française and, at others,
condemning collusion with its founder, Charles Maurras.13 Analogously, the theological
controversy seemed to be resolved first in one direction by a none-too-subtle repudiation
of Surnaturel in the pages of Humani Generis, but then in the other by Gaudium et Spes
22 and the much-discussed (but little defined) “post-Vatican II consensus” in Roman
Catholic theological anthropology.14
Over the last 20 years or so, this controversy has reemerged primarily in the
anglophone context, first as an intra-Thomist argument and then spilling over into the
wider scene. Its basic theological and philosophical terms have not much changed since

13

See Peter Bernardi, Maurice Blondel, Social Catholicism, and the Action Française: The Clash
Over the Church’s Role in Society During the Modernist Era (Washington, D.C.: The Catholic University
of America Press, 2009).
14

Compare Humani Generis (“It is well known how highly the Church regards human reason, for
it falls to reason to demonstrate with certainty the existence of God, personal and one; to prove beyond
doubt from divine signs the very foundations of the Christian faith; to express properly the law which the
Creator has imprinted in the hearts of men; and finally to attain to some notion, indeed a very fruitful
notion, of mysteries” [Pius XII, Humani Generis, encyclical letter, August 12, 1950,
http://w2.vatican.va/content/pius-xii/en/encyclicals/documents/hf_p-xii_enc_12081950_humanigeneris.html, sec. 29]) with Gaudium et Spes 22 (“In reality it is only in the mystery of the Word made
flesh that the mystery of man truly becomes clear… For since Christ died for all, and since all men are in
fact called to one and the same destiny, which is divine, we must hold that the Holy Spirit offers to all the
possibility of being made partners, in a way known to God, in the paschal mystery” [Vatican Council II,
Gaudium et Spes, Pastoral Constitution of the Church in the Modern World, December 7, 1965,
http://www.vatican.va/archive/hist_councils/ii_vatican_council/documents/vatii_const_19651207_gaudium-et-spes_en.html, sec. 22]). See also William L Portier, "Twentieth-Century
Catholic Theology and the Triumph of Maurice Blondel." Communio vol. 38, no. 1 (Spring 2011): 103–37.

6
the 1940s, but the background concerns about modernity have matured. The internecine
divisions of Republican France seem quaint and parochial when compared to the
concerns about globalization, multiculturalism, decolonization, and pluralistic democracy
shaping early-twenty-first century Catholic theological anxieties. On both sides of the
contemporary debate over the supernatural, the metaphysical strategies of the 1940s
persist. Answers to a medieval speculative problem of the supernatural are expected to
more-or-less directly address the modern problem of discerning God’s work in a
pluralistic world. A cadre of neo-de Lubacians put forward the categories of “gift” and
philosophical paradox to liberate the supernatural from what they view as neo-scholastic
captivity and secular modernist complicity. While this can appear anti-metaphysical by
contrast with its neo-scholastic opponents, all of the neo-de Lubacians—John Milbank’s
post-modern elision being noted below—stake out a metaphysical position on the
problem of the supernatural.15 Indeed, Milbank is explicit that a mistaken theory of the
natural/supernatural relation can render political theology impossible per se.16
The neo-de Lubacians are opposed in this effort by a band of neo-neoscholastics—sometimes called “ressourcement Thomists” or “Thomists of the strict
observance”— who resolve the problem of the supernatural by rehabilitating the concept
of ‘pure nature.’ At their vanguard is Steven A. Long who, although sympathetic to De
Lubac’s concern about pervasive secularization, thinks the rejection, let alone the

15

See John Milbank’s argument that de Lubac’s account consists in a “non-ontology” that is
“articulated between the discourses of philosophy and theology, fracturing their respective autonomies, but
tying them loosely and yet firmly together.” John Milbank, The Suspended Middle: Henri de Lubac and the
Renewed Split in Modern Catholic Theology, 2nd ed. (Grand Rapids, MI: Wm. B. Eerdmans, 2014), 4–5.
16

John Milbank, Theology and Social Theory, 2nd ed. (Malden, MA: Blackwell, 2006), 206–9.
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marginalization of natura pura was precisely the wrong approach.17 Long argues that
recognizing pure nature and its proportionate end reveals philosophically (and so, he
implies, publically) the “theonomic” character of our nature and all creation with it.
Metaphysical anthropology set against the backdrop of an explicitly Thomist ontological
hierarchy provides the basic position, known with natural certitude, from which God’s
legislative intentions can be discerned and—because it is a matter of philosophy and not
sacred theology—then thematized in law. Long insists that this does not prevent it from
serving a kind of apologetic purpose in an ostensibly pluralistic society. Still, the only
viable pluralism Long admits is that among Thomist natural law theists and Roman
Catholics obedient to the Magisterium on all matters of faith and morals.
An assumption undergirds this debate and it is shared by both the neo-de
Lubacians and the neo-neo-scholastics. Nearly every player in the contemporary
anglophone controversy over the supernatural sets out constructing, retrieving, or
elucidating a metaphysics of the natural/supernatural relation, usually in a medieval or
Renaissance mode, and very often implying (but only occasionally spelling out) the
adequacy of these metaphysical positions to addressing modern concerns like secularism,
atheism, individualism, etc. Nearly all parties on all sides of this debate assume a basic
reducibility of Christianity’s neuralgic problems with modernity to whether or not the
correct position on the metaphysical relation of nature to grace or of human nature to its
end prevails in Christian theology. We will explore some of the forms this assumption
takes below. We will find evidence that there are in fact two problems of the supernatural
at work in the contemporary debate: a medieval problem and a modern one. It will suffice
17

Steven A. Long, Natura Pura: On the Recovery of Nature in the Doctrine of Grace (New York,
NY: Fordham University Press, 2010).
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for now to see that there are two problems. In Chapter 4, I will present a largely
metaphysical argument for why the modern problem is irreducible to and so irresolvable
by metaphysical solutions.
For now, let us set about discerning a) that the contemporary debate is in fact
intractable and b) that there are in fact two distinct problems at play in the twentieth- and
twenty-first-century controversies over the supernatural.
2. The De Facto Intractable Contemporary Controversy
The recent Anglophone literature on the controversy over the supernatural is a
shimmering, swirling vortex of vortices, sounding with the clattering and reclattering of
Patristic, Thomistic, Renaissance, twentieth- and twenty-first-century theological and
philosophical material. Article after article, book after book has tried to capitulate and
recapitulate, again and again, Thomas’s philosophical and theological achievements, the
various clarifications and obfuscations, retrievals and misrememberings of the
Renaissance commentarial tradition, early-twentieth-century transformations and
reactions in theological method, the myriad appraisals of their post-Conciliar
consequences (regarding which, for every 3 theologians, there are 5 opinions), and the
fractal perspectives of each figure trying to at once offer his or her (but usually his) subtle
refinement of any or all of the aforementioned, while at the same time defending his
(usually his) pet figure from the attacks of the others. There are, in this cloud of
witnesses, some truly masterful works. Still, in surveying 20 years of scholarly writing on
the topic, I cannot find a single work that masters the debate itself. If it can be mastered
at all, I know for sure that I cannot do so here or, I confess, probably at all. This is just as

9
well. As becomes more or less immediately evident in surveying the controversy, the
scholarly community does not need one more rehearsal of the debate. They are ample.18
In what follows, I will briefly sketch the unfolding of the controversy in the recent
anglophone literature, explore both the evidence for the intractability of the contemporary
anglophone controversy over the supernatural, and then turn to the evidence that there are
two problems at play therein, not just one. We will return to my stronger claim that the
modern problem is irreducible to the medieval one in Chapter 4.
2.1. The Recent Anglophone Controversy Over the Supernatural
At the turn of the twenty-first century, the question of the supernatural was mostly
a matter of intra-Thomist debate. In a 2000 article in The Thomist, Steven A. Long
engaged dialectically with the work of Denis Bradley on the various loci of the debate:
the notion of obediential potency, the reality of a purely natural end for human beings,
the natural desire to see God, whether this latter is in vain, whether it is specifically in
vain apart from grace, and how Christ reveals the profundity of our nature and its ends to
us.19 These are treated primarily as exegetical, hermeneutical, and logical matters internal
to Thomas’s writings. In 2004, Sapientia Press published the first edition of Lawrence
Feingold’s The Natural Desire to See God According to St. Thomas Aquinas and His
Interpreters, which offers a compendious survey of the commentarial tradition on the

18

For an in-depth review of the contemporary controversy, see Christopher Smith, "Surnaturel
Revisited: Henri De Lubac’s Theology of the Supernatural in Contemporary Theology,” PhD dissertation
(Pamplona: Universidad de Navarra, 2013). For a more brief, but still excellent review, see Edward T.
Oakes, "The Surnaturel Controversy: A Survey and a Response." Nova et Vetera (English Edition) vol. 9,
no. 3 (Summer 2011): 625–56.
19

Steven A. Long, "On the Possibility of a Purely Natural End for Man," The Thomist vol. 64, no.
1 (2000): 211–37.
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question, as well as dialectical engagement with Henri de Lubac and the Nouvelle
théologie.20
There is, at the same time, a parallel discussion about the reception and
interpretation of Henri de Lubac among Anglo-Catholics. In the 1990’s, John Milbank’s
Theology and Social Theory bracketed what he considered reactionary “integralism” to
focus on the theological conditions of possibility for a genuine Christian socialism. He
sought to adjudicate between ostensibly-Rahnerian Liberation Theologies and the
promise of a semi-Blondelian/de Lubacian/Balthasarian post-liberal political theology.21
A decade later, Milbank evidently felt compelled to address a wider range of Christian
ontologies and with them a wider array of political theologies, sketching out his
radicalized neo-de Lubacian position in the “suspended middle” between them. Thus,
John Milbank’s The Suspended Middle appears in 2005, revisiting his approach to the
question of the supernatural in Theology and Social Theory. Milbank takes up Henri de
Lubac’s Surnaturel (and its reworked thesis in The Mystery of the Supernatural) to
advance his postmodern troubling not only of the natural/supernatural distinction, but
also of fundamental ontology per se.22
Milbank was not the only Anglo-Catholic theologian turning to de Lubac in the
early 2000s on matters of church, politics, and church politics. Hans Boersma in 2007
published "Sacramental Ontology: Nature and the Supernatural in the Ecclesiology of

20

Lawrence Feingold, The Natural Desire to See God According to St. Thomas Aquinas and His
Interpreters, 1st ed. (Naples, FL: Sapientia Press, 2004).
21
22

John Milbank, Theology and Social Theory, 206–56.

John Milbank, The Suspended Middle: Henri De Lubac and the Debate Concerning the
Supernatural, 1st ed. (Grand Rapids, MI: William B. Eerdmans, 2005).
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Henri de Lubac," in New Blackfriars, noting the political context and questions of de
Lubac’s work, but also avoiding dialectical discourse with de Lubac’s Thomist critics.23
Although Guy Mansini presciently brought the neo-neo-scholastic and neo-de
Lubacian approaches into conversation with his 2002 Gregorianum article, it was a 2007
issue of Nova et Vetera devoted to Lawrence Feingold’s book that touched the match to
the fuel of the contemporary controversy.24 Steven A. Long and Reinhard Hütter’s
contributions anchored the book symposium, both taking a stand on Feingold’s
considerable research to intervene in the debate. Long took on de Lubac’s interpretation
of Thomas and Hütter in turn criticized Milbank’s radicalization of de Lubac.25 Long and
Hütter would remain at the core of the neo-neo-scholastic response to the “de Lubac-ian
consensus.” Their arguments from this symposium would reappear (in whole or in part)
as chapters in their own books addressing (in whole or in part) the controversy over the
supernatural in the twenty-first century.26
The conversation spilled over into Communio and Theological Studies in 2008.
Nicholas Healy’s article in Communio tried to resituate the discussion of de Lubac’s
work in a more properly theological context than the usual framing in formal ontology.27

23

Hans Boersma, "Sacramental Ontology: Nature and the Supernatural in the Ecclesiology of
Henri De Lubac," New Blackfriars vol. 88, no. 1015 (2007): 242–73.
24

Guy Mansini, "Henri De Lubac, the Natural Desire to See God, and Pure Nature."
Gregorianum vol. 83, no. 1 (2002): 89–109.
25
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Raymond Moloney sought to bring Lonergan’s interventions to bear on the renewed
debate in the pages of Theological Studies, perhaps with an eye to correcting Mansini’s
rather narrow comparison with Feingold in Nova et Vetera.28 Hütter and Mansini, in turn,
would take up complementary questions in the pages of the The Thomist, the former
giving a detailed exegesis of Thomas’s method and conclusions regarding the desire for
God in the Summa Contra Gentiles (with a particular eye to isolating the properly
philosophical elements of Thomas’s position) and the latter underlining the ongoing
significance of de Lubac’s theology for good or ill in Roman Catholic thought.29
In 2010’s Natura Pura, Steven A. Long did for Feingold what Milbank had
previously done for de Lubac: briefly and polemically radicalize the basic outlook
embedded in the accumulation of theological data.30 The first chapter offers a lightly
edited version of his Nova et Vetera defense of natura pura. Then Long widened his
scope to criticize Hans Urs von Balthasar’s treatment and criticism of natura pura. Long
also considers the moral and political theological proposals of three fellow Roman
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Catholic thinkers in light of his thesis about the centrality of natura pura. Against
Jacques Maritain, Long argues that a practical consensus cannot be made with those who
reject the “theonomic” character of reality both undergirded and made manifest by the
philosophical discernment of natura pura in “precision from grace.” Against Jean Porter,
he argues for the perennial nature of this theonomicity’s content, such that any effort to
historicize moral reasoning as a capacity must run aground on its stubborn teleological
structure and so, again, its determinate content. Long finds that David Schindler Sr.
“underemphasizes the realization that the core and architectonic elements in
sociopolitical, legal, and cultural life, when they have been healthy in the West and
particularly in North America, have comprised a strong subset of the theoretic inheritance
of Christendom (the praembula fidea and the truths of the natural law).”31 In the words of
D. Stephen Long, for Steven A. Long, “The Catholic doctrine of pure nature fulfills
Protestantism and America.”32 Long’s argument, that natura pura funds a) the thick
conception of the natural law required for the moral life and b) a return to the
confessional state required for justice to flourish, presents with admirable clarity the
moral, social, and political theological questions that are always waiting in the wings of
the debate about the supernatural.
While Long tried to drag the controversy closer to the center of Thomist
philosophy, others aimed to widen the idiom of the debate. Conor Cunningham satirized
the hypothetical logic of natura pura in the pages of Communio, indicating a world alien
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to Christian doctrine.33 Kathryn Tanner recalled the biblical link between human nature
and the imago Dei to suggest that we recognize the relevant analogue for the divine in our
unlimited plasticity. She argued that this malleable historicity is a kind of ontological
poverty that accords better with the gratuity of both creation and grace.34 Servais Pinkaers
brought in a phenomenology of friendship to modulate the account of desire implied in a
“natural desire to see God.”35 Edward T. Oakes made a valiant play to transpose the
debate into the existential key of Balthasarian theo-dramatics, speaking of an overlooked
“natural hostility to God.”36 Sean Larsen’s article in Modern Theology was perhaps the
most impressive foray, going to great lengths to enter into the mentality of both Milbank
and Hütter, then measuring them both against the challenge posed by Walter Mignolo’s
de-colonial re-narration of modernity.37 Even Larsen, who made the most responsible
report on these two major figures in the debate and also the most radical challenge from
beyond the controversy’s usual bounds, ultimately sides with Hütter on metaphysical and
epistemic grounds and only gestures in conclusion to the idea that perhaps de Lubac’s
central point was never really metaphysical after all.38
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Still, others have been content to continue hashing out the problem in strictly
Thomist terms. Bernard Mulcahy’s book, Aquinas's Notion of Pure Nature and the
Christian Integralism of Henri de Lubac, took an unapologetically Thomist line, although
it ultimately did not make much of an impression on the debate, save a review alongside
Long’s Natura Pura in Nova et Vetera.39 Thomas Joseph White entered the fray in 2010
as well, engaging admirably with the problem of historicity and historicism, though still
offering a basically Aristotelian response to Foucault and Nietzsche: nature is the
intelligibility of substance, and so is required to even recognize historical transformation
as change per se.40 As mentioned above, Hütter’s Dustbound for Heaven returned to the
topic after three chapters on Thomist political theology. However, as we will see below,
the tendency remains, even among those who venture beyond merely exegetical
questions, to settle the challenges of history, morality, society, and polity in exclusively
metaphysical terms.41 Of late, the parties have retreated to their corners. Articles by
Thomists are increasingly exegetical and historical.42 An interesting issue of Nova et
Vetera considered the legacy of Matthias Scheeben through the lens of the nature and
grace debate. Unfortunately, many of the speculative avenues suggested by Scheeben’s
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work are, as of now, still waiting to be taken up.43 On the other side of the debate, David
Grummett’s 2015 article carried de Lubac’s thesis toward Augustinian doctrinal
questions and away from metaphysical or political questions, and so also away from the
conflict with interpreters of Thomas.44 The debate, though hardly settled, seems in
remission.
2.2. De Facto Intractability
The narrative above, insofar as it begins with and returns to scholarly siloes,
implies that the contemporary debate over the supernatural is intractable. One obvious
strategy for demonstrating (rather than merely implying) its intractability would involve
showing how the controversy is conceptually or logically intractable. In other words, I
could present first an analytic of the arguments on offer, then some synthesis of the
opposed positions with due caveats for where this ideal type breaks with the data set, and
a line of inference indicating why the positions as stated and so opposed cannot be
brought to some final, adjudicated position. In other words, I could labor to show that the
contemporary controversy over the supernatural is per se intractable. This approach poses
several serious problems. First, I am not certain that this conclusion follows from the
facts, though neither am I certain that it does not. Second, it would require a Herculean
(and, if it proved correct, Sisyphean) scholarly task that would occupy the entire length of
this study, preventing me from turning to both an interpretive and constructive reframing
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of the problem. Third and finally, to be preoccupied with the problem as it stands, even to
show that the problem is per se intractable, would cover over what, in my view, is the
problem with the problem of the supernatural: it consists in two problems and not just
one. We need to face up to this problem with the problem in order to move the whole
issue forward, rather than merely explaining why it is not moving.
Instead, I will show that the controversy is de facto intractable.45 Whether or not
the debate can move forward on the present terms, in fact it has not. To this end, I
compare the present debate to the debates of the 1940s and especially those debates as
they approached their near-term cessation in the promulgation of Humani Generis. Aidan
Nichols’s excellent short history of the tête-à-tête between the Jesuits of Lyon and the
Dominicans of Toulouse from 1946 to 1949 will serve as a representative sample of our
debate’s prior instantiation.46 This may not seem like the most relevant excerpt, when
compared to the more famous (and arguably more pertinent) conflagration between Henri
de Lubac and Reginald Garrigou-Lagrange subsequent to the publication of Surnaturel in
the summer of 1946 or even the prior debates over the notion of Christian philosophy in
the 1930s.47 However, the vignette selected by Nichols serves better here. It is less
narrowly preoccupied with the specific metaphysical quandary of the natural desire to see
God, enveloping the wider and equally integral questions of theological method, its
relationship to philosophy, and the merits of engaging with modern movements in
thought. This more capacious subject matter allows a wider range of correlations to be
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drawn with the contemporary debate, my main purpose in this section. We will find the
major players in the debate of the 1940s like Garrigou-Lagrange, Marie-Michel
Labourdette, Jean Daniélou, and Henri de Lubac making theological, philosophical, and
methodological moves that presage the approaches taken by the likes of Steven A. Long,
Reinhard Hütter, Servais Pinkaers, and John Milbank. My intention in drawing these
parallels is to suggest that the contemporary debate is not so much advancing its midcentury predecessor as reenacting it. This should serve as warrant for judging that the
debate is de facto intractable as it stands, resting on terms that hew so closely to those of
the 1940s.
Nichols begins his history of the conflict at the 1946 publication of Labourdette’s
essay, “La théologie et ses sources” in the Revue Thomiste. Labourdette takes aim at the
Source Chrétiennes (edited by Daniélou and de Lubac) and Théologie monograph series,
and so by extension at the Jesuits of Lyon from whom the series issue. Labourdette
expresses “grave reservations” about both series and calls for a debate as to the “nature
and task of Catholic theology.”48 He found them both, in Nichols’s words, “animated by
a spirit of disapprobation of, and even contempt for, the Scholastic and especially the
Thomist achievement, and worse still by a depreciation of intelligence in its search for
abiding truth.”49 The previous year and with reference to the wider Continental culture,
Charles Journet wrote to Jacques Maritain, “In this disintegration of the world, if you try
to stay faithful to St. Thomas, they think you’re mad.”50 This shift away from the
centrality of Thomism (and Thomists) to the intellectual life of France was read by the
48
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Thomists concerned as, in Maritain’s phrasing, “anti-intellectualism.” It took on this cast
especially insofar as, in their view, it “put between brackets the conceptual formulation of
maybe even the revelation but certainly the theology and philosophy we have received
from the Middle Ages(.)”51
The echoes of this sentiment return, in our day, most strongly and most clearly
from the work of Steven A. Long. In addition to a persistent tendency to quote from St.
Thomas as though that alone settles matters both of philosophy and theology, Long quite
explicitly holds up the Thomist commentarial tradition as the achievement of true
metaphysical knowledge in both the natural and the supernatural orders. Deviation from
this tradition of Thomist thought “constitutes a veritable Rosetta stone in deciphering the
intelligible causes and narrative of post-modern, pluralist theological fragmentation(.)”52
He claims that the very thing de Lubac aimed to accomplish in opposing secularist
materialism and individualism “truly is achieved… in the doctrine of St. Thomas Aquinas
and of the Thomistic commentatorial tradition that de Lubac misapprehended.”53 But
Long is not alone here. Thomas Joseph White has on more than one occasion taken up
the Dominican mantle in this debate to insist that Thomas (and through him, Aristotle) is
up to the task of providing not just a contemporary, but indeed a perennial philosophy for
the Church.54 Reinhard Hütter noted relatively early on that Lawrence Feingold’s
compendious The Natural Desire to See God According to St. Thomas Aquinas and His
Interpreters has perhaps proved so provocative to John Milbank and others because it
51
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proceeds in precision from both modern secular thought and more recent, culturally
dialogical forms of Thomism.55 Hütter does not shy away either from indicating that this
provocation is compounded by “operating in a mode of discourse very unfamiliar to
theological readers by now largely unaccustomed to the conceptual precision and rigor
once cultivated by the ‘schoolmen.’”56 Malloy echoes this accusation against modern
Catholic theology.57 In any case, we can see that there is a tendency still among the neoneo-scholastics to repeat the neo-scholastic linkage of anti- or a-scholasticism with antiintellectualism and scholarly decadence.
But anti-intellectualism or decadent intellectualism was not the only thing, in
Labourdette’s estimation, that ailed the series emerging from Lyons in the 1930s and 40s.
He also cites concerns about an historical and experiential relativism manifest in the
Nouvelle works. As to the former, Nichols notes a tendency to treat truth as only true for
a particular place and time. He cites Henri Bouillard, who “notoriously, had written at the
conclusion of his study of St. Thomas’s theology of grace that a theology that fails to be
contemporary is to that extent false(.)”58 Labourdette was concerned that "a subjectivism
of ‘inner experience’ or ‘spirituality’ could undermine the objective value of the truths of
faith.”59 Long and White again most overtly echo this concern about relativism. Long
takes a much harder line, voicing repeatedly his concern that a “dense” notion of nature
has succumbed to what he vaguely refers to as “Hegelian dialectic” and so been
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evacuated of meaning.60 White takes the more balanced (and, indeed, more metaphysical)
view that in order for there to be any kind of intelligible historical process, there must be
(pace Nietzsche and Foucault) some identifiable, universal, and stable human nature to
undergo the changes proper thereto. This is a philosophical corollary to his theological
contention that “pure nature” is needed in order to anchor the medieval theorem of the
states of human nature (what he calls “states of grace”).61 Still for both Long and White
and for those of their school, there is an unwillingness “to follow the representatives of
these alien philosophers onto their own home ground,” and a sense that those who play,
in Journet’s words, “on a conceptual keyboard borrowed from Hegel and Existentialism”
are allowing obviously mistaken methods to derail their theologies.62
Though Labourdette named a number of figures in what would come to be known
as the Nouvelle théologie (including Boullard, Balthasar, Fessard, de Lubac, and de
Chardin), it was Daniélou’s essay, “Les orientationes présentes de la pensée religieuse”
in Études that he took as the “key” to the movement and its pernicious, if subterranean
agenda. Daniélou, in Nichols’s appraisal, does make a strong argument that neither
scholasticism, nor even ressourcement are adequate “by themselves (to) guarantee the
renewal of Catholic thought” demanded in the post-war world. Neo-Thomism, Daniélou
thought, could serve as a barrier (un garde-fau) against Marxism, existentialism, and
other modern philosophies antithetical to Catholic faith. But he thought one must reply
and to reply requires dialogue and dialogue requires some engagement.63 For this task,
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Daniélou thought scholasticism obsolete. Rather, he proposes a phenomenological
approach to “religious realities in their concrete form.”64
Kathryn Tanner’s essay, “Grace without Nature,” is perhaps the contemporary
contribution to the natural/supernatural debate that resonates most radically with
Daniélou’s vision. She argues that, because the deepest meaning of humanity is (as per
Genesis 1) to bear the image of God, an infinite openness and “plasticity” of human
beings is our most salient feature.65 Moreover, this feature is salient not because it is our
own, but because it is God’s. In whatever state we find ourselves as humans, it cannot be
made sense of by distinguishing that which is specifically natural or supernatural to us,
but rather always in terms of a radical gift that we receive in our unlimited plasticity. She
argues that once this fact, in deep agreement with both Patristic and contemporary
thought, is established, Daniélou’s phenomenological approach (coupled, of course, with
a doctrinal ressourcement) would seem the only appropriate method for investigating that
which is human. The truest metaphysical word that can be said about human life at any
moment is that it is, in its relation to God as origin or as end, pure gift. Beyond that, you
would have to go investigate what state we find ourselves in according to the temporal
unfolding of our gifted openness. Theological investigation would be no different in this
respect. Theology must stay close, her theology without nature implies, to our plastic
concreteness.
John Milbank’s approach does not excise nature so cleanly as Tanner’s, content
instead to trouble the notion of nature in a post-structuralist way. In Theology and Social
Theory, Milbank fights running skirmishes against post-modern social philosophies on
64
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their own ground, aiming to show that this ground was always already Christian. At the
risk of overextending the metaphor, Milbank’s strategem requires one trust that the
excision of the theological from modern and post-modern thought made of those thinkers
poor cartographers, such that they fundamentally mistake the character of these regions
of life and politics they have all-too-recently colonized. Thus, Milbank very much wants
Christian theology to engage with material and existential matters and perhaps even
according to modern and post-modern methods, but always according to a kind of
Renaissance Augustinian theological program. Thus, when reflecting in a radical (and
revisionist) way about the legacy of Henri de Lubac’s Surnaturel in The Suspended
Middle, Milbank asks us to take up a radical de Lubacian “(non)ontology” which sees the
microcosm of human culture as itself participating in a groundless economy of reception
and return of “gift”.66 Precisely how culture should appropriately receive and return this
(non)ontological gift, in both TST and The Suspended Middle, is a matter of concrete,
practical, and especially aesthetic judgment (informed by devotion to the tradere of
Christian practice).
Returning to Nichols, de Lubac had no intention of responding to Labourdette’s
suspicious accusations and call for debate, but the disagreement spilled beyond the
borders of France. An ambiguous reference to the “new theology” appeared on the lips of
Pius XII in de Lubac’s hearing. Apparently, in the preceding months, Reginald GarrigouLagrange briefed the pontiff on Labourdette’s forthcoming article in consorious terms.67
In July of 1946, Garrigou-Lagrange had written to Labourdette that the opinion in Rome
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was that the works issuing from Lyons “are a return to Modernism.”68 Thus, the
continental politics of the Church put pressure on leadership in the Society of Jesus to
produce a response. De Lubac would be its main author.69 Published in the French Jesuit
journal Recherches de science religieuse, the reply was occasionally polemical (“If the
evil days of Modernism are now, thank God, far from us, the evil days of integralism may
be coming back”), but in the main it sought to reverse the charges of historicism and
relativism. Scholasticism was to be held in reproach, on Nichols’s recounting, for its
historical insensitivity. The accusation of “anti-intellectualism” could, according to the
Jesuit response, only be maintained from the perspective of a perverse intellectualism.70
This angle of response could well appear in Theological Studies, Modern
Theology, Communio, or even occasionally as a minority report in the pages of Nova et
Vetera today. Most recently, David Grumett defended de Lubac in the pages of Modern
Theology against both neo-neo-scholastic and overly politicized or culturally theorized
interpretations by insisting on the deeply Augustinian character of his theological
position.71 David Burrell’s review of Thomas Joseph White’s Wisdom in the Face of
Modernity called into question White’s confidence in the preambulae fidae as pure
philosophy.72 Servais Pinkaers argued that an exclusively metaphysical treatment of the
68
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natural desire for God overlooks the existential data on our desire for friendship with God
and so misses the point.73 Conor Cunningham makes an absurdity out of hypothesizing
about natura pura as a speculative intellectual exercise, insisting that the world
hypothesized cannot be squared with the vision of creation set down by the Church
Fathers.74 Hans Boersma presents de Lubac’s ontology as inseparably tied up with his
ecclesiology.75 These are but a sample of the ways in which the Jesuit response to the
Dominican accusations of 1946 have been from various angles repeated in the past two
decades. The neo-De Lubacians and their allies continue to argue that there is some
historical (in the widest sense) element to the question of the natural and the supernatural
that cannot be settled at the level of metaphysical reduction to principles. To settle for
metaphysical reduction and thereby think one has said everything that needs to be said on
the matter (or, at least, that what remains is a small matter of prudentially mopping up
accidental particularities) leaves out something essential and, moreover, essentially
Christian.
In 1947, the controversy only became hotter and more widely adverted to. In the
Swiss journal Liberté de Fribourg, the Polish Dominican Innozent Bochenzky “spoke of
the new theology as a radical evolutionism and irrationalism which would warm up the
tired remains of Modernism.” Garrigou-Lagrange’s famous article, “La nouvelle
théologie, ou va-t-elle?” appeared in the pages of Angelicum. At this, Labourdette’s more
hardline superior forced a further salvo, although this was in lieu of publishing Garrigou-
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Lagrange’s article in the Revue Thomiste and thereby inviting “a Roman intervention.”76
Nichols summarizes their response as follows:
They maintained that the metaphysics of St. Thomas is, quite simply, true, not just
as an hypothesis or as the expression of a mentality but objectively and by the
nature of things. Moreover, they claimed of Thomism that it was not only a
theology of nature and essence but also a theology of event and therefore in a real
sense a theology of history; they accepted that theology is not revelation, and
however perfect it may be leaves open spaces that premature appeal to the
magisterium ought not to foreclose; they state nonetheless that they cannot be
regarded as mere partisans, for Thomism is not a party but the philosophy and
theology of the Church herself—even if what is most profoundly at stake in the
present quarrel is not the rights of the doctrine of St. Thomas so much as those of
theology itself when considered as a veridical science of God and his relations
with the world.77
If this identification of scholastic method with theology per se proved the final battle line
for the relatively moderate Dominicans like Labourdette and his superior Nicholas, then
there can be little surprise that hardliners like Bochenzky and Garrigou-Lagrange saw any
departure therefrom as necessarily a return to Modernist error. Within this Thomist
foundationalism, there was room to integrate new knowledge. But, in their view, “better
than anyone before him Thomas grasped the foundational truths of metaphysics and how
to build on them a synthesis which would be all the more hospitable to every truth
precisely because dependent on a true metaphysic.”78 Because the ideal of theological
science was settled in his synthesis, any departure in method could be at best a regression
to pre-scholastic approaches or, at worst, a poisonous collaboration with the perverse
mentalities of alien, indeed hostile parties.79 But all this controversy was making the
French episcopacy nervous, and so in 1947 “Labourdette wrote an irenic piece conceding
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the liberty of the various theological schools but not their parity,” which was faint praise
to the ears of the Jesuits and rather too conciliatory for his fellow Dominicans. Still, there
was not much more to be said. In 1950, Humani Generis seemed to settle the matter and
in the Dominican’s favor—at least for a while.80
It is worth noting how much the ecclesial situation was, in the main, inverted by
Vatican II and the apparent vindication of de Lubac in Gaudium et Spes 22. As we noted
above, neo-neo-scholastics will still appeal to a Thomist notion of scientia and its rigor to
defend their positions against more phenomenological, historiographic, and even
sociological approaches to Catholic theology. But for some time now, they have been at
pains to note how few in the wider Catholic theological audience are willing or (they
suspect) able to engage with this mode of theologizing. Whether this evaluation is
accurate or not, it is certainly the case that much of Catholic theology in the anglophone
context has moved away from thinking of their task as wissenschaft unburdened by the
significance of intellectual birthdates or addresses. Daniélou’s concern for a theology
attentive to the proximate exigencies of its time(s) and its place(s) has been well taken
since the council.
Nonetheless, it is not only Thomist neo-neo-scholastics, but also their neo-de
Lubacian interlocutors who continue to debate the problem of the supernatural in terms of
its various metaphysical loci. The effort of de Lubac to bring both historical and
phenomenological/existential methods to bear on the problem is only occasionally
appropriated by his proponents. Even in Sean Larsen’s excellent Modern Theology
article, when it comes to de Lubac’s thesis, he hardly does more than suggest that
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perhaps what de Lubac phrased in metaphysical terms was not meant in a properly
metaphysical register at all.81 Thus there remains a certain irony: although neo-neoscholastics sense that between Humani Generis and Gaudium et Spes they were pushed
up the theological stage and into the background, so now to hold the minority-position (as
White calls it), the debate has been ineluctably framed according to their native
theological idiom and method.82 It is with the restriction of the debate to this nexus of
medieval, metaphysical questions that we will be concerned in the next section.
3. The Problem(s) of the Supernatural
Along the way, I have indicated two elements at work in the controversy over the
supernatural. The predominating element is metaphysical, concerned with ends, natures,
powers, and orders. It proceeds according to an ancient ideal of science, one that proved
sufficiently powerful to fund the medieval synthesis of reflection on Christian doctrine
and philosophical speculation. This synthesis has an enduring relevance and each
generation of theologians in its wake faces the challenge of appropriating its
achievements and discerning its respective applications and limitations vis-à-vis
contemporary questions. But there has been another element at work in the twenty-firstcentury debate about the supernatural. This element is recognizably modern. It is not so
concerned to reduce effects to their principal causes as to make sense of the human
microcosm on its own terms. It asks about history, society, politics, freedom, and identity
as in via.83 If the ancient ideal of science aims at synchronic structure, this modern
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element terminates in a diachronic account of process. If the ancient ideal brackets the
accidental in favor of the essential, the contingent in favor of the necessary, and the
particular in favor of the universal, this modern element aims at complete explanation of
all the relevant data.84
Both of these elements have been at work in the contemporary controversy, but
only occasionally have they been adverted to in their distinction from one another. The
latter modern element is, when treated at all, usually considered either as an occasion for
asking the medieval metaphysical question or as the arena in which the implications of
the medieval element play out. The modern problem of the supernatural, in other words,
is not recognized as a formal problem of its own. Below we will see that even when
thinkers address the modern element in a serious and sophisticated way, in every case
they revert back to basically medieval, metaphysical intellectual habits to answer the
questions that arise. We will have to wait until Chapter 4 to explore why this modern
element is formally irreducible to its medieval counterpart. For now, I will restrict myself
to presenting the evidence that there are, in fact, two problems at play.
3.1. Medieval and Modern Elements in the Controversy
Early in the contemporary debate, Boersma noted how de Lubac’s theology of
grace followed Blondel in opposing a theological extrinsicism that, by its regional
separation of nature and grace, set the stage for a philosophical immanentism. Boersma
was not alone in noting how this rather academic point served de Lubac’s opposition to
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secularization and an ecclesiology of domination.85 Of course, contemporary
secularization takes a slightly different shape than the forms de Lubac faced. The
secularization de Lubac opposed took a different shape even than that opposed by
Blondel. Blondel found himself between the anti-clerical liberalism of the French
Republic and the positivist Monarchism of the Action Française.86 De Lubac faced the
march (both literal and figurative) of fascism and Marxism in Europe.87 But in each of
these, we find a question about authority. Whether as an appeal to religion as
otherworldly myth in Vichy fascism and its monarchist progenitor or as the material
dialectic of class conflict in Marxism, Blondel’s and de Lubac’s centering of the
supernatural aimed to undermine justifications of absolute and all-too-worldly power.
The neo-neo-scholastics share this antipathy to encroaching secularization,
although—in Steven A. Long’s case especially—it is not clear how they would evaluate
the case of Action Française or its place in the genealogy of Continental authoritarianism.
Long praises de Lubac for the seriousness with which he takes the problem of atheistic
politics, even if he would offer a radically different prescription to treat it.88 In case we
might be tempted to think that this concern for forms of secularization in matters of
politics was a quirk of de Lubac’s intellectual biography or an inheritance from Blondel,
it also appears in those efforts to retrieve Scheeben on the question. Oakes quotes the
following from Scheeben’s Nature and Grace:
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[T]he crisis [of secularism] has not yet been completely settled, and it will not be
settled until the supernatural order is frankly, adequately, and radically
distinguished from the natural order. . . . Whenever these truths are not assigned
their own exclusive sphere and are intermingled with truths of the natural order,
they are necessarily confused with the latter, and therefore not only lose their
organic union with truths of their own kind but suffer a dimming of their own
light.89
Of course, we see here Scheeben distinguishing nature from the supernatural in order to
unite them, rather than uniting them in order to distinguish them a’la de Lubac.
Whichever direction one travels between the ideas, it seems a theological concern with
secularism carries along a concern with the nature/grace relation and, perhaps, vice versa.
Indeed, chapters 5, 6, and 7 of Mulcahy’s book are organized around different versions of
this correlation in de Lubac, de Regnon, and Milbank.90
It is suspicious, however, that often these concerns about secularization, politics,
and, ultimately, the process of history are named, only to be abandoned. Boersma raised
de Lubac’s sense that the ontological, ecclesiological, and political questions are integral
in his New Blackfriars article, but ultimately only treated the first two, at most gesturing
towards the political question.91 David Braine, in his 2008 Nova et Vetera article, framed
the question in terms of original sin and the logical problems relating our two-fold end,
but eventually turned to the modern, existential analysis of angst and alienation
considered as “empirical phenomena.”92 However, he responded to this existential,
empirical, modern topic entirely in terms of metaphysics. When he gestured to ontology’s
implications for questions of political authority, Braine again considered only
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metaphysical responses and, in the end, punts on them as beyond the scope of his
inquiry.93 Nicholas Healy’s 2008 Communio article relegates the entire topic to a
footnote.94 Raymond Maloney noted the connection for de Lubac between his ontological
project and his opposition to secularization, Nazism, and Marxism, but never returned to
it after his detailed treatment of Lonergan’s approach to the ontological question.95
Mansini explicitly avoids the political question by reducing it to a theological matter of
metaphysical anthropology in his 2009 article in The Thomist.96 I have already mentioned
the way in which White responded to the challenge posed by Foucaultian historicism
with an Aristotelian appeal to intelligible substance.97 In his 2012 article in American
Catholic Philosophical Quarterly, Christopher M. Cullen mentioned that the foremost
implication of de Lubac’s thesis is for philosophical ethics, and continues to note a
number of salient points about the relationship between ontology and the historical
import of human autonomy, but does not return to address the questions for moral
philosophy he raised initially.98
There are certainly works in the contemporary debate that make no mention of
those elements of the problem of the supernatural that call out for a modern, diachronic
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mode of response.99 This is unobjectionable, as far as it goes, although one might be
concerned that the full breadth of contemporary questions are being held in abeyance.
Still, there are also several thinkers who have, in the course of the controversy, faced
these questions of existential, historical, and political concern directly. We have already
made note of many of them. Milbank devoted an entire chapter to the ontology of natural
and supernatural in Theology and Social Theory with an eye to discerning the theological
conditions of possibility for a political theology that was not simply subordinated to
social theory.100 He returned to this question in The Suspended Middle, making a
sustained attack on the idea that philosophy could maintain autonomy over the political
or that (political) theology could simply be a naïve reading of grace at work in the world.
But Milbank’s answer at every turn, to every difficulty, is to insist again and again on the
delicate maintenance of the “(non-)ontology” he attributes to de Lubac’s Surnaturel. This
(non-)ontology holds the key, he thinks, to the historical and political reiteration of a
Christian culture.101 Thus, as in Theology and Social Theory, we see that for all of his
wide-ranging engagement with postmodern thought, the argument of The Suspended
Middle boils down to an apologia for how his politics are controlled by his ontology. An
answer to the medieval question always provides the answer to modern (and postmodern)
concerns.
Though their politics are diametrically opposed, one may detect an identical
strategy in Steven A. Long’s sustained discursus on the ontology of natura pura and the
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theocratic Catholic politics it undergirds. One of the weaknesses of Long’s argument in
the first chapter of Natura Pura is a tendency, despite his appeals to Thomas’s scientia,
to take Thomas’s locutions at face value, controlling very little for context or Aquinas’s
theoretical controls of meaning. Much of the argument boils down to, “Thomas says…”
However, the strategy in chapter four proves more compelling because Long fits the
“required hypothesis” of natura pura into a thick and well-wrought scheme for Catholic
moral and political philosophy. Indeed, so systematic is this vision that sans some
speculative account of natura pura (even if not precisely under that heading), a morally
or politically sound social order is portrayed as fundamentally impossible. But we notice
here too the basic methodical assumption of the whole debate: the synchronic structure of
ontology determines the shape of moral, social, and political philosophy and theology.
Answers to the medieval, metaphysical question about how to relate the natural and
supernatural orders more or less automatically answer diachronic modern questions by
implication and extension.
Sean Larsen’s 2013 Modern Theology article on Milbank and Hütter comes
perhaps the closest to both distinguishing the medieval and modern elements in the
debate over the supernatural and addressing them as irreducible to one another. Larsen
diagnoses in Milbank’s approach a Renaissance romanticism whereby the medieval
ontology of the natural and the supernatural is “expressed” in the on-going repetition of
aesthetically-discerned Christian practices. Rather than making logical criticisms of
Milbank’s (non-)ontology, Larsen brings the genealogical hammer of Walter Mignolo’s
post-colonial analysis down on Milbank’s nostalgia. Indeed, he directly accuses Milbank
of identifying the Church and the European Renaissance. Larsen shows how, via
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Mignolo, this identification has historically fit within a wider conflation of the Church
and civilization per se.102 Thus, Larsen convincingly indicates how Milbank’s post-liberal
resistance to totalizing secular reason can be deconstructed as also and at the same time a
paradigmatically colonial—and so modern—project of erasing Christianity’s “others.” In
this way, Larsen brings modern methods of analysis to bear on Milbank’s properly
modern concerns and resists the pervasive habit of reducing them to more “fundamental”
medieval, metaphysical structures.
Unfortunately, when Larsen turns to treat of Hütter’s neo-neo-scholastic account
of the intellect’s ordering to God, he frames his positive appraisal of its implied openness
to alterity exclusively in metaphysical, structural terms. From this vantage, it cannot be so
decisively settled whether, relative to Long’s thickly theocratic political philosophy,
Hütter’s implied openness is a matter of substantive differences or merely Hütter’s
reticence to spell out what his speculative account implies.103 Finally, I have already
made mention of the merely allusive suggestion with which Larsen concludes, namely
that de Lubac’s purpose was post-metaphysical in the first place. Consequently, the sole
approach to the controversy that distinguishes its medieval and modern elements and
approaches them with distinct and corresponding methods still only does so halfway and,
in the end, without being sustained.
3.2. Elements of the Medieval Problem
The astute reader may have noticed that, insofar as it focuses on the medieval
element, the contemporary anglophone controversy orbits around twin conceptual suns:
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gratuity and integrity. This can be seen most clearly in a pair of complementary
questions.
1) If grace is gratuitous, does it make a necessary difference?
2) If grace makes a necessary difference, is it gratuitous?
The neo-neo-scholastics respond that grace adds something of eternal importance and is
necessary for the attainment of that eternal something, but it does not make a
fundamental and necessary difference. If it did, then grace—so far from perfecting
nature—would destroy its integrity. The neo-de Lubacians, by contrast, respond that
grace makes a necessary difference. Theologies that deny this to preserve the integrity of
our nature overlook the gratuity of being-a-creature itself and so, despite their protests to
the contrary, violate the integrity of the unitary graced-creation that is God’s unmerited
gift. Now, it must be said that the neo-neo-scholastic answer implies that grace is not
entirely necessary, even if that for which it is necessary is of great consequence. Grace, in
other words, is not really necessary, but only ‘necessary for…’. The neo-de Lubacian
answer, however, seems to beg the question why, if gratuity is made the sole defining
characteristic of grace, creation and grace are different. “After all,” Lonergan asks, “what
is there that is not a free gift of God?”104
But both answers imply the same underlying question, albeit in different ways:
“How does God’s grace make a difference in human beings?” The neo-neo-scholastic
answer implies it insofar as we might wonder how grace can be necessary for something
like eternal life without being fundamentally necessary for our being. The neo-de
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Lubacian answer implies it insofar as we might wonder how grace is differentiated within
creation at all.
One can ask a more general form of this question: “How does God’s grace make a
difference in Creation as a whole?” This more general form of the question is important
and interesting, but it is not very much asked (if at all) in the contemporary anglophone
debate over the supernatural. Consequently, I am going to set it aside except to note that
its existence reveals that the form of the problem of the supernatural with which the
debate has been concerned is a specific form of what I have been calling the medieval
problem of the supernatural.
If God, by granting us grace, acts in a way that makes a difference both in human
beings and in creation as a whole, then there arises the question of God’s action in
general. But we know dogmatically that God acts in at least one other way, namely to
create creatures, and so it becomes clear that the medieval problem of grace (as pertains
to both the specific case of human beings and creation in general) is itself a specific
instance of a more general problem. Thus, in addition to the specific medieval problem of
the supernatural that pertains to grace, there is a generic medieval problem of the
supernatural that pertains to God’s ad extra agency in general.105
This generic medieval problem of the supernatural can further be expressed by a
general and specific question. The generic form of the generic medieval problem of the
supernatural asks, “How does God’s action make a difference in creation?” The specific
form of the generic medieval problem of the supernatural asks, “How does God’s action
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make a difference in human beings?” The answers to this generic medieval problem of
the supernatural are not at all irrelevant for the specific medieval problem of the
supernatural that pertains to grace. Insofar as grace is an element of God’s ad extra
agency, the determinations of God’s ad extra agency will pertain to it. Nor does this
reduce God’s grace to God’s general ad extra agency, for the determinations that pertain
to the latter will not preclude, nor be adequate to reveal that by which grace is
specifically differentiated within God’s ad extra agency as a whole.
Let us schematically recall the distinctions made thus far:
The Medieval Problem of the Supernatural
1) Specific Medieval Problem: “How does God’s grace make a difference…?”
A) Generic Form: “…in Creation?”
B) Specific Form: “…in Human Beings?”
2) Generic Medieval Problem: “How does God’s action make a difference…?”
A) Generic Form: “…in Creation?”
B) Specific Form: “…in Human Beings?”
Now, the existence of a question implies the possibility of an answer and the
existence of a problem implies the possibility of a solution. Extant specific forms of the
solution to the specific medieval problem (1.B.) will be the concern of chapter 2. In brief,
I am persuaded that it can be found in Thomas’s position in Summa theologiae, 1-2, q.
109, a. 2. As the generic form of the specific problem (1.A.) is not much at play for
parties in the contemporary anglophone controversy, I will not bother addressing it here.
Bernard Lonergan’s Grace and Freedom has convinced me as well that there exist in
Thomas’s corpus generic and specific forms of a solution to the generic medieval
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problem of the supernatural. In brief, the answer to the generic form of the generic
medieval problem (2.A) is Thomas’s theory of universal causal cooperation with God.
The answer, in turn, to the specific form of the generic medieval problem (2.B.) is
Thomas’s theory of free cooperation with God. Lonergan shows why both are integral to
Thomas’s position on the specific form of the specific medieval problem (1.B.) and I am
arguing that all of these together constitute a medieval solution to the medieval problem
overall, at least as it is raised in the contemporary debate. The elements of this wider
solution, however, are rather diffuse in Thomas’s corpus. In Chapter 2 we will see how
Lonergan gathered them together. I will present the position first analytically and then
synthetically.
3.3. Anticipating the Modern Problem
We do not yet possess the conceptuality we need to articulate the modern problem
and why it is irreducible to its medieval counterpart. Nonetheless, it may suffice to note
that the modern problem pertains to human freedom and its products. Moreover, it is a
problem that emerges only once one has a solution to the medieval problem because it
presupposes it. In other words, once one knows how God makes a difference in creation
generally and in human beings specifically, it follows one can ask exactly what that
difference is. But in chapter 2 we will see that in part the difference God makes is to
make creatures to be in general and human beings to be free in particular. From this
affirmation emerges the possibility of what I will call the medieval ambiguities. One
might characterize these ambiguities by noting that, if God causes beings to be and
human beings to be free, this effect need not necessarily be read as a “difference.” Or,
more precisely, we might say that the “difference” God makes by making creatures to be
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and human beings to be free is different from nothing. The whole argument cannot be
made yet, but affirming that this “difference” in fact makes a difference is a prephilosophical decision. But if one makes this affirmation, one also affirms that the
universe of being has a sufficient reason and that human freedom has a fundamental
meaning and purpose. That God makes human freedom to be means also that God makes
the products of human freedom to be. Moreover, God renders both intelligible. Within the
horizon established by this affirmation it is sensible to ask what concretely God is making
human freedom and its products to be. But, as we shall see, this is a hermeneutical
question: what do human freedom and its products mean?
All of this will occupy us in detail in chapter 4, but for now it will have to suffice
to sketch out as best we can the basic elements of the modern problem of the
supernatural. The modern problem of the supernatural is not a speculative problem, but a
hermeneutical one. Consequently, it does not ask ‘how?’ but ‘what?’ The modern
problem is not a synchronic metaphysical problem (for it presupposes a metaphysical
solution), but a diachronic historical problem. Consequently, instead of asking, “what
difference does God make…?” it asks, “what difference is God making…?” The modern
problem is concerned both with human freedom and the products that depend upon its
exercise. Consequently, the modern problem asks both, “what difference is God making
in human freedom?” but also “what difference is God making in the products of human
freedom?” Since, as we will see in chapter 2, a cause and its effects are necessarily
distinct, these questions pose distinct problems. The former problem I call the “existential
modern problem of the supernatural.” The latter I call the “artificial modern problem of
the supernatural.” The existential modern problem is “existential” in the same sense that
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existential philosophy is, i.e. concerned with the way in which human freedom
determines itself. The artificial modern problem is not artificial in the sense of being
“false” or somehow fraudulent. Rather, the artificial modern problem is artificial insofar
as it is concerned with the artifacts of free human making.
We can summarize these anticipatory determinations of the modern problem of
the supernatural as follows:
The Modern Problem of the Supernatural
Modern Problem: “What difference is God making…?”
Existential Form: “…in human freedom?”
Artificial Form: “…in the products of human freedom?”
4. A Problem of Cooperation
Thus, we have two problems, not just one. It is undeniable that something
irreducibly medieval is at work in the controversy. It is, as we saw above, the more
evident and more developed part. When I have called this part medieval, I do not at all
mean to be pejorative, but intend to name an excellence, a perfection accomplished in the
Catholic intellectual tradition through the metaphysical subtlety of St. Thomas Aquinas
and his contemporaries. But there is also something irreducibly modern about these
questions that has been suppressed in the various ways discussed above and which I have
tried to make evident nonetheless. The irreducibility of this modern part demonstrates the
limits of the medieval element and so of the solutions on offer. It indicates, at a
minimum, the heuristic place into which an adequate theology of the supernatural would
realize a modern achievement. But to settle for this merely heuristic placeholder would be
too stingy an assessment of modern intellectual achievements. There are genuine modern
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virtues which theology in general and a speculative theology of the supernatural
specifically would mutilate itself by excluding.
All of this is to say that there is needed some cooperation between the medieval
and modern philosophical and theological enterprises if the medieval and modern
problems of the supernatural will be addressed both in their distinct irreducibility and
their intimate, indeed inseparable connection. This cooperation is not reducible to
rendering medieval and modern approaches to the supernatural coherent. It is not enough
to show that they are compatibly parallel descriptions of the same data, answering the
same question from different perspectives, for there are two irreducible problems and not
just one. Questions that really differ require really different answers. Nor is this
cooperation reducible to arguing for the continuity of medieval and modern answers to
the problem of the supernatural, for such continuity would, whether it were a formal or a
merely material continuity, always only be grounded in the identity of a single question
to which the Catholic intellectual tradition has labored cumulatively and progressively to
answer. Such continuity may well exist, but to make it the central issue would occlude
rather than solve the distinct problems of the supernatural.
Cooperation is required because there are two problems of the supernatural and
not only one. Moreover, the irreducibility of these problems to one another owes to the
asymmetrical bond that holds them together. Without the medieval problem and its
adequate solution (in part, a theory of trans-natural cooperation between God and
creatures we shall see in Chapter 2), there can be no adequate recognition of the modern
problem in its full theological scope. Still, as we will see in Chapter 4, the integrality of
the medieval problem and solution with the modern problem owes precisely to the
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former’s inadequacy to the modern problem it reveals. Theologians and philosophers
could spend lifetimes refining the medieval solution in light of intervening developments
and still never adequately address the modern problem. The inadequacy of any medieval
solution owes, fittingly enough, to the disproportion of the modern problem to medieval
speculative techniques. In brief, the modern problem is relatively supernatural to the
medieval solution. Just as the theorem of the supernatural governs Thomas’s theory of
divine concursus and thus his solution to the medieval problem, so it will govern my
effort to articulate and sketch the outlines of a solution to the modern problem in Chapter
5, my conclusion. Much as our natural powers are elevated by cooperation with God’s
grace to habits and acts that merit what we could not without God’s help, so we will see
that the medieval solution finds an enlarged and enriched horizon in cooperation with the
theoretical developments constitutive of the distinctly modern problem. Indeed, the
horizon of the modern problem will be so much enriched and enlarged that theologians
may feel it is beyond their power to address. But here too the theorem will be at work,
reminding us that it is not just in the first-order work of our living, but also in the secondorder vocation to scholarly reflection that we need God’s grace to heal us from the
confinement of sin, to elevate us beyond the circumscriptions of finitude, and to stitch us
into the supernatural community through which God is at work in the world.
We will see that, as there is a specific obediential potency in human beings for
receiving the help of grace, also there is a kind of specific obediential potency in
Thomas’s solution to the medieval problem. Thomas’s account of rational process
indicates the place that the mediation of meaning has in our knowledge of the real. When
this epistemic account finds its proper place in Thomas’s faculty psychology of deliberate
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action, we can appreciate the place that the mediation of meaning has in Thomas’s
account of human agency and therefore the place it has in his account of human
cooperation with God. What I will call a ‘modern philosophical mentality’ in Chapter 3
offers us a chance to recognize that not only does meaning mediate the fully human
world of thought and action, but it also constitutes that world. The constitutive function
of meaning rests at the heart of the modern problem, for it places human freedom beyond
itself, not just in the agency by which human beings act, but also in the objects about
which it deliberates. Where the medieval problem asked in a metaphysical register where
and how God’s ad extra agency can be discerned in the nature of human freedom, the
modern problem asks where and how God’s agency can be discerned in the various
nexuses of human action’s products that we call, in general, “culture.” Of course, the
metaphysics of divine concursus can only tell us ‘that’ and ‘how’ God is at work in our
cultures, but some other approach is needed to appreciate ‘what’ God is up to therein. A
solution to the modern problem must stand on the synchronic metaphysical structure of
the medieval solution in order to attempt some hermeneutics of God at work in history.
The medieval and modern theological cooperation I have in mind will consist in
answering both the ‘that’/’how’ question and the ‘what’ question in a critical and
methodical way.
The relatively supernatural character of the modern problem of the supernatural
with regard to its medieval counterpart should not, however, be read as an uncritical
baptism of modern philosophy or theology as a whole (if one could even synthesize such
an aggregate in the first place). It is, instead, to engage in a bit of positive dialectic,
selecting that which is authentic in two epochs of the Catholic intellectual tradition and
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advancing them through critical, methodical inquiry and constructive cooperation. Of
course, one could engage in the negative dialectics that seeks to diagnose what has been
inauthentic—which is to say, oblivious, obtuse, irrational, or irresponsible—in the
unfolding of the Catholic speculative tradition, whether in its medieval or modern
phases.106 One would no doubt find much to reverse. However, because facing up to the
modern problem requires cooperation with the medieval synthesis, we are better served to
discern what has been genuine and successful in both epochs and promote them for the
sake of traction on this fundamental issue. Where counter-positions stand in our way, we
should not shy from venturing our best judgment, but I will not be on the hunt for a
sweeping diagnosis of all that ails either the modern or the medieval mind on this
question or others. Though it would require another study altogether to say precisely
why, I am further inclined to say with regard to modernity that it is entirely too early to
render sweeping judgments for or against. Modernity is not, in my opinion, a project in
its wrap-up phase about which we may declare success or failure. My patient reader will
have to wait until the concluding chapter to get a sense precisely why, but I am of the
opinion that modernity is, in the broader historical sense, just getting going and we have a
role to play in whether it works out well or not.
5. Philosophies, Theologies, and Ambiguities
A final methodological note: what follows will pivot frequently between
philosophy and theology. Moreover, it will shift between medieval and modern ideals of
philosophy and theology. These transitions are significant, for a thinker’s methodical
106
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frame stands to their ideas as questions stand to answers, insofar as they create a context
of validating conditions and an implied criterion of relevance. Moreover, changes in the
relationship between methodical frames modify their relative significance in a project of
inquiry. We will see that the separation of philosophy from its subordination to
speculative theology transformed philosophy’s self-understanding radically, such that
whole new frames of investigation became possible. If that were not complicated enough,
developments in theology can occasion new questions and new answers in philosophy,
just as developments in philosophy can set the stage for new advances in theology. In
Chapter 2 we will see how questions and answers in the theology of grace transform the
philosophy of divine transcendence and ad extra agency. This rebounds to allow the
theology of grace to be reconfigured as a systematic account of habitual and actual grace.
In some cases, these developments are sufficiently momentous that they transform not
just the content of one discipline or the other, but also their respective selfunderstandings. We will see in chapter 3 that the theorem of divine transcendence that
emerged from this dialogue between medieval theology and philosophy sowed seeds of
an ambiguity that at once helped to justify an autonomous and separated modern
philosophy and also undermines the possibility that its autonomy can be anything more
than relative.
In a similar way, the development of a modern scientific ideal for philosophy—
that it should endeavor to explain the diachronic processes of history, of morality,
society, and politics in their concreteness—has tendered to theology a new set of
questions and techniques that it still struggles to integrate within its methodical selfunderstanding. We will see how these questions and techniques apply to a new way of
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asking about divine ad extra agency in general and God’s grace specifically that cannot
be adequately addressed only according to medieval metaphysical techniques. Indeed, in
Chapter 4, we will have applied these very metaphysical techniques to the question to
show that they do not dissolve the problem’s force. This irreducibly modern problem of
the supernatural will demand a novel set of questions and techniques. But this set cannot
be a mere aggregate and still aim at the unity intended in every intellectual enterprise.
Thus, in chapter 5, I will suggest a heuristic that at once unifies these modern questions
and, thereby, sets their coordination as a criterion for the adequacy of any theology that,
on the matter of the supernatural, aspires to do for the twenty-first (or twenty-second)
century what Thomas Aquinas did for the thirteenth.
Still, we cannot overlook the way in which this cooperation that runs from
modern philosophy to modern theology also rebounds back upon modern philosophy. In
the face of the ambiguity medieval philosophy revealed, the pre-philosophical decision to
pursue complete explanation by way of a modern philosophy cannot itself be completely
explained within an autonomous human method of inquiry. It will always beg its own
originating question. Nor can theology undo this basically undecidable decision at
philosophy’s beginning. Instead, theology makes explicit its heteronomy by beginning in
the “yes” of faith to the created communication of God’s transcendent nature. In this way,
theology avows what modern philosophy must always hold in brackets, and so speaks a
prophetic word to those modern philosophies that would make of their relative autonomy
an absolute tyranny over both subject and object, over being itself. Modern theology can,
at the same time, model for modern philosophy the practical humility required to realize
the dizzying scope of its orienting aspiration to complete explanation. Finally, we can
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note that this vulnerable posture of intellectual risk before the ambiguity of being should,
if nothing else, disabuse philosophies and theologies of the illusion that their own
modernity consists in a triumph over their medieval forebears. They have carried us and
we have the responsibility to, cooperatively, take our turn carrying them.
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CHAPTER 2: A MEDIEVAL SOLUTION
Towards the end of Chapter 1 (§3.2), I briefly sketched out some elements of
what I called the medieval problem of the supernatural. I framed these elements in terms
of operative questions. There is a specific medieval problem of the supernatural and it has
both a generic and a specific form. It is this latter, specific form of the specific medieval
problem with which my reader no doubt spontaneously associates the problem(s) of the
supernatural. “How does God’s grace make a difference in human beings?” This specific
medieval problem can be framed in a more generic form that asks after the difference
God’s grace makes in creation as a whole. With this question we are not presently
concerned. My contention, however, is that the traction Thomas Aquinas gained on this
specific form of the specific medieval problem of the supernatural was due in no small
part to the advance he made on a more fundamental and philosophical generic problem of
the supernatural: How does God’s action make a difference in creation in general and
human beings specifically? In what follows I argue that Thomas’s solution to the specific
form of the specific medieval problem of the supernatural consists in the application by
analogy of a prior, philosophical solution to the generic problem of the supernatural. I
was tipped off to this undergirding philosophical position by Bernard Lonergan’s
reconstruction of Thomas’s theory of operative and cooperative grace, as well as his
detailed treatment of divine agency, knowledge, and volition.1

1

Bernard Lonergan made a lengthy study of Thomas Aquinas’ works in the late 1930s and
through the 1940s. This resulted in a number of texts. Some are exegetical works concerned with reporting
what Thomas thought on the basis of what he wrote, like Lonergan’s dissertation, Gratia Operans: A Study
of the Speculative Development in the Writings of Thomas Aquinas and the heavily revised Theological
Studies article into which he transformed it. See Bernard Lonergan, Grace and Freedom: Operative Grace
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The hinge between Thomas’s theory of divine agency and his theory of grace is
his account of divine and human cooperation. This chapter, thus, takes as its primary
purpose the exposition of Thomas’s position on concursus. In order that this position be
shown with adequate clarity, and so that its character as a solution to the medieval
problem(s) of the supernatural be manifest, a great deal of ink will be spilt on the prior
and foundational notions that are its material. In what follows, we will first acknowledge
the theological problematic that plants the notion of cooperation with God in the fertile
soil of Christian speculation: the apparently contradictory dual affirmation of the need for
God’s grace and the reality of human freedom. Then we will follow Lonergan’s seven
phases of development in the theological material that made his synthetic solution to this
problem possible. This solution rests upon two foundational ideas: a theorem of the states
of human nature and, most importantly for our purposes, what Lonergan calls the
“theorem of the supernatural.” From these theological materials we turn to Lonergan’s
lengthy and complicated account of the philosophical material that Thomas appropriated
and augmented to fund his position on divine agency. Because the development of these
philosophical materials is sufficiently unwieldy, I will follow up the account of their
development with Lonergan’s synchronic and synthetic presentation of the same notions
from his supplementary textbook, “De scientia atque voluntate Dei.” Finally, I examine

in the Thought of St. Thomas Aquinas, eds. Frederick E. Crowe, Robert M. Doran, CWL 1 (Toronto:
University of Toronto Press, 2000). Others from roughly the same time period are supplementary Latinlanguage texts Lonergan provided to his seminary students in order to augment the assigned manuals and to
aid their understanding of Thomas’s synthetic positions on important theological loci, like providence,
predestination, and grace. See Bernard Lonergan, “God’s Knowledge and Will,” in Early Latin Theology,
eds. H. Daniel Monsour, Robert M. Doran, CWL 19 (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2011), 256411. What I will present here is no more than “Lonergan’s Thomas.” Moreover, I present the positions he
advanced in order that they should be measured by their adequacy to the speculative problems they address,
rather than by their fidelity to my reader’s sense of what surely Thomas meant.
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philosophically the solution to the specific form of the generic problem of the
supernatural: free cooperation between human agents and God.
1. The Dialectical Position: Grace and Freedom
Speculative theology, Lonergan posits, begins from “dialectical positions.”2 These
Lonergan conceives on analogy with “methodological positions” in the natural sciences.
Scientists will “maintain incompatible theories simultaneously,” such as that light is both
a wave and a particle, in order to both indicate what is known, but also that element
which is as-yet-unknown. Lonergan’s notion of a dialectical position does something
similar with the truths or “doctrines” of the Christian faith. Because “truth is one, and
God is truth,” apparently contradictory doctrines are affirmed by the speculative
theologians even when the theoretical mechanics of their unity as yet escapes theological
articulation. But Lonergan’s notion of dialectical positions is “more radical” than the
methodological positions held by the scientist. The theories affirmed by the scientist may
be overturned in a later paradigm that clarifies the unity of the two apparently opposed
accounts. The doctrines of the Christian faith, though they may develop in their
expressions, are permanent in their meaning. Complete explanation of the universe is, at
least in principle, a proportionate aim for the scientist. Complete positive comprehension
of God in God’s transcendence is not a proportionate aim for the theologian. And so the
as-yet-unknown moment in theology’s dialectical positions cannot ever be entirely
eliminated, even as the imperfect understanding (or, more precisely, the negative
coherence of explicitly articulated non-contradiction) continues to prove intellectually
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fruitful. The theorems and techniques of speculative theology are instruments for
achieving this imperfect but fruitful understanding, and so for discerning that element in a
dialectical position which is susceptible to explanation by analogy and that element
which remains mysterious and so hidden in God.
The problem of the supernatural has its roots in Christian late antiquity. The
conjunction of two apparently contradictory affirmations in Christian doctrine generated
controversy at the end of the fourth century. St. Augustine in De gratia et libero arbitrio
argued for both the reality of human freedom and the gratuity of God’s grace. Pelagians
prioritized the Christian affirmation of human freedom and moral responsibility to make
the merit of human action a condition of God’s grace. By contrast, there were monks at
Hadrumetum who so prioritized God’s grace that human freedom was denied altogether.3
Against the Pelagians, Augustine offered an incipiently speculative distinction between
operative and cooperative grace. Lonergan summarizes it as follows:
God cooperates with good will to give it good performance; but alone he operates
on bad will to make it good; so that good will itself no less than good performance
is to be attributed to the divine gift of grace…Thus God operates to initiate us in
the spiritual life, and he cooperates to bring us to perfection; alone he works to
give us good desires, and together with our good desires he labors to give us good
performance.4
Whether God operates a bad will or cooperates with a good will, God’s grace is always
the cause of our meritorious actions. Against the opposite error, Lonergan notes
Augustine’s insistence that the will is just as free when God is cooperating with a good
will as when God replaces a heart of stone with a heart of flesh. This is a matter of
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biblical witness for Augustine.5 Still, he does not paper over this apparent difficulty.
Lonergan writes,
How, Augustine asks, can God say both dabo vobis and facite vobis? Why does
he give, if man is to be the maker? Or why does he command, if he himself is to
be the giver? To this the answer is the celebrated paradox: the will of man is
always free but not always good: either it is free from justice, and then it is evil;
or it is liberated from sin, and then it is good.6
Appeal to paradox does not solve the difficulty; it only clarifies its terms. Paradox serves
to acknowledge that two apparently contradictory terms are actually coincident and so the
contradiction must be merely apparent. Paradox indicates that there is a dialectical
position confronting the theologian. Moreover, it indicates that there must be a
speculative solution to the apparent contradiction. It does not of itself provide one.
Augustine’s appeal to paradox can only be considered a speculative failure if his
text indicates that he had set out to provide a speculative theory of grace. Lonergan does
not think De gratia et libero arbitrio can be considered to have such a speculative
purpose. Rather, Lonergan finds Augustine argued in an essentially dogmatic manner,
“marshaling such an array of [biblical and patristic] texts that the [doctrinal] claim is
obviously true.” In Augustine’s words, “Not I, but scripture itself has argued with you.”7
That humans are free and that grace is beyond any desert of ours is something one assents
to when one affirms the teaching of the Church. That affirmation need not, and for many
centuries did not include an understanding of how exactly both of those things were true
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“(God) has revealed to us through his holy scriptures that there is free choice of will in man.”
Augustine, De gratia et libero arbitrio. c. 2, §2, 882.
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without contradiction. If Augustine’s readers struggled to understand what he put forward
on the basis of what God has revealed, “they were not to dispute but to pray for light.”8
Although the apparent antinomy of grace and freedom was shown to be no
justification for straying from orthodox belief, the antinomy itself was not made to
disappear. If God’s grace is gratuitous and so beyond our power to merit (as the Church
teaches), how does receipt of it not impinge on or even obliterate our freedom (which the
Church also affirms)? How can it be that grace really changes the person who receives it,
but also it does not thereby deprive that person of his or her agency? Still, these twin
doctrinal commitments—to the reality of human freedom and to the absolute gratuity of
God’s grace—are explicitly part and parcel of the Christian endowment at least as early
as St. Augustine. So began a centuries-long effort at a coherent speculative theology that
would not only affirm both, but also show how what is affirmed can be understood
together.
2. The Development of the Theological Material
Recall that the dialectical position on grace and freedom has its origins in
Augustine’s polemics against the Pelagians, where the central issue was the necessity of
grace. Augustine coined the distinction between gratia operans and gratia cooperans to
indicate the universal necessity of grace. Lonergan traced the development of the
problem to which this distinction is an answer. He organized his inquiry into the
theological development of gratia operans from Augustine through Aquinas around five
general phases. Within these he constructed a seven-phase scheme for development on
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the theorem of the necessity of grace specifically. In Lonergan’s view, this theorem made
Thomas’s final theological position on grace possible. Tracing this development will
allow me to present relevant developments in the philosophy of God as they emerge in
cooperation with the theology of grace. These developments in the philosophy of God
will, in the longer term, make possible the position on concursus in which Thomas’s
solution to the medieval problem of the supernatural consists.
2.1. The Necessity of Grace
For Lonergan, an adequate account of the necessity of grace rests on a set of two
cognate theorems: the theorem of the supernatural and the theorem of the states of human
nature. I will be concerned mainly with the theorem of the supernatural, but in the context
of speculation on grace, Lonergan calls this the “generic” theorem, because it considers
humans as creatures in general. The theorem of “the states of man,” however, considers
specifically different initial starting positions for attaining eternal life, and so Lonergan
calls it the “specific” theorem. Lonergan’s seven-phase scheme takes this distinction,
between the generic and specific theorems, as a hint at the formal structure of the
speculative development behind Thomas’s position on grace. He notes that learning
begins from the particular and then moves to the general, only to then return to the
particular. 9 By underlining the place of the particular within a larger horizon, one can
reveal significant features of the particular.10 Lonergan’s seven-phase scheme, then, finds
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work in history.
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this movement concretized in the development of the above theorems, from the specific
to the generic and back to the specific.
2.1.1. Phase 1
The first phase of development begins from a question: why is grace necessary?
Development per se does not begin with the naked perplexity of a problem, but only
when a possible solution to the problem, a possible answer to the question, is adverted to
and analyzed. Lonergan again points to Augustine as the font of development in De
correptione et gratia. There, Augustine notes a significant difference in Adam’s need for
grace from our own. The first man, he notes, had been given the ability not to sin and so
was “righteous in that good in which he was created(.)”11 By contrast, the predestined do
not have this same help that enables them to avoid sin (“perseverance”). To the extent
that they do have perseverance, they have it by a different “gift” without which they
could not persevere in avoiding sin.12 Augustine also says that “a greater liberty is
needed” against temptations that did not exist in the pre-lapsarian paradise. Adam was
created with a free will that he “made a slave to sin,” whereas the predestined have a will
that “had been a slave to sin” but was liberated by Christ. This liberation, however, is not
to the freedom possessed by Adam, but a different freedom provided by the Second
Adam, Christ—a freedom enslaved to justice and God forever.13 The specific theorem—
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the theorem of the states of human nature—first peeks onto the scene on this hunch that
grace is needed because of a specific difference in our state from that possessed by our
first parents after their creation and prior to their fall into sin. We need a gift they did not
need and a freedom they did not have.
2.1.2. Phase 2
The second phase generalizes the basic tendency of the specific theorem into a
full articulation of the difference between our need for grace and that of our first parents.
The tendency in Augustine to treat grace and liberty as correlates gets taken up and
extended into an account of the four states of, not human nature in general, but human
liberty specifically. Lonergan follows Landgraf in locating this scheme’s full articulation
in Lombard’s Sentences. The first state of human liberty is possessed ‘before sin.’
Nothing impedes the good, nothing impels evil, reason can proceed without error, and the
will can desire what is good without difficulty. The second state is possessed ‘after sin
without grace.’ We are able to sin, unable to not sin, and our concupiscence oppresses
and conquers us. The third state is possessed ‘after reparation’ by grace. Though we are
still oppressed by concupiscence, we are not conquered by it, so that in our liberty and
weakness we are able to sin, but in our liberty and God’s grace we are once again able
not to sin. The fourth state is possessed ‘after confirmation’ in grace. We are unable to be

will be truly free (John 8.36) ... To this sin (of final impenitence) they are no longer slaves, not free in that
first state as he was, but by the grace of God set free through the second Adam, and in that liberation
having the free will by which they are slaves to God, not that by which they are taken captive by the devil.
For set free from sin they are made slaves to justice (Romans 6.18), in which they will stand to the very
end.”
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either conquered or oppressed by concupiscence, and so have the inability to sin.14 One
can see, then, how when the need for grace is addressed by a fully generalized theorem of
the states of man, the whole discussion proceeds in terms of liberty, but without an
articulated theory of liberty itself. In other words, freedom is not considered in terms of a
nature distinct from grace. That grace and freedom (and so human nature) are compatible
is affirmed, but still not explained.
2.1.3. Phase 3
In the third phase, Augustine’s tendency to treat grace and liberty as correlates
becomes codified in an established theorem and the specific theorem alone is applied to
the question of the need for grace. As a result, a number of speculative inadequacies
appear more clearly. The need for some further speculative apparatus becomes manifest
as the specific theorem raises further questions it is inadequate to answer.
First, there is inadequacy on the question of merit. In Lonergan’s view, Lombard
states the doctrine of merit quite correctly. Adam and Eve need grace because, though
they are adequate to the avoidance of sin as created, they are not adequate to merit eternal
life; for that another grace besides creation is needed. The problem remains, however,
why avoiding sin without further grace is not meritorious.15 The specific theorem alone
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cannot explain this. A distinction between naturalia and gratuita, though commonplace,
is left similarly without speculative support. If the specific theorem is the only available
speculative scheme on hand, it is perfectly logical (as Radulphus Ardens had it) to argue
that all virtues were originally natural, but were lost by original sin, and are only now
gratuitous for us in our present state.16 Of course, this means that although gratuita is
strongly affirmed, it is at the expense of naturalia, which is effectively denied. From this
follows claims like that without charity, there are no virtues at all, that besides charity
there is only cupidity, and that nature is per se crooked.17 From this denial of nature
emerges a further inadequacy with regard to the definition of grace. Now, the doctrinal
definition was established. No one disagreed that “grace is what is due to God's free gift
and not due to man's desert.” The speculative difficulty was to say what, on that
definition, was not grace—“after all, what is there that is not a free gift of God?”18
Cardinal Laborans, for example, variously defined grace first as “everything man either
has at birth or receives after birth,” then more specifically, “everything that the elect have
at birth or receive afterwards,” finally landing on the virtues of the elect.19 The tendency,
in other words, to resolve the question by an undifferentiated appeal to ‘gift’ is not a
uniquely modern, nor a forgotten Patristic insight.
Further, a purely psychological description of grace—as healing fallen reason and
will—leaves the practice of infant baptism in a mess of controversies. Lonergan notes
generic theorem of the supernatural without realizing it was a development without which Lombard had
labored. See Lonergan, Grace and Freedom, 185, n. 51; 217.
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that forgiveness of sin and justification are in scripture attributed to conversion, faith, and
charity, which do not on their face seem to be habits, but psychological acts. However,
baptism of infants “opens the gates of heaven.”20 It seems to follow, then, that the
baptized infant is justified. Evidently the essence of justification could not lie in the order
of acts. What it is about the “sacrament of faith” that infants receive in baptism that
justifies them remained unclear until the thirteenth century. Lonergan believes that, in
part, this difficulty persisted so long because the speculative question itself went unasked
by many. More importantly, when it was asked, the requisite theoretical materials were
simply unavailable. Certainly the Aristotelian theory of habit was not on the scene, but
also, in the absence of the more wide-ranging theorem of the supernatural, the effort to
apply only the theorem of the states of liberty to the question distorted the entire
enterprise. It leaves Lombard indecisive, for instance, about whether virtue is an act or a
habit and inclined many to the view that the notion of virtue as a habit was simply
inconceivable. Lonergan speculates that this may have led to the mistaken distinction
between remission of sins in infants and the infusion of grace in adults.21 It is only when
Waldenses and Cathari begin to demand re-baptism of adults baptized as infants that the
issue is resolved dogmatically in a condemnation of the above distinction.22 The lack of a
speculative solution remained however. Continued correlation of liberty (in terms of
reason and will) and grace (exclusively understood as the reparation of fallen reason and
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will) left firmly entrenched the psychological approach to grace that created the problem
of infant baptism in the first place.23
The final inadequacy, then, is the decisive one: though grace is defined in terms of
liberty, no adequate philosophical theory of liberty can emerge into the speculative
theological enterprise. Thus, the theory of grace is rendered viciously circular. A
philosophical theory of liberty is needed to shed analogical light upon the speculative
problem of grace and generate synthetic (rather than merely analytic) approaches thereto.
Lonergan speculates that the condemnation of Abelard’s position on liberty (“That free
will is enough by itself for (doing) some good”) may have led to Lombard’s definition:
“free will is the faculty of reason and will by which the good, with the help of grace, is
chosen, or evil (is chosen) when grace is lacking.”24 If the question, “why is grace
necessary?” stood alone, this could perhaps prove a satisfying definition. However, the
foregoing has labored to show how the speculative question about the necessity of grace
serves an ulterior, indeed prior aim: explaining the coherence of affirming both the
universal need for grace and the reality of human freedom. Lombard’s definition simply
restates the dialectical position in its paradoxical form. St. Anselm and St. Bernard had
the same problem.25 This is not to say that there was no philosophical definition of liberty
at hand (Lombard quotes Boethius’s definition, for example), but the problem is how to
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deploy it in such a way that the natural element and the revealed element are affirmed
coherently and not just paradoxically.26
2.1.4. Phase 4
In small part, the entrance of the notion of habitual grace onto the scene helped to
crack open a number of these problems. The more momentous advance was the theorem
of the supernatural and with it a governing tendency to distinguish two different orders,
one disproportionate to the other. With it, the fourth phase of speculation on the necessity
of grace could begin. Lonergan finds the first hints of its speculative efficacy when
Stephen Langton links gratum faciens, gratuitum and meritum. This linkage begins to
suggest that grace is not merely a matter of healing the psychological effects of sin, but
also of making the created soul somehow fit for eternal life. Praepositinus makes more
headway “by pointing out that reason is the highest thing in nature, yet faith is above
reason.”27 This begins to make more explicit a distinction between ontological orders.
But it was, in Lonergan’s view, Philip the Chancellor who established the significance of
the theorem of the supernatural permanently by breaking with St. Bernard and Hugh of
St. Victor to affirm a distinction between a natural amor amiritiae erga Deum and charity
as the meritorious love of God.28 In doing so, he further distinguished two kinds of
appetite, natural and rational:
[He] asserted the former to be self-regarding, the latter to tend absolutely to the
honestum; and then subdistinguished two rational appetites, one following reason,
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another following faith; the former of these is dilectio naturalis, the latter is
charity.29
Lonergan finds that Philip gave an articulation of the theorem of the supernatural, in this
case applied to the question of a meritorious love of God. To the “familiar series of grace,
faith, charity, and merit,” Philip the Chancellor systematically correlated “nature, reason,
and the natural love of God.” His is a “theory of two orders, entitatively
disproportionate(.)”30 This structure of two disproportionate orders is the generic theorem
of the supernatural at work. It will, in Lonergan’s estimation, crack open the question of
the necessity of grace and by extension the question of gratia operans et cooperans. It
also facilitates a more adequate articulation of divine transcendence and immanence that
leads to what I am calling the solution to the generic medieval problem of the
supernatural and, as we will see in Chapter 3, its attendant ambiguities.
Lonergan goes to some lengths to insist that the theorem of the supernatural is not
some new doctrinal element added to the definition of grace. It does not add any data to
the problem. As a theorem, it is the intelligible nexus organizing the data into a coherent
unity. Thus, when Philip addresses the question of merit by delineating two orders, he is
not introducing a supernatural character to grace that was not already affirmed. In phase
three, we saw how gratuitas was never in danger, but often it was affirmed at the expense
of naturalia. What Philip achieved “was the creation of a mental perspective, the
introduction of a set of coordinates,” making it possible to intelligently affirm “the
validity of a line of reference termed nature.”31 It became possible to recognize that the
root inadequacy in the specific theorem consisted in an inability to distinguish in thought
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what in the concrete is given all together (the gift of grace and the nature of freedom).
The theorem of the supernatural made this possible. The general need for gratia elavans
and the specific need for gratia sanans could eventually be coordinated on firm
speculative ground.
2.1.5. Phase 5
In the fifth phase, as in the second, there is the generalization of the newly
emergent theorem to its full articulation and application. Once Philip the Chancellor
introduces the theorem of the supernatural onto the speculative scene, it can (like the
specific theorem before it) be generalized and so extended to a number of extant
problems. Alexander of Hales takes it up to resolve the problem of merit in pre-lapsarian
humans that Lombard had failed to address. Albert the Great develops a theory of
sanctifying grace, resolving the issue of infant baptism and also providing some clarity to
the respect in which divine virtues were divine. Finally, we come to Thomas Aquinas’s
direct statement of the need for grace in terms of the disproportion of the divine essence
to the powers of any created being in the Summa contra Gentiles: “Quidquid excedit
limites alicuius naturae, non potest sibi advenire nisi per actionem alterius.”32
2.1.6. Phase 6
In the sixth phase, as in the third, there is the tendency to utilize one theorem to
the exclusion of any other. But now it is the generic theorem that is given pride of place.
So the force of the theorem of the supernatural in explaining the need for grace in our
first parents to merit eternal life and the efficacy of sanctifying grace in baptized infants
32
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to the same effect eclipsed the problem of moral impotence in St. Albert’s Sentence
commentary and the early works of St. Thomas.33 According to Lonergan, “both attempt
to reduce the non posse non peccare to the sinner's inability to obtain the remission of his
sins without grace.” In their historical moment, the issue was reconciling non posse non
peccare with liberty. In that sense, a generalized application of the generic theorem to the
problems that occasioned the specific theorem meant a certain subterranean Pelagianism
loomed. Without the specifications of our concrete situation—namely, the moral
impotence proper to a fallen nature—Thomas’s rather direct statement that “man is able
to fulfill through free will that good which is proportionate to human nature” becomes
dangerously ambiguous.34 Even Thomas’s follow up remark, “but although man can
perform good works of this kind without the grace that makes him pleasing (to God), still
he cannot perform them without God,” does not quite snatch the issue back from the
brink. Habitual grace called out for a distinct notion of actual grace as the theological
analogue to the Aristotelian pair, habit and act, but initially Thomas allows a general
notion of divine providence to carry the whole issue.35 Consequently, it is not fully clear
if grace is concretely needed to perform naturally virtuous acts or merely providence. It is
not clear if grace is both operans and cooperans as elevans and sanans in both habit and
act.
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2.1.7. Phase 7
In the seventh phase, Thomas is able to synthesize the generic theorem of the
supernatural and the specific theorem of the states of nature into a compound theorem of
the necessity of grace. The paragraph from the Prima Secundae is so clear in its
application of both theorems to the question that I feel compelled to present it in its
entirety here:
Thus, then, there is one respect in which man in the state of integral nature needs
a gratuitous power superadded to the power of nature, namely, (the power) to do
and will a supernatural good. But in the state of fallen nature, there are two
respects (in which he needs something gratuitous added): namely, for healing, and
further to perform a good work of supernatural power, which is meritorious.
Further still, in both states man needs divine help in order to be moved by that
help to act righteously.36
First, there is presented an answer to the question why we need grace in terms of the
generic theorem of the supernatural. The powers of our human nature need a gratuitous,
supernatural power added to them in order to be proportionate to desiring and performing
supernatural goods. Without this elevation of our natures, they are disproportionate to the
divine order in which they would participate. Second, there is the restatement of our need
for grace in terms of our specified state of nature—namely, fallen. Concretely, we are
both disproportionate to the supernatural good, but also so wounded by sin that we are
morally impotent with regard to both disproportionate and proportionate goods. Further,
in the light of the generic theorem, the blanket statement non posse non peccare can now
be specified. In general, there are goods to which human beings are created proportionate,
but, specifically, fallen humans are unable to will and do these without the help of
healing (gratia sanans). Finally, because of this commerce between the two theorems, we
36
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can identify two sets of two respects in which human beings need divine help to act
righteously: both to elevate and to heal and both to do the proportionate good and the
disproportionate good. Thus is laid the foundation of a distinction between the help of
general providence and the help of grace, operative and cooperative, healing and
elevating, habitual and actual. But this last point gets me out ahead of myself. The
theorem of the supernatural turns out to have significance beyond the questions of merit
and the necessity of grace. This significance regards God’s general providence, the theory
of divine operation, and the question of free human cooperation with God. All of these
play a central role in the medieval solution to the medieval problem of the supernatural
and the ambiguities we will see in Chapter 3 that follow therefrom. But what do the
generic and specific medieval problems of the supernatural share in common? Both
puzzle over the integral cooperation between two disproportionate orders. Consequently,
the generic medieval solution is a theory of cooperation and Thomas applies it by analogy
to the specific medieval problem, as evident in ST 1-2, q. 109, a. 2.
But before a theory of co-operation can be derived, there is needed a prior account
of operation itself. It is fitting, then, that I turn now to Lonergan’s retrieval of Thomas’s
theory of operation, both in general and specifically on the matter of divine operation.
First, I will consider Thomas’s appropriation and augmentation of Aristotle’s theory of
action. Second, some consideration will be given to Thomas’s adaptation of Aristotle’s
theory of praemotio physica and the argument that effective action requires ‘application,’
or an order that brings agent and patient into proper disposition. Third, the notion of
hierarchical degrees of causality will be explicated so that, fourth and finally, Thomas’s
theorem of divine cooperation or “concursus” can at last be laid out with some clarity.
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Indeed, with the theorem of divine concursus, we are finally getting down to the business
at hand: explicating the theory of divine and creaturely cooperation that at once
undergirds the medieval solution to the medieval problem of the supernatural, but at the
same time reveals the medieval ambiguity waiting behind an adequate philosophy of
divine agency.
3. The Development of the Philosophical Material
Whether one is investigating the question of God’s general auxilium or the
specific question of God’s grace, attributing agency to God can carry a problematic
implication: does God, in acting, change? If so, at the very least God’s simplicity,
infinity, and eternity are all called into question. On the other hand, if God does not
change, how can there be meaningful free cooperation between human beings and God?
Would not God’s unchanging agency determine the human will such that any hint of
freedom is excluded? Again, the same problem appears whether one takes up the topic of
providence or of grace because it is a problem that hounds talk of divine agency in
general. For Lonergan, this problem haunts the theology of providence and of grace alike
because it has its roots in philosophical assumptions about agency itself. This, after all, is
the nature of speculative theology: “it constructs its theorems with respect to the
supernatural order by appealing to the analogy of nature.”37 Thus, when Lonergan
approaches the problems of divine action in his dissertation, he tackles the philosophical
question of agency first out of the gate.
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The fundamental question is whether, in passing from posse agere to actu agere,
an agent undergoes change qua agent. On its face, there seems good reason to think so.
“Now it is evident,” Lonergan writes “that the two propositions, potest agere, actu agere,
cannot both be true with respect to the same agent and the same activity at the same time.
The two, as defined, are contradictory: the first means that (one) is not acting; the second
that (one) is acting.” There must be, then, some real difference in the objective situations
described by the respective propositions, “(for) contradictory propositions cannot be
verified in identical situations.”38 However, to assume that a real change in the agent qua
agent provides this difference creates a problem for any Thomistic or Aristotelian
philosophy: it excludes a motor immobilis. If one affirms a change in the agent passing
from posse agere to actu agere as a priori necessary, one has to also accept the
implication that this change is a priori universal. If that is the case—if omne movens
movetur—then there is excluded the possibility of a motor immobilis and so, by dint of
infinite regress, neither can there be motion, nor by extension can there be action.39
Perhaps there is a theological reason we can affirm a real change in the agent
actually acting. Have we not already gone to great lengths to show the mark left on
Thomas’s thought by the theorem of the supernatural? Perhaps there is a difference
between the agency of the Creator and the agency of creatures on the question of posse
agere and actu agere. Lonergan denies that Thomas thought so. True, the Creator acts in
virtue of a substantial act and the creature an accidental one, as Thomas indicates in ST 1
q. 54, aa. 1–3, but Lonergan insists there is no evidence that He also “places in the
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creature a real distinction between a posse agere and actu agere.”40 Thomas’s account of
agency is a completely general philosophic account. In addressing the position Thomas
held, Lonergan briefly exposits the Aristotelian doctrine of agency Thomas appropriated
and then turns to Thomas’s commentary, which includes first a defense of the doctrine
and then an important augmentation. This augmentation regards how action is predicated
of an agent and it seems meant to head off the very misunderstanding with which we are
concerned here—namely, the attribution of a real difference in one actu agere.
3.1. Aristotle’s Position
First, then, there is Aristotle’s position on motion.41 Lonergan summarizes it as it
appears in Physics III, boiling it down to seven definitions and a six-step exposition.
Notice how Lonergan breaks down Aristotle’s philosophical position into its basic terms
and defines them by their relation to one another, only then fitting them into a
theorematic scheme.
First, the definitions:
1) An actively moving thing (motivum) is that which can move something
(movere).
2) A mover (movens) is that which moves something (movet).
40
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3) A movable thing (mobile) is that which can be moved (moveri).
4) A moved thing (motum) is that which is moved (movetur).
5) Movement (motus) is the act of something existing in potency (potentia)
insofar as it is in potency.
6) Action (actio) is a movement… as from the agent (ut ab agente).
7) Passion (passio) is a movement… as in the patient (patiente).42
Lonergan then exposits in six steps how these terms fit together into a single
theorematic scheme to explain what motion is. The first three steps delineate which terms
in the above definitions constitute real and adequate distinctions and which do not. First,
between a mover (movens) and an actively moving thing (motivum) there is no real
distinction. Second, there are adequate real distinctions between a mover and a movement
(motus), between a mover and a movable thing (mobile), and between a moveable thing
and a movement. Third, there is a real, but inadequate distinction between a moveable
thing and a moved thing (motum) and between a movement and a moved thing.
The latter three steps of Lonergan’s exposition make more explicit how the above
definitions fit together into a full theory of agency. Fourth, then, the reality of a
movement is common in both action (actio) and passion (passio), such that there is only
one entity, but it is called an action when considered from its relation to its origin and it is
called passion from its relation to its subject. Fifth, the active potency of a thing moving
(motivum) and the passive potency of a moveable thing both move from potency to act,
but this transit involves only one act. This act is the same movement in the moveable
thing (as passio) and from the mover (as actio). Sixth and finally, the distinction between
42
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action and passion is thereby maintained even though the reality, the motus, is a single
entity. This is because the movement has two terms: its origin and its subject. When the
movement is considered from the origin, it is called action. When it is considered in the
subject, it is called passion.43
For Aristotle, motion is a single entity that can be considered from the vantage of
its origin or from the vantage of its subject. Though both the origin (movens) and the
subject (motum) transit from potency to act—actually moving and actually moved,
respectively—there is only one act, the movement itself. This inheres in the moved
subject, but is merely “from” the moving origin. This turns out to be the fundamental
point in Aristotle’s theory of agency as appropriated by Thomas. Thus, the distinction
between actio and passio is maintained, but as notional rather than real. In other words,
the distinction survives despite Aristotle demoting its ground from the assumed
substantial difference to a difference of relation.
3.2. Thomas’s Commentary
Thomas clarifies Aristotle’s account by distinguishing between a mover moving
as mover and a mover “happening to be moved when moving.”44 He insists on the
theoretical control of meaning at work in Aristotle’s definitions: “still movement is not
the act of the thing moving but of the movable thing insofar as it is movable.”45 To recur
to definition 5 above: Movement (motus) is the act of something existing in potency
(potentia) insofar as it is in potency. That the mover is concretely moving does not mean
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that it is moving qua mover, and so the abstractions of Aristotle’s doctrine are liberated
from the ostensible “self-evidence” of the way things appear—the very “obviousness” of
which gave rise to the quandaries of physics in the first place.
Thomas also underlines what I noted above: since the movement as passio is in
the patient and only from the agent, the act of a movement inheres in the moved because
“the act of anything at all is in that to whom the act belongs.”46 Now, the movement is
still caused by the mover or agent, even though the movement—and so the act of the
movement—is in the patient. But this leads to something of a subtlety in Thomas’s
commentary. Because the mover is also moving, which is to say that it has movement in
it in another respect (than as agent), it must also have act in some respect. Thus the
question is raised: is this movement in the mover the difference or change needed to
explain the transit from posse agere to actu agere?47 Thomas’s answer is worth quoting
at length:
He (Aristotle) shows that the same act is act of the mover and the moved. For
'mover' is said insofar as something acts, but 'moved' insofar as it is changed; but
it is the same thing which as mover causes by acting and which as moved is
changed by receiving. And this is what he says (in stating) that the mover is the
'active force of the movable thing,' that is, it causes the act of the movable thing.
And therefore it is necessary that there be just one act of the two, namely, of the
mover and of the moved; for it is the same thing that is from the mover as from
agent cause, and is in the patient as receiver.48
We see with Thomas the pay-off of Aristotle’s control of theoretical terms. Movers cause
by acting, but receiving this active force changes the moved. Thus, the act is shared in the
movement from agent to patient, but only the patient is changed. What, though, about the
movement in the agent? Is not that a change in the mover qua mover, in the agent qua
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agent? Aristotle denies this on the basis of the objection already noted above: if it were,
then every mover would also be moving and there could be no unmoved mover. As
Lonergan puts it: “Parmenides would have won.”49
Lonergan adverts to another, a posteriori argument Thomas uses to bolster the a
priori argument from infinite regress. Thomas notes in his commentary on the De anima
that the faculty or organ of hearing receives its act from sounding, but the act of both
sounding and of hearing are in the organ of hearing, that which is according to its
potency.50 Were the act of sounding not received by that which has the potency of
hearing, there could not be an act of hearing, and so the act of both must be in the faculty
or organ as recipient or patient. This carries as a corroborating, negative implication what
Thomas had stated explicitly as early as De potentia: the patient is related to the agent in
such a way that, should the act of the patient cease or be removed, the agent is
unchanged.51 If an act of hearing ceases, the concrete sounding from which it received its
act need not cease or change. It can ring on, unaffected. Indeed, to be unaffected is what
it is to be the mover and not the moved.
3.3. Thomas’s Augmentation
Having seen Aristotle’s basic position on motion and Thomas’ clarifications, we
can now consider Thomas’s augmentation of Aristotle’s position. His augmentation
concerns how action is properly predicated of an agent and rests on a parallel of logic and
metaphysics. The ten genera or “predicates” of being are not, Thomas notes, divided
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univocally the way that species within a genus are. Instead, he writes, they are divided
“…according to the diversity in (their) mode of being.”52 That is to say that they are
divided in proportion to the modes of predicating. Hence, they are called “predicaments.”
Not all the kinds of predicament are of the same nature and Thomas distinguishes three
basic kinds. There are predicaments of substance, which regard the essence of a thing.
There are “inhering” predicaments, such as quantity (which regards the matter of a thing),
quality (which regards the form of a thing), and relation (which regards being by
reference to another). Finally, there is what he calls “extrinsic” predication, which
regards a thing “by way of some denomination.”53 This notion of extrinsic predication or,
as Lonergan sometimes calls it, “extrinsic denomination”, is crucial for avoiding the error
that would assume transit from possibly acting to actually acting involves a real change in
the agent. Indeed, Lonergan says that extrinsic predication “attacks the very root of the
error.”
This third, extrinsic kind of predication is the kind of predication that pertains to
agency. The predicament of passion is denominated from the agent, “for to suffer is
nothing else than to receive something from the agent.”54 Contrariwise, the predicament
of action is denominated from the patient, “for action is an act (going) from the agent to
another.”55 Without this notion, it is too easy to assume that the “objective real difference
involved by the transition from the truth of one proposition [posse agere] to the truth of
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the other [actu agere]” inheres in the agent.56 But this is merely an assumption and an
incorrect assumption at that. Lonergan writes:
What is overlooked is that the emergence of the effect does supply such a real
difference in the objective field. And the reason why it is overlooked is that it is
assumed that all predication is of exactly the same nature, that ens divides
univocally into the ten predicaments the way a genus divides into its species. Such
a blunder cannot be attributed to St. Thomas.57
On Lonergan’s read, not only does Thomas affirm Aristotle’s account of actio and
underline the core, controlling theoretical elements in his commentaries, but he also
augments Aristotle’s position with an explication of the unspoken element in these
metaphysical problems that might lead one to reject Aristotle’s doctrine. If one supposes
that all predicaments are denominated of a subject in the same, inherent way, then the
problem becomes insoluble. But if one recognizes the logical and metaphysical
legitimacy of extrinsic predications, it becomes possible to see why not all movers are
moving.
Lest Thomas’s defense and augmentation of Aristotle’s position leave any doubt
as to whether he also appropriated this same philosophical position in his mature
speculative theology, Lonergan directs us to two passages in the Prima pars that indicate
Thomas has. On the topic of divine procession and having just mentioned Aristotle’s
Physics, Thomas summarizes the Aristotelian doctrine thusly:
…although action is the same as movement, and similarly passion, still it does not
follow that action and passion are the same; because in action there is implied a
reference 'as that from which there is movement in the movable thing,' but in
passion (the reference is) 'as that which is from another’(.)58
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On the theory of creation as well, one finds the Aristotelian position (if not Aristotle’s
terminology) organizing the argument, such that “since actio is motus ut ab hoc and in
creation there is no motion [of itself], it follows that creatio is simply the relation.”59
In summary, then, the notion of extrinsic predication clarifies the logicometaphysical relation of patient to agent. An agent is denominated as acting from the
patient who receives the act of its inhering movement. The patient’s receipt of the act of
movement does not involve a real change in the agent and this can be seen both a
posteriori in the fact that passio can cease without a change in the agent and a priori
from the proximate implication that all movers would have to be moving and the remote
and subsequent implication that there could thus be no motor immobilis, and so no
motion at all. Agency, then, is a matter of the patient’s dependence for its act upon
another and so the transit from posse agere to actu agere is verified in the changed
patient rather than any change in the agent. This general position on agency must be held
in mind as we move through the following section. If it is lost, the subsequent accounts of
application, of universal instrumentality, and of Creator/creature cooperation will fall into
irretrievable incoherence and the medieval solution will be lost with it.
4. Action’s Required Order
The above account of agency explicitly abstracted from the motion of the mover.
The motion of the mover was noted only insofar as Thomas followed Aristotle in
insisting this motion is not in the mover qua agent. But such an account is insufficient to
explain actual motion, because to be an actually moving thing is part of the definition of
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what it is to be what can actually move something.60 Thus, the above position on agency
merely explains the form of any possible movement or change without giving a full
account of actual motions. For any particular possible movement to become actual there
is required some situation or mutual relation or disposition of the mover and the moved.
Aristotle’s doctrine of physical premotion serves to provide an explanatory frame for how
such situations, mutual relations, or dispositions are provided to the possibly moving and
possibly moved such that the active power of the mover-as-cause can be applied to the
moved-as-effect.61
On this point, Lonergan again adverts to Thomas’s commentaries on Aristotle.
Thomas says, commenting on the Physics, that all things that act (whether according to
nature or understanding) or suffer are possible agents and patients. They cannot just move
or be moved in any disposition or situation, but only in some determinate relationship or
“propinquity” to one another. Only under these proper circumstances does one move and
is the other moved.62 But as we have already seen, if omne movens movetur, there cannot
be a first motion.63 In Aristotle’s cosmology, this problem is resolved by making the first
mover a motor immobilis. The heavenly spheres, then, are that which is primarily moved
and move eternally, sustaining the earthly eternal series of generabilia and corruptibilia
that are sometimes, but not always moving. The mediation of the corpus caeleste is
required because the first mover cannot cause terrestrial quandoque moventia. It would
have to act differently at different times and that would itself require motion, negating its
60
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very character as motor immobilis. Instead, what Aristotle calls “physical premotion” is
sustained by the ever-wheeling corpus caeleste, bringing mover and moved together,
with the first mover serving as final cause.64 For change in the world to be maintained,
there must be and always have been a source of constant motion bringing those situations
about, changing the disposition of or relations among movers and moved. For Aristotle,
the physical premotion of the corpus caeleste is universal, because in every coincidence
of worldly mover and moved, there has to have been an ordering premotion of this kind.
Thomas, for his part, adopts this doctrine of physical premotion in his account of
God’s providential agency, but transforms it significantly by resituating its first mover to
the horizon of personal theism. Lonergan underlines a hint from Thomas’s commentary
on the Metaphysics to exactly how he will appropriate the doctrine of premotion—under
the heading, “application”. When the passive element in a movement or change is
brought into sufficient proximity to the active element, the act of the mover/agent can be
communicated to the moved/patient. For example, when something combustible is
applied to an open flame, the actual combustion is communicated to the combustible
material. Without this application—that is, without this spatiotemporal ordering of the
combustible to that which is already burning—there cannot be any actual movement,
change, action, or passion.
Thomas takes up this way of speaking (applicatur) with reference to how God
“moves all things to their appointed end by His intellect.”65 As Thomas says in a number
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of places, Deus omnia applicat.66 In one respect, this is a straightforward appropriation of
Aristotle’s teaching. Thomas quite logically affirms universal application, because for
Thomas God is not less than first mover in Aristotle’s sense, and the first mover causes
all motion and premotion.67 But to identify premotion with universal application by
divine providence already assumes the horizon of personal theism. Strictly speaking,
universal divine premotion is not yet providence. Aristotle’s first mover acts simply as
final cause and the corpus caeleste only ensures change continues perpetually. Thomas’s
God acts by his intellect and that means God is furthermore “the causa per se of every
coincidence of mover and moved, every conjunction of causes, every combination of
effects.”68 Thomas writes in the Prima pars,
But God is not the cause of something except as he is intelligent, for his substance
is his understanding ... And everything acts through the mode of its substance.
God therefore moves all things to their proper ends through his intellect. But this
is to be provident.69
In this way, God’s application is Aristotelian premotion, but also rather more. God causes
each particular motion in the further sense that God’s mind plans and God’s will intends
“the endless premotions that constitute the dynamic pattern of the universe(.)”70 Thus, for
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Thomas’s theory of providence, an intellectually intended premotion simply is an
application, such that Deus omnia applicat.
Thomas’s appropriation and augmentation of Aristotle’s theory of premotion
helps to highlight an aspect of God’s providential agency that is sometimes overlooked.
We have focused in this section primarily on the influence that Aristotle’s philosophy had
by providing natural, philosophical elements as material for a theological position on
grace and freedom. But Thomas’s augmentation of Aristotle’s theory of premotion gives
us an example of that influence running the other direction in the commerce between
philosophy and theology. The Christian insistence on a personal God, with a mind and a
will, transforms Aristotle’s theory even as it accepts its basic theorematic shape and the
cosmology in which it is ensconced. Thomas’s God does not simply create beings with
certain natures and powers and then leave them to the exercise of these with the on-going
underwriting of divine conservation. Thomas understands God’s providential agency as
not just creating and conserving, but also applying these entities to their effects within a
cosmic order. It is the order that meets the conditions required for possible motions to
become actual motions. God intends it eternally, but it unfolds temporally. Thus, as
Lonergan reads Thomas, God’s will not only creatively intends the existence of things,
but also the order from which they emerge over time, and so (by extension) those things
in their mode of emergence. As we will see below, in the case of human beings, this
means God wills our exercise of free agency as well.
4.1. Degrees of Causality in the Order of Action
To call God the causa per se of premotion implies that every created thing is an
“instrument” of providence. Once again, Lonergan notes that Thomas appeals to a

82
perfectly general philosophical theory (of causality, in this case) to provide the
intellectual structure undergirding his speculative theological account. The trail of this
implication begins with the nature of causality. Following Thomas’s account in the De
Veritate, Lonergan notes that being a cause qua cause has two aspects.
1) it must be something in act: omne ens agit quatenus est actu.
2) the something that it is must be proportionate to the effect intended: omne
agens agit sibi simile.71
With regard to the second aspect, Lonergan lists four ways of being proportionate to an
intended effect. First, something can be proportionate to its effect in virtue of that
something’s natural form and, second, in virtue of a more eminent form. Thus, fire is
proportionate to causing heat by virtue of its natural form, while the corpus caeleste,
neither hot nor cold in itself, “is the principal cause of all emergence of heat, cold,
humidity, and dryness(.)”72 Third, something can be proportionate to its intended effect in
virtue of an idea in the mind and, fourth, in virtue of an idea transitioning from a mind to
the effect. Thus, an architect’s intention (vis artis) for a building is proportionate to the
building as an effect as in his or her mind, but the same idea distributed (virtus artis)
through the division of labor (to electricians, steel workers, etc.) in the building’s
construction is also proportionate to this effect.73
This enumeration is also a hierarchy of degrees. Lonergan explains it by analogy
from motion as esse incompletum. Motion, on this Aristotelian approach, “is not
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'something' but a process 'towards something.’”74 The analogy goes, “as a motion is the
esse incompletum of its term … so also the proportion of the instrument is an incomplete
realization of the proportion of the principal cause.” In other words, instruments rely on
another, more eminent cause to complete their proportion to an effect. Thus, 1) fire is
proportionate to producing heat per modum naturae completae and 2) the corpus caeleste
per modum naturae completae et eminentioris. By its nature fire produces heat, but the
premotion of the heavens is required for it to actually be in the disposition to do so, and
so it is in a sense an instrument of the order of the heavens, even though its nature is in
complete proportion to the effect of producing heat. Hence the corpus caeleste is a more
eminent cause than the flame itself.
In the realm of intellectual causes, then, we have 3) the architect who is
proportionate to his or her effect as an intellectual agent, per formam apprehensam and 4)
the various instruments of his or her design that are proportionate to the effect per modum
naturae incompletae, per quoddam esse incompletum.75 The form of the architect’s
understanding is proportionate to the building as its effect, but the mediation of his or her
various laborers is instrumental insofar as they are proportionate to welding, electrical
work, etc, but not to the nature of the desired effect: a complete building. The efficacy of
the artist’s intentions resides in the workers as in a medium—per modum quo colores
sunt in acre, et virtus artis in instrumento artificis.76 And so, Lonergan says, it becomes
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possible to define ‘instrument’: “an instrument in the strict sense is a cause that is
proportionate to its effect per modum naturae incompletae.”77
Hence it is that Thomas affirms God’s providence as being proportionate to its
effects per modum naturae completae et eminentioris because God is first mover, but also
per formam apprehensam because God is an intellectual agent.78 Not only do the forms
of creatures participate in the divine ideas, but so too does the order of cosmic unfolding
participate in God’s providential design.79 We also get a clearer sense of what it meant to
say above that “the execution of providence is mediated.”80 Fate, this cosmic ordering, is
the artistic vision of God according to another mode of existence, one embedded in
secondary causes such that they produce God’s desired effects.81 Recall, moreover, that it
is embedded in the secondary causes as their “disposition or series, that is, (their)
order(.)”82
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As we have already seen, to be the patient of an action is to be in a relation of
dependence upon the communicated act of the agent, and so we know that the mediation
of the secondary causes does not add anything to or change anything about God’s agency.
Thomas says, “the efficacy of the principal agent is found instrumentally in all the
instruments ordered to the effect, as being one in a certain order.”83 Rather than
something added to God’s agency by arithmetic composition—that is, in a sense where
“God does this much and creatures do this much”—Thomas is describing a hierarchy of
qualitative degrees of causality, in all of which God’s agency is immanently efficacious.
As we turn now to consider this hierarchy explicitly, it will become evident how holding
both kinds of causal proportion in mind—per modum…eminentioris and per formam
apprehensam—is essential to Thomas’s philosophical appropriation and theological
augmentation of Aristotle’s theory of physical premotion.
What has not been explained yet, however, is precisely what is meant by
“eminence”. For if both God and a creature are proportionate by nature to some effect,
why is God a “higher” cause of that effect than the creature? Lonergan adverts to
Thomas’s commentary on the Liber de causis to address this question. Lonergan notes,
“it is argued that the higher cause prius intrat, vehementius imprimit, et tardius recedit.”84
This locution is impressionistic, to be sure, but Lonergan finds the context suggests a
rather restrained interpretation—that “the activity of the higher cause is a presupposition
of the activity of the lower”85—and it is an elaboration of a more general metaphysical
principle. In the same commentary, Thomas writes, “if whiteness were separate, simple
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whiteness itself, and not something participating in whiteness, it would be the cause of all
white things insofar as they are white,” and so accordingly, “the Platonists held that that
which is being itself is the cause of being for all things(.)”86
What if there are a plurality of relevant causes for some given predicate? How
then does one proceed? Thomas summarizes Aristotle’s answer as follows:
We must always take the media which are nearer the subject in which we seek the
cause of that common effect; and we must proceed in this way until we come to
that which is immediate to the common effect. And he assigns the reason for this,
namely, that that which is from the side of what is contained under something
common is the cause for its being under that common (predication): for example,
if D is under B, and if C is the cause for D that B is in it. And from this it follows
further that C is the cause that A is in D; and B is the cause that A is in C. But A
is in B itself per se and immediately.87
Lonergan helps walk us through what this means:
Here 'immediate' has its etymological sense of 'nonmediated,' 'logical first.' Thus,
Socrates is mortal, because he is a man; a man is mortal, because he is an animal;
an animal is mortal, because its material cause is composed of contraries. The
three middle terms are 'man,' 'animal,' 'with material cause composed of
contraries.' The first of these is the least general. The last is the real cause of
mortality: not only does it make 'animal,' 'man,' and 'Socrates' mortal; it also is the
cause of 'animal' making 'man' mortal, and of 'man' making 'Socrates' mortal.88
It becomes clear in light of the above what it means to say that a higher cause “arrives
first, makes the greater impression, and leaves last.” Human beings are mortal even if
they are not Socrates, and animals are mortal even if they are not human, and animals are
not the only beings possessed of “a material cause composed of contraries” such that they
one day die. The higher cause precedes the lower as a condition. It is the difference that
makes a difference. It persists even if lower media are logically excluded. To put it more
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briefly, its activity is the presupposition of the activity of lower causes. A cause is higher
to the extent that it is a more fundamental presupposition of effect in consideration. Thus,
the scale of causal eminence terminates in causal ultimacy.
This is simply good Aristotelian metaphysical analysis by which things are
reduced to their causes, but it also suggests the way in which higher causes do not
compete with lower causes for explanatory “space” in Thomas’s theory of action. This
has significant pay-off for Thomas’s theory of Deus operans et cooperans. Another
somewhat lengthy quote merits reproduction here insofar as it makes this connection
explicit for us:
Let A, B, C be three causes in an ordered series so that C is the ultimate one
performing the action. It is clear that C performs the action by its own power; and
the fact that it is able through its own power to (do) this, this is through the power
of B and further through the power of A. And therefore if it is asked, Why does C
act? the reply is, Through its own power. And why through its own power?
Through the power of B. And so on till (the series) is reduced to the power of the
first cause, to which the Philosopher, in book n of the Posterior Analytics, text.
22, and book n of the Physics, text. 38, teaches (us) to resolve questions. And thus
it is clear that, since God is the first cause of all things, his power is most
immediate to all things.89
There can appear now the conjunction between the cosmic spatiotemporal ordering
effected by the eternal and universal application of God’s providential intention and the
logically ordered series of agents that constitute the hierarchy of causes. Because God’s
providential ordering of the cosmos and its creaturely inhabitants is a condition of the
efficacy of those creatures as agents, God’s providential ordering is the ultimate,
“highest” cause of any and every created effect. We can see this conjunction by the
ambient light of Thomas’s appropriation and augmentation of Aristotle’s theory of
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motion and agency. Because agency is extrinsically predicated of agents, God can have
this immediate relationship to the agency of creatures without Himself having to be
moved. God can be at once the highest and the most immediate cause, all without
displacing “lower” creaturely agents in the explanation of cosmic unfolding. Most
importantly, we are now prepared to discuss Thomas’s theory of cooperation, the last of
the theorematic materials required for both the philosophy of divine and human agency
and the theology of operative and cooperative grace in which the medieval solution to the
medieval problem of the supernatural consist.
5. The Theory of Cooperation or “Concursus”
We can turn now to what Lonergan calls the “central theorem” in Thomas’s
theory of gratia operans: his notion of cooperation. I hope that my reader has not been
too tried by the above forays into the theory of actio, of premotion and application, of
instrumental participation and the hierarchy of causes. For Lonergan, these are important
scaffolding for the theory of cooperation. They prevent the errors that can emerge
because of the “somewhat ingenuous assumption that everyone knows precisely what it is
to 'cause,' 'operate,' 'cooperate.’”90 They are important also as philosophical material in
the cooperation between the ancient mind of the philosopher Aristotle and the medieval
mind of the theologian St. Thomas Aquinas. It is this tradition of dialectical appropriation
and augmentation that makes Thomas’s solution to the medieval problem of the
supernatural possible.
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The general notion of cooperation is that two or more causes combine to produce
a single effect. This occasions a question: if each cause has its own actio (which it must
by definition), how do the actiones of these relate? Lonergan enumerates three kinds of
cooperation. The first he calls “coordinate cooperation,” as when two people pull a boat
together. This is cooperation in the sense denied of creaturely cooperation with the
Creator above: person A pulls this much and person B pulls this much and in so doing
they move the boat together. The actiones of each cause are combined by (vectoral)
addition. However we might imagine cooperation with God, Lonergan will not even
briefly consider that coordinate cooperation applies here. “With it we are not
concerned.”91 The second kind of cooperation Lonergan calls “accidental cooperation,” in
which there are two distinct actiones and they produce two effects, as when Abraham
begat Isaac and Isaac begat Jacob. Lonergan is not going to consider this kind either.
What Lonergan calls “serial cooperation” pertains to the divine concursus. Serial
cooperation involves three actiones, but a single product, as when (on Lonergan’s
example) Peter kills Paul with a sword. Here, we have three actiones.
1) Peter moves his sword to strike a death blow.
2) His sword, so moved, kills Paul.
3) Peter kills Paul.
Recall again that agency is predicated extrinsically from the existence of the effect. Peter
is the mover of his sword because the sword so moves. The sword is the slayer of Paul
because Paul dies in receiving its actio. Lastly, Peter is also (and no less) the slayer of
Paul because, in receiving Peter’s actio in the medium of the sword, Paul dies. Thus it is
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that there can truly be distinguished three actiones, but only the one really distinct
product (the death of poor Paul) and one notionally distinct product (a moved sword).
There is, however, no third product. Indeed, if you do not have only one really distinct
product of more than two really distinct actiones, you do not have an instance of serial
cooperation. Finally, the third actio is the cooperation itself.92
Lonergan distinguishes this basic philosophical notion of cooperation in
preparation for what he views as Thomas’s central theorem on ad extra divine agency:
Deus operatur in omni operante. In brief, created agents cannot have actio without
attributing the same actio to God. Lonergan distinguishes in Thomas’s presentation a
direct and an indirect statement of the theorem. The direct statement is, as already stated,
that God operates in all operation. The indirect statement, then, is that unless God moves,
creatures cannot operate.93 We will follow Lonergan in presenting a number of passages
from Thomas’s corpus in which these two forms of the theorem appear.
First, we turn to the direct statement of the theorem. In the De veritate, it appears
as the general form of God’s operation in the will:
(As) every natural action is from God, so every action of the will, insofar as it is
an action, is not only from the will as acting immediately, but from God as the
first agent (and the one) who makes a stronger impression.94

92

Lonergan makes an important point about the two potential errors this account of cooperation
invites and how they seem to have produced the opposed positions of Durandus, Báñez, and Molina. He
writes, “Now these two errors [denying that there is a third actio and affirming a third product] correspond
to the two positions between which St. Thomas steers a middle course. He does not deny a third actio, and
so differs from Durandus, who is reputed to have held that God merely creates and conserves. He does not
affirm a third product, and so he differs from Báñez, who posits a praemotio physica, and from Molina,
who posits a concursus simultaneus. The point to be grasped is that to deny the position of Báñez or of
Molina is not to affirm the position of Durandus.” Ibid., 303–4.
93

Ibid., 304–5.

94

De Veritate, q. 22, a. 8.

91
We see here also the impressionistic language of the commentary on the Liber de causis
(“vehementius imprimit”) deployed with precisely the same theoretical control as before,
insisting on the immediacy of the higher cause to the lower as its presupposition. Thus,
God operates in the will as God acts in all of nature, with the plain implication that God
then operates in all operation.
The Summa contra gentiles has an entire chapter devoted to the proposition quod
Deus est causa operandi omnibus operantibus and Lonergan notes that it begins with the
statement, “Deus est causa omnibus operantibus ut operantur.” Thomas gives six reasons
why this is true. First, insofar as creatures act virtute divina, they can of themselves be
causes of being. Second, because “God is the cause of the virtus from which proceeds the
creature's operatio,” and thus God is its cause.95 Third, the divine conservation of the
virtus is necessary for the virtus to enable the actio, and so God causes the act. Fourth,
divine application is required for any actual actio and passio, and so God is the cause of
both. Fifth, because all lower agents act in virtue of their higher causes, “God is more the
cause of any actio than any subordinate agent.”96 Sixth, because God ordains all things to
their ends, everything acts virtute divina, and so God is the cause of all actio.
Three chapters later in the SCG, Thomas explicitly raises the question of
cooperation. How can two agents do one producing? Here, it is reinforced that the lower
agent(s) act in virtue of the higher and both produce the whole effect, though in different
manners.97 The same treatment appears in De potentia q. 3 a.7, in the sed contra, in
which analogies are drawn from art, generation, and existence to show, in the end, how
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there is a single product produced by at least two agents. In other words, it shows that
creatures and the Creator cooperate and, on Lonergan’s analysis, that their cooperation is
an instance of serial cooperation.98
Lonergan finds that Thomas, presumably in his maturity, simplifies the
presentation of this theorem in the Prima pars. Instead of constellating a number of
interlocking causal reasons to affirm cooperation between Creator and creature in every
actio, he boils things down to three active causes: final, efficient, and formal. Deus
operatur in omni operante is affirmed in all three respects, but final cause becomes the
controlling notion. Lonergan writes,
[The final cause] is the cause of the activity of the efficient cause; therefore any
effect is causally related to the final cause; but any causal relation is an actio of
some sort, and so, even on the ground of finality, God operates in all operation.99
While the efficiency of this form of presentation is to be admired as a speculative
accomplishment, it is so general as to be nearly occlusive of the metaphysical mechanics
at work. The presentation in the SCG is perhaps less systematic, but pedagogically more
helpful. For Lonergan, the point is to see that the theorem at work is identical.
Finally, we turn to the indirect statement that, unless God moves, no creature may
operate. In the De veritate, this principle is presented only in terms of the divine
operation as creating and conserving the creature.100
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For God is the cause of a natural operation, insofar as he gives and preserves that
which is the principle of natural operation in the thing, from which by necessity a
determinate operation follows; as when he preserves gravitation in the earth,
which is the principle of downward motion.101
By the Prima secundae, Thomas has added a further element to the indirect statement of
the theorem. Created causes, because they are agents in tempore, need the ordering of
premotion in order to actually act. Thus, creatures act both in virtue of God’s creative and
conserving agency, but also virtute motionis divinae. See, on this point, the “general
reason” that human beings need the auxilio gratiae in ST 1-2, Q. 109, A. 9.102
With the theorem of cooperation in hand, my aggregation of the philosophical
material behind Thomas’s solution to the medieval problem of the supernatural is
complete. The notion of serial cooperation clarifies the manner in which the divine
operation acts in all created operations. Moreover, it becomes evident how Thomas’s
various appropriations and augmentations of Aristotle’s philosophical advances are
synthesized into a position on divine agency that so far from impinging upon the agency
of creatures, is explicitly the existential presupposition of any creaturely agency at all. It
remains to state Thomas’s synthesis on divine action and providence directly. Then I will
turn to Lonergan’s retrieval of Thomas’s position on God’s operation not in creation
generally, but specifically in the human will. That position in concert with the general
account of divine agency prepares the way to the general ambiguity of created causality
and the specific ambiguities pertaining to human freedom with which Chapter 3 will
begin.
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6. Lonergan’s Synthesis of Thomas on Divine Concursus
Having laid out in the previous section Lonergan’s analysis of the theological and
philosophical material in Thomas Aquinas’s theory of cooperation, it becomes possible to
state directly and synthetically Lonergan’s interpretation thereof. This task will occupy us
for the remainder of this chapter.
6.1. God’s Efficient Causality
God acts. Indeed, God necessarily acts. God is the infinite, eternal, pure act of
existence. God’s essence is God’s act of existence. Thus, divine action poses no problem,
per se. Even if one distinguishes within God’s infinite and eternal act the action of
knowing God’s self or of willing the infinite good that God is, still these acts are likewise
infinite, eternal, and necessary in God. The speculative problem arises when one asks
whether God’s infinite, eternal, and necessary act has any effects. Does God, in other
words, act ad extra? Is God an efficient cause? These questions suggest a perhaps
difficult implication: If God does have ad extra effects, these effects (because
conditioned by God’s agency) are contingent and so predicated of God contingently.
How can a necessary agent cause contingent effects? The short answer is that though God
acts necessarily, God’s ad extra agency is predicated of God contingently. If God is an ad
extra efficient cause, God is eternally the efficient cause of every being that is not God.
But there exist beings that are not God. So, we affirm that God is the efficient
cause of every being that is not God. Moreover, because they are conditioned by God’s
efficient causality, every thing that is not God is a contingent thing. It is true, then, that
being the cause of every contingent thing is predicated of God and God’s agency
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contingently. The difficulty remains, however: how can a contingent effect be predicated
of a necessary cause? If God is an efficient cause contingently, how is he such eternally
and without limit? First, it is important to recall the Aristotelian nature of efficient
causality in Thomas’s work. Second, we must recall Thomas’s augmentation of
Aristotle’s theory: the extrinsic mode of predication/denomination. Further, it will also be
important to distinguish kinds or senses of necessity.
First, efficient causality is, by nature, an action that produces a passion. Action
and passion are two aspects of a single reality. This entity is considered ‘action’ as from
the agent, but passion as in the patient. The agent, then, is the efficient cause of the effect
in the patient. Its act is communicated to the patient in producing an effect. The
movement, change, or difference inheres in the patient, but is only ‘from’ the agent. In
this way, the production of an effect does not produce a change in the agent, for if it did,
it would in this respect be a patient instead (by definition). Moreover, if it were a
metaphysical law that agents changed when they acted, then there could be no unmoved,
first mover, and so no motion at all.103 Thus, to predicate efficient causality of God and
specifically efficient causality with regard to every existing, contingent thing involves no
change in God, and so no threat to divine eternality, simplicity, or impassibility.
Second, agency is not predicated of a subject intrinsically, but as we have already
seen, extrinsically. It is predicated by denomination from something ‘outside’ or other to
that subject—namely, its effect. Thus, in order to truly say that God is the cause of every
contingent thing does not impute any contingency to God, but only predicates efficient
causality of God contingently. Lonergan writes, “Whatever is predicated of God
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contingently has its truth-correspondence through extrinsic denomination.”104 Extrinsic
predication/denomination makes it possible that contingent propositions can be true of a
necessary being, because they are true by reason of something that is not God. Lonergan
notes that propositions are called “simultaneous in truth” when “they are true by reason
of one and the same entity.”105 Extrinsic predication makes possible propositions that are
simultaneous in truth. The attribution of agency and the acknowledgement of an effect
are both true by virtue of the existence of the difference produced in the thing affected.
Thus, the statements that contingent beings exist and that God causes contingent beings
to exist are both true by virtue of the reality of contingent beings.106
Third, Lonergan distinguishes three kinds or senses of necessity: 1) absolute
necessity, 2) that which is necessary upon the supposition of something else, and 3) that
which is necessary upon the supposition of itself. The first is the necessity proper to
God’s being and only to God, that which cannot not exist. The second, ‘that which is
necessary upon the supposition of something else,’ consists in the relationship of
antecedents and consequents. This second necessity includes metaphysical necessity (e.g.
that “finite substances cannot exist without inseparable accidents”), physical necessity
(e.g., the diffusion of heat), and moral necessity (e.g., “if you speak, you tell the truth”).
But it is the third kind of necessity, ‘that which is necessary upon the supposition of
itself,’ that provides clarification on this question.107
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Now, any and every being is necessary on the supposition of itself, because this is
the minimal necessity that, as long as something is, it necessarily is. This kind of
necessity pertains to any being, even if it possesses none of the other forms of necessity
above. For example, Lonergan says, “(take) an action that is both free and
supererogatory. As long as it exists, it necessarily exists; and yet such an action is neither
absolutely nor metaphysically nor physically nor morally necessary.”108 None of these in
the second class of necessity—metaphysical, physical, or moral—or, in their absence, the
correlate kinds of contingency can be deduced or derived from the presence or possession
of this third kind.
In sum, we can say that God causes (as efficient cause) contingent beings such
that they receive the act of their contingent existence from the infinite, eternal act of
existence that is God’s being. God, then, is the agent of this action because contingent
beings depend upon receiving the act of their existence from God. This contingent
existence, however, inheres in the contingent being and not in God. Efficient causality is
predicated of God extrinsically because it is predicated of God in virtue of an entity other
than God. Consequently, the propositions “contingent beings exist” and “God causes
contingent beings to exist” are simultaneously true by reason of the same entity—namely,
the existent contingent beings. Finally, these contingent beings exist, at minimum, with
the necessity of that which necessarily is by supposition of itself. From this necessity, no
other forms of necessity can be deduced or derived.
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6.2. God’s Transcendent Causality
Though above I have focused on God’s agency as an efficient cause, God’s
agency is also transcendent. This was already hinted at generally when we affirmed that
God is the cause of every contingent being and every being that is not God is contingent.
Thus, the distinction between God as cause and everything else as effect is also a
distinction between Creator and creature. The specific reasons for affirming the
transcendence of God’s agency come into view at the conjunction of several principles:
first, the principle of priority; second, the principle of simultaneity of truth; third, the
irresistibility of divine action; fourth, an inverse insight into the relation between God’s
causality and created causality.
First, the principle of priority simply insists that a cause is prior to its effect. God
is eternal, and so the priority here obviously cannot be temporal priority. God’s causing a
thing is prior to its existing in the sense that God’s action is a presupposition for its
being.109 But God is the efficient cause of all things, and so whatever exists comes from
God’s prior action.
Second, and from the other direction, the principle of simultaneity in the order of
truth means that truths that are true through the same entity are true simultaneously. Such
truths are grounded in extrinsic predication. Any statement predicated of God
contingently is predicated extrinsically and so posits the existence of an extrinsic
denominator. Thus, the statement that God causes a universe of contingent beings is true
simultaneously with the statement that there exists a universe of contingent beings.110
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Third, these two together imply that God’s creative action is, in the traditional
Thomist language, irresistible. God is the prior cause of everything that is. By extrinsic
predication, the statements, “God causes something to be,” and, “it is,” are
simultaneously true by reason of one and the same entity: the contingently existing thing.
What God causes to be exists necessarily, but only with the minimal necessity that is
from the supposition of itself.
Fourth, the above three points may occasion an inverse insight—indeed, an
inverse insight at the heart of the medieval ambiguities we will face in Chapter 3. There
is no contradiction between the statement that what God causes to be in God’s
transcendence necessarily exists and the statement that what God causes to be is
contingent. Indeed, these are convertible statements. From God, the action is necessarily
effective. In the creature it is contingent, because it is conditioned by God’s action.
Moreover, because the effect is contingent, the agency by which God’s action is
necessarily effective is predicated of God contingently. If God acts ad extra, God’s action
is necessarily effective. Though we might expect it to, this simultaneous dual affirmation
of God’s transcendent agency does not, on its own, tell us anything about the order of
necessity and contingency, because it regards God’s agency as transcendent. Lonergan
says, “one cannot determine solely by the irresistibility of (God’s) action whether what he
…effects is necessary by metaphysical, physical, or moral necessity,” or merely
contingent in any or all of those respects. The only necessity that can be deduced or
derived from God’s transcendent agency is that of those things that are necessary by the
supposition of themselves. This kind of necessity accords equally with contingency or
necessity of the metaphysical, physical, or moral kind. The affirmation of God’s
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transcendent causality tells us that God causes the world that is, but not what kind of
world God has caused.
These four principles prepare the central notion governing Lonergan’s account of
God’s transcendent causality: proportion. Agents must be proportionate to their effects,
and the proportion of an efficient cause is determined by its nature. As we affirmed at the
beginning, God and only God exists by nature, which is why God is the only absolutely
necessary being. Not only is God the cause of every contingent being, but also the only
being proportionate to causing existence.111 This general disproportion between creatures
and the Creator to being the cause of existence is the most general form that the theorem
of the supernatural takes. The act of existence is received by and inheres in creatures as
patients of God’s transcendent action. Moreover, it is communicated gratuitously, both
because creatures are not by nature proportionate to operatively apprehending existence,
but more fundamentally because without its gratuitous communication, creatures do not
exist to operate at all.
At this point one can see most clearly the service paid by theology to the
philosophy of God. The effort to figure out why pre-lapsarian humans required God’s
grace produced this distinction between entitatively disproportionate orders. This
distinction, then, possesses the theoretical mobility proper to a theorem, such that it can
serve to control the relation of terms in the philosophy of God as well. Although the
theorem of the supernatural emerged historically in the speculative theological context
and so is temporally prior to any separated philosophy of God, the present project rests on
the insight that its general philosophical application to the question of the cause of
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existence is theoretically prior to its specific speculative theological application on the
aporia of grace. It also highlights why the theorem of the supernatural is not enough to
explain our need for grace on its own. The problem, as we already saw, is distinguishing
God’s grace from anything else. “What, after all,” as Lonergan says, “is not a free gift of
God?”
6.3. God’s Artisanal Governance
So far, however, we have only established that God’s ad extra agency creates and
conserves the existence of beings if and when they exist. Lonergan, following Thomas, is
able to derive further significance from God’s action by applying the analogy of an
artisan working with instruments. This analogy opens up the question of God as cause to
not just the totality of existent beings, but also to the order that obtains between them, and
so of God as not just operating, but operating in the operation of creatures.
The question arises, if God is the cause of every contingent thing, is the totality of
created beings itself an intelligible, complete unity? Are these myriad beings, in other
words, parts in a whole? Does the universe have an order? Lonergan says yes. When one
asks after the totality of created beings without exception, one heuristically takes the
vantage of eternity. From this heuristic vantage, not only does one anticipate that the
universe possesses an order, but that it has a perfect(ed) order. For Lonergan, every
possible world conceived in the mind of God is a complete, intelligible unity. God acts
through intellect and so possible worlds are those that God conceives in wisdom and
chooses justly. But, Lonergan says, intelligence grasps unity and wisdom arranges things
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in order. Furthermore, perfect justice leaves nothing incomplete.112 Thus, every possible
universe, including this actual one, is not just an aggregate of beings, but (from the
vantage of eternity) a whole with a complete, intelligible order.113 Thus, in both every
possible world and in this actual world, every being has a relation to the whole as one of
its parts and is ordered within the whole as such. God causes the actual order of the
universe, then, as well as the existence of the smaller wholes that make up its parts.
From the viewpoint of temporal being, however, we find divine action causing the
order of the universe by instrumentality, by application, and so by cooperation. Because
no created cause is proportionate to causing the existence of its effects, all created causes
are causes only in the essential order. They cannot by nature cause their effects to be, but
only to be this or that or, as Lonergan says, “such.” Nonetheless, created causes do also
cause their effects to exist. Their act is communicated to the effect and inheres in the
patient as affected. Such communication, after all, is that in which agency consists. As we
saw above with regard to existence, every created cause acts per modum naturae
incompletae, per quoddam esse incompletum.114 Thus, every created cause is also an
instrument of God’s creative causality insofar as it produces the existence of an existing
effect.
This minimal sense of instrumentality, however, is not yet enough for created
causes to be effective causes. That created beings possess an act to be communicated
makes them only potentially agents. In order for them to actually produce effects, there is
further required premotion. They must be brought into a proper relation or disposition
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with regard to that in which they would potentially produce an effect or else the potential
patient is not available to receive its act from the agent. Just as from the vantage of
eternity there is an order of beings as wholes in themselves, as parts of larger wholes, and
each subsidiary whole as a part in the complete intelligible unity of the universe, so from
the view of temporal being there is also a correlate order of the spatiotemporal relations
that are presupposed in each actual instance of created efficient causality.
In this way, created causes are instruments of God in the further sense that they
are moved into relations or dispositions for effective causation according to God’s
governance. Thus, God applies all causes to their effects by the instrument of premotion.
The opportunities to act and be affected are as caused by God as the form and existence
in which the power to act and/or the potential to be affected inhere.115 As Lonergan puts
it, “God wills B should exist because of A.”116 The dynamic spatiotemporal order of the
universe is also an effect of God’s action through God’s intellect. In this way, God acts
ad extra per formam apprehensam, and so God’s agency is analogous to the agency of an
artisan exercising his or her proportionate power and understanding through the
instrument of either sub-contractors or tools or both. Hence the title of this section: God’s
artisanal governance.
Created causes, in their existence, in their movement through the universe, and in
their efficacy as causes, cooperate with God’s agency. They cooperate by the serial
cooperation described above. Because God acts irresistibly, created causes cooperate with
God insofar as they operate at all. God’s action is necessary for all created action.
Because of God’s transcendence, the necessity of God’s action for all created action tells
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us nothing about whether those created actions are metaphysically, physically, or morally
necessary or contingent. Insofar as God acts in them, they are necessary only on the
supposition of themselves. Neither does God’s universal and unfailing application of
every cause to its effect(s) provide the means to deduce or derive whether the cause
produces its effect with metaphysical, physical, or moral necessity or contingency. Every
potential cause has the occasion for its actual efficacy according to the cosmic order
effected by God, and so is determined by God. But it is completely determined by God
and so is determined both in its mode of existence and its mode of emergence. These
include both contingent and necessary modes (to say nothing yet of the freedom that
pertains to human causality).
Distinguishing the necessity for God’s action in created causes and the necessity
with which created causes produce their effect when God acts in them from the mundane
forms of necessity and contingency (metaphysical, physical, moral) in the above fashion
rests on the intellectual force of the theorem of the supernatural. Without the
disproportion of creatures to the Creator, this radically determining, but not deterministic
account of God’s ad extra agency would not be possible at the theological or
philosophical level. Though Lonergan underlines the specific difference the theorem of
the supernatural makes in the speculative theology of grace, here I want to underline the
general and indeed foundational difference the theorem makes in the philosophy of God
and God’s agency.
6.4. Divine Operation in the Human Will
A free agent is free in two respects. First, it is the cause of its own determination.
Because to be free is a mode of agency, action in general is that which is determined by
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this determination. The source of this determination as determinate is the intellect. It
makes this determination, primarily, by apprehending some good.117 The apprehension of
some good is not of itself enough to determine what a free agent will do, because the will
can act or not act with regard to this or that good, no matter what the object presented to
it for decision. Lonergan notes that even the infinite good may not move the will
automatically, depending how one interprets ST, 1-2, q. 10, a. 2. Thus, the will can be
determined and moved by some good apprehended, but it is not necessarily so
determined or moved.118
Second, the will may or may not move itself from potency to act. When the
intellect apprehends a good, the will is brought into act with respect to this good as an
end, and then it may move itself from potency to act with regard to the means to that
end.119 In this way a free agent determines what it will do by its intellect, but whether it
will act at all the will determines. A will is called free primarily insofar as it may or may
not move itself to act—which is to say, actually willing the means to an apprehended
good as its end. Secondarily, it is called free because the means to an end are optional
rather than necessary, the practical judgment that selects these means is contingent, and
the bonum apprehensum does not move the will efficaciously but, as I have already
noted, only formally.120
But is the free agent’s contingency qua free in contradiction with the affirmation
already established that God irresistibly acts in every created cause? Lonergan identifies
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several now-familiar errors that might lead to such a conclusion. Errors, he says, that
emerge because of anthropomorphism in our thought about God and God’s agency.
Today, we might call these errors, “cognitive defaults,” and expect them to crop up
regularly. First, there is a tendency to think of God’s agency as temporal instead of
eternal, and so to mistake the priority of God’s action for sequential, rather than causal
priority. Because God is eternal, God does not act ‘before’ human action, as there is no
‘before’ or ‘after’ for God.121 Second, because God is infinite in every respect, human
acts cannot add anything to the being of God. For this reason, contingency cannot be
introduced into God because of the contingency of human agency aggregating to God by
additional cooperative acts.122 Further potential objections are headed off by adverting to
the already established notions of extrinsic predication and those things that are necessary
on the supposition of themselves. Human acts do not change God because agency is
extrinsically predicated of agents, and so true propositions about God’s causal role in
human acts are true of God by reason of the existence of the human acts and not some
transformation in God. Finally, the necessity with which free human acts are produced by
God’s action is the aforementioned necessity upon the supposition of itself, by which it is
said that insofar and as long as something exists, it necessarily exists.123
All of this is to say in various ways that God stands outside the order of all other
causes. God’s effects are, in themselves, necessary or contingent at God’s choice. If God
does ‘this’, it must be. But the necessity of a ‘this’ can be absolute or it can be
hypothetical (as when God wills that B should exist because of A). Which ‘this’ in fact is
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depends on God’s chosen action. As chosen, then, these acts are intended, i.e. foreknown
with the priority of causal priority. Whichever ‘this’ is, contingent or necessary, as from
God’s action it necessarily is.124 Thus God’s operation in every created operation is ad
modum naturae. Indeed, it must be, because deus operatur in omni operante is a theorem,
not a datum. By extension, God operating in the human will does not prevent human
minds from causing their own acts formally, nor deprive our wills of the freedom to
contingently act or not to act. God causes our causality in its mode of emergence—
namely, as contingent freedom. At the same time, God irresistibly produces the effect
God intends, but again in its mode of being, including the mode of freedom/liberty.125
This is simply the specifically human volitional instance of the general relation of
temporal and contingent causes predicated of God as the effects of his irresistible action.
6.4.1. The Nature of Habits
Additionally, there is the relevance of the dynamic pattern of the universe on the
question of human freedom. Free causes no less than non-rational agents require
premotion in order to be applied to their effects. God’s providence intends the cosmic,
spatio-temporal order and thereby irresistibly creates the circumstances and dispositions
in which free agents can be efficacious in producing contingent or necessary effects
contingently or necessarily as the case may be. Still, as God’s instrument, the order of the
universe produces what God intends irresistibly and efficaciously.126 But this cosmic
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ordering—application by premotion—has an analogue in the human being as free cause:
the habit.
Lonergan notes that perfection in the dynamic order of operation—that is,
action—is radically one with perfection in the order of being, and perfection in the order
of being is measured by the proportion of potency and act. God alone is actus purus,
“with potentiality at zero and act at infinity,” and so only God operates with absolute
perfection.127 This is the impeccability proper to God and God’s transcendence. Angels,
for their part, are compounds of potency and act, but are beyond time. Consequently, they
can fail in their action in some cases, but, as atemporally “created in the full development
of their natures,” are fixed by a single act towards their goal.128 Humans, though, are
essentially temporal and so the development of our nature emerges in a series of acts. At
birth, Lonergan says, our “higher powers are the spiritual counterpart of materia prima.”
This indeterminate potentiality is ordered to the good in general, but human beings never
happen upon the good in general. What is good is always concrete. This concreteness
means that the good is “ever unique” and, by contrast, evil is manifold. In other words,
there is the right thing to do and then nearly endless ways to fail to do it.129 Humans
begin with the odds stacked against us morally. We are agens imperfectum.130 We can act
properly in any and every instance, but because our moral potential is realized in time and
space, it will in the course of things act properly only, as Lonergan says, “in minori
parte.”131 It is, to put it in more modern terms, improbable that we will do what is right.
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The only remedy to this situation is to set about actualizing our moral potential so
that we act rightly with greater regularity. Habits and dispositions meet this need by
making the external moral demands of the universe the internal form of our operations.
Dispositions do this inconstantly, but habits do so more perfectly. Habits actualize our
moral potential, determining some principle or power of our nature, “forming a certain
quality in (it).”132 Because habits are a perfection of an indeterminate potency, their
immediate effect is formal.133 They make this moral form of the universe, as Lonergan
put it, our “second nature.”134
The theorem of the supernatural, which we had previously appealed to in order to
account for the disproportion between divine agency and created causes, also allows us to
make a distinction in the order of habits. We may distinguish between acquired habits
and infused habits. Acquired habits or virtues are those caused by acts. This notion is
familiar: practice makes perfect. But Thomas’s argument for why it is that acts cause
habits may seem a bit strange to those not acquainted with it. In ST 1–2, q. 49, a. 2, he
says that in agents possessing only the active principle of their acts, a habit cannot be
caused by that agent’s own acts. However, some agents possess both the active and
passive principles of its acts, as when a human will acts if moved by the object presented
to it by the intellect. In these agents, acts can cause habits in their agents.
Why does the introduction of passivity make habit formation possible? First, as
already stated, effects of action inhere in what is moved—that is, in the patient. The
passivity of the will to receive determination from a bonum apprehensum is a being132
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moved. Thus, if one recalls our discussion of premotion above, what is moved is disposed
by the action of the agent. Second, acts of the will are free precisely because the will can,
in principle, act or not act to will the means to the end presented as bonum apprehensum.
That which acts only out of an active principle cannot have a habit (cannot be
“accustomed or unaccustomed,” Thomas says), because it cannot fail to act if in the
proper external disposition or relation to what it would move. But free agents can fail to
move themselves to act (this is the essence of freedom) and so need not only external
disposition and relation to what would be moved by its action, but also an internal
disposition towards moving itself. This internal disposition towards operation we call a
habit.
Thus, acquired habits are formed in us by our actions. Now, intellectual habits can
be formed by a single act, as when one comes to understand something and, coming upon
the same intelligibility in the future, continues to understand. But volitional habits,
because the apprehensive powers are, Thomas says, “inclined variously,” require multiple
successive acts to be formed habitually.135 In so doing, we both actualize our moral
potential and determine it, concretizing it. Humans, then, as temporal free agents, have
the opportunity (within the constraint of those ends and means cosmic premotion ordered
by God’s providence has made available in our time and place) to be the artisanal
governors of our souls by giving the actualization of our natures a determinate
character—forming it and realizing it at the same time. In this way, our action is
analogous to God’s: we finitely and temporally can create the microcosm of ourselves in
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much the same way that God infinitely and eternally acts to determine and realize the
cosmos in its every moment of emergence.
Of course, what God makes is neither materially nor formally before God makes
it. What we make and what we cause by our action is materially before we make it. But it
is important not to hypostatize after the fact the abstraction by which we identify its
material ‘existence’. What we will is not yet, but what would be.136 That is an essential
part of what makes the action by which it is caused free. The object of the will is, prior to
action, an intellectual object. Though it may be part of an extant species (like an
automobile) or not (like a hyperloop transportation system), it is not yet substantial until
caused to be in cooperation with God by our action. It is as much a mistake to think of
what we will in the way that Lonergan warns us not to think of what we know by our
intellects: as “already out there now” entities.137 To think of what we will as “already out
there now” covers over the way in which what we efficaciously will and do, we make.
This point will be of fundamental importance for the modern problem of the supernatural
in Chapter 4.
All of this brings us back to the problem of human beings as agens imperfectum.
Good acts need to occur regularly to inculcate virtue in the appetitive powers of our
souls. But the structure of our moral nature—as temporal and requiring insight into
phantasm—make these acts improbable and so irregular. Unfortunately for us, the only
thing that can make them probable is virtue. But we cannot have acquired virtue without
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those acts occurring regularly, at least for a time. Worse, moral failures also have a
formative effect on the soul, imbuing vices where virtues should be and further impeding
the actualization of our moral potential. On top of concupiscence, there is moral
impotence, and on top of our moral impotence, there is our sinfulness. This is not to say, I
should reiterate, that free, right action is impossible. It remains possible for us by nature,
but as we already saw in the more general treatment of causality above, possessing
proportion to an act is, by itself, to be only possibly acting. Actual action requires the
further ordering of physical premotion for all created causes. Similarly, the proportion to
free, right action still requires a proper spiritual or psychological disposition—a kind of
moral instance of application—to be efficacious, to be actual for the most part, and to
realize itself as an agens perfectum.138
Happily, the theologian may recognize a second category of habits: infused
virtues. The theorem of the supernatural does the heavy lifting on this point. We are, by
nature, proportionate to the acquired virtues, but the proper disposition or relations
(internal or external, in either case) are likely to be lacking that would allow the
proportion of our nature to become actually efficacious in the moral realm. The infused
virtues, then, are entitatively disproportionate to our natures. For one, they are received as
a gift from God and not by means of our own operation. Second, they transform the
disposition of our nature under circumstances in which, though perhaps proportionate to
the operations needed, we lacked the disposition to make them efficacious. Third, they
can also (in the case of the theological virtues: faith, hope, and charity) communicate a
moral form that is, in itself, beyond the proportion of our nature to operate or develop
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habitually. In these three ways, the infused virtues address both the specific theorem of
the need for grace (the state of our nature as fallen) and the generic theorem of our need
for grace (the disproportion of eternal life in God to our created natures).
What is important here, however, is that whether one operates according to his or
her created nature in developing acquired habits (of justice, say, or courage) or one
receives as grace from God the infused virtues (whether, under our dire moral
circumstances those virtues proportionate to our nature, but unavailable to our moral
impotence, or those virtues of faith, hope, and charity disproportionate to our natures), in
both cases we see the created human agent cooperating with divine agency. Not only
does God act to create and conserve the human acts that issue from both kinds of habits,
but God provides both the external and internal relations and dispositions in which the
habits are acquired, received, and/or consist.
What Lonergan has provided are the array of philosophical and theological tools
that Thomas deployed to get a better handle on the ‘natural’ or philosophical element in
the speculative problem of grace and freedom. From these Thomas could derive
speculative theological solutions by analogy. My emphasis, however, has been on the
developments on the philosophical side that accrued from Thomas’s efforts in theology
by this speculative method. If Lonergan’s read is correct, we have a perhaps permanent
achievement with regard to the relation of divine and created causality in general, and
that of divine and human agency specifically. It is a medieval solution to the medieval
problem of the supernatural in its full generality.
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7. Conclusion
Tracing Lonergan’s retrieval of Thomas leads to this perhaps surprising double
conclusion. First, we have seen how the commerce between philosophy and theology in
the Middle Ages produced advances for both fields. A theological problematic spurred
Thomas’s appropriation and augmentation of Aristotle on to philosophical developments
that, whatever dividends they paid in his speculative theological enterprise, stand on their
own merits. Developments on the specific form of the specific medieval problem
generated developments on the generic and specific forms of the generic medieval
problem. These, in turn, rebounded to scaffold Thomas’s eventual solution to the specific
form of the specific medieval problem of the supernatural. The integration of these, then,
constitutes a medieval solution to the entirety of the medieval problem of the
supernatural.
We will see in the next chapter how the benefit philosophy accrued from its
commerce with speculative theology also saddled it with a new problem. When separated
from its cooperative concern with theology, philosophy will discover that these new
developments suggest a fundamental ambiguity from which it cannot, by its own powers,
loose itself. There is the general ambiguity regarding the explicability of the universe (if
any), and alongside it the specific ambiguity of human freedom and its purpose (if any).
Of course, the theologian may recognize how the doctrines of creation and redemption
provide a resolution to these ambiguities. However, insofar as these doctrines must be
affirmed by faith, the theologian cannot absolve us of the philosophically undecidable
choice to which we are called by these ambiguities. In this way the theologian cannot, so
to speak, snatch the analysis of this choice and its grounding ambiguity out of the hands
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of the philosopher. It will remain a perennial ambiguity for philosophy and, as perennial,
it calls out for a philosophical pluralism that can mediate between those philosophies
generated out of the existential postures taken by philosophers.
Above I indicated that what in our free agency we do, we also make in
cooperation with God. What is made by our action, including the fully human worlds of
cultural meaning and value, cannot therefore be bracketed out of our philosophical and
theological inquiries. Chapter 4, then, will indicate how the medieval account of human
and divine cooperation might itself cooperate with modern concerns about the
constitutive function of cultures to suggest a modern problem of the supernatural. The
final chapter, then, will work to sketch a heuristic for an adequately modern approach to
theologies of the supernatural.

CHAPTER 3: MEDIEVAL AMBIGUITIES, MODERN MENTALITY
Our path through Lonergan’s mid-century Thomism had an ulterior motive. I
want to suggest that Thomas’s solution to the medieval problem of the supernatural
ultimately leads to a pair of ambiguous philosophical conclusions. The first is a general
ambiguity that regards the intelligibility of the universe. This is the titular ambiguity of
this study, “the ambiguity of being.” The second is a specific ambiguity that regards the
meaningfulness of human agency and action. We might call this “the ambiguity of being
(free)”. For the purposes of keeping their nested correlation in view, however, here I will
call the former the “general medieval ambiguity” and the latter the “specific medieval
ambiguity.” As we will see, in one respect these ambiguities are subsequent to the
medieval solution to the medieval problem of the supernatural, for they are rendered
thinkable thereby. In another respect, however, we will discover that these ambiguities
also lurk beneath and behind both the general medieval problem and its solution and
undermine the notion that the medieval solution consists entirely in an apodictically
demonstrated fundamental ontology. We will discover that the ontological position on
human freedom and cooperation with God rests on a more basic, existential, and prephilosophical position with regard to the same.
To appreciate the philosophical force of these ambiguities, it was necessary to
know both the synthetic philosophical and theological positions that suggest them. It was
necessary as well to know something of the cooperation between ancient and medieval
philosophy and theology that produced them in the mind of Thomas Aquinas. Those
questions occupied us in Chapter 2, but now we may turn to the ambiguities directly.
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1. The General Medieval Ambiguity
Lonergan praised the theorem of the supernatural for the release it effected in the
thirteenth-century theology of grace, enriching the sense in which grace is at once
gratuitous and necessary. It also cracked open the difficult question of God’s creative and
providential agency. To say that every created cause cooperates with God’s action to
bring about the universe that God intends can, for those prone to praying with their
metaphysics, have profound spiritual significance. But this same theological insistence on
universal instrumentality, resting on the theorem of the supernatural, also produces a
certain deflationary effect on the role that common sense might attribute to God’s agency
in the world. To borrow the words of Matthew Lamb, the truth of the statement, “from
‘all eternity’… God understood and knew and loved such and such to happen,” only
requires that it happen.1 God’s agency causes every cause, without exception or
restriction. But then the question arises: if God causes every cause, what difference does
God’s agency make in the world? This question is at the heart of the first, general
medieval ambiguity.
At one level, this question is easy to answer. God’s agency makes the biggest,
most important, and most fundamental difference there can be: God’s agency causes the
universe, everything in it, and its order of causal unfolding to be at all. If this difference is
not made, between existing and not existing, no other differences matter. But is this
fundamental, binary difference between what is and what is not all there is to it? Now, if
one affirms universal instrumentality and causal cooperation with God within a
1
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speculative theological context controlled by a doctrine of creation, then one has reason
to believe that God’s agency, even though it is unrestricted in scope, is still determinate.
God understood and knew and loved this possible world to be actualized in the temporal
unfolding of the universe. God intended to cause this world and its various beings,
causes, and events.
But if one withdraws from a theological context and enters into a strictly
philosophical method that explicitly prescinds from religious doctrine, the answer to this
question becomes ambiguous. It becomes ambiguous, in particular, whether God’s
agency is determinate or not. From the vantage of the creature’s experience of creaturely
being, untutored by religious doctrine, the data of experience do not so clearly suggest a
determinate relationship to the transcendent. After all, if God’s causal agency acts in
every created cause without limit or exception, what contrast or definition can one trace
in the available evidence that would suggest whether or not God causes the universe to be
and to be thus ordered with any kind of determining or determinate intentionality? Robert
Cummings Neville, for example, comes to the conclusion in God the Creator that God is
the purely indeterminate act of creation, the ur indeterminacy against which every other
thing has determination, and so being.2
Certainly, one can extrapolate from human conceptions of alternative possible
cosmic orders to divine knowledge thereof, but this approach is vulnerable to suspicions
of projection: why does the presence of alternate possible cosmic orders in our minds
necessitate an intentional mind in God whereby God would know those possible worlds
by knowing our conception of them? And why does it necessitate a choice between them
2
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in God? After all, the whole account of free agency provided above rests on the essential
affirmation that apprehended goods (like possible world orders) are not enough to
necessarily move a free will to act. It only secondarily involves the determination of
some means—in this case, the whole unfolding of cosmic process—and perhaps this is
only a condition of temporal freedom. In other words, perhaps God causes what is, but
trivially and not at all lovingly.
Furthermore, if one applies this Thomistic theory of divine agency to what we
now call the ‘natural scientific method,’ God’s agency applies to every side of every
explanatory functional equation. It can, therefore, be cancelled off every side of every
equation without remainder and without making any difference for the correlations, laws,
frequencies, etc., with which the natural sciences are concerned. God’s agency answers
two questions that, while relevant to the prosecution of the scientific method, are not
strictly speaking scientific questions. God’s agency answers whether anything exists at all
and whether the universe is fundamentally intelligible—that is, whether it has a sufficient
reason for existing. However, the procedures of natural scientific inquiry operate quite
happily when these two elements are merely assumed rather than demonstrated.
Let us suppose (as there is ample evidence to do) that the natural sciences
emerged from a Christian horizon of speculative theology, passed through a broadly
Christian period of natural philosophy, only to now emerge in the modern era as a
separated, thoroughly secularized project. The efficacy of their methods has been well
proven, both in the annals of natural knowledge and in the arena of applied engineering
and technological advance. It has carried through all of this the grounding insight into a
distinct line of reference called “nature,” and fundamental assumptions that skeptical
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suspicions about the existence of the universe or its basic intelligibility get one exactly
nowhere. It has, however, quite practically excised the remote principle of these
grounding assumptions: an account of the transcendent creating God. After all, in this
limited respect, Laplace was right: the scientist really does have no need of that
hypothesis to explain the relations among intra-mundane realities (even if he was wrong
about their mechanistically determinist character).3
The scientific method, because it assumes the fundamental intelligibility of the
universe, may come around to ask after its own fundamental assumption. But the
intended term of this question—the reason there is anything at all and that all of it is the
way it is—would have to be transcendent at the very least with regard to time and space.
Consequently, there will be, by definition, no direct data on the term intended by this
question. There remains what Lonergan calls the data of consciousness on the intention of
complete intelligibility itself and this could be taken as data on the term of this
fundamental question. One can, it is true, trust the intellectual thrust of this intention of
complete intelligibility and so extrapolate from it a heuristic for the transcendent term
that explains the existence of the universe and its order. This is what Lonergan himself
does in chapter 19 of Insight.4
One can also reasonably suspect that it is an act of androcentric projection to take
this questioning intention of being’s complete intelligibility as evidence that there is in
fact an answer to one’s fundamental question. One can affirm the intention itself (after
all, there is data on it among the data of consciousness) and still demand further evidence
3

On Laplace’s mistake, see Patrick H. Byrne, "God and the Statistical Universe," Zygon: Journal
of Religion & Science 16, no. 4 (1981): 345–63.
4

Bernard Lonergan, Insight: A Study of Human Understanding, eds. Frederick E. Crowe and
Robert M. Doran, CWL 3 (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2000), 657–708.

123
on its term. But such data, in principle, cannot be forthcoming. Thus one might come to
the inverse insight that the universe is only intelligible proximate to our evolved
intellectual powers. When it comes to the fundamental question regarding the explanation
of existence and the existing cosmic order, there is no intelligibility where one expects it
to be. At bottom, the existence of the universe is a bare matter of fact and so an absurdity.
This possibility reveals that there is a general medieval ambiguity and that this is its
negative pole.
With regard to the general medieval ambiguity, the answer at which one arrives
depends upon the basic existential comportment one has towards the question that reveals
it. If one chooses to trust the thrust of the questioning intention of complete intelligibility,
one can come to an ontologically affirmative, if formally heuristic answer with regard to
God and the explicability of the universe. If, however, one chooses to be suspicious and
distrusting of this same thrust, one is equally warranted in coming to the opposite
conclusion. In either case, there are no data on the term of inquiry to adjudicate between
these fundamental options. Moreover, in each case, one can look back at the courses of
inquiry by which one was led to either conclusion and reinterpret what one knows of the
universe accordingly. For the first course, one finds a world known, chosen, loved by a
God transcendently operating in every effective mundane operation. From the second
existential posture, one can read the universe as a determinate, but accidental being that
seems to permit us to understand it up to a certain point, but if pushed too far rebuffs our
human-sized minds and turns a cold shoulder to any naïve, anthropomorphic projections
of intelligence or intention. The ambiguity resides in the givenness of finite, contingent
existence as apprehended from the abstractive viewpoint of a separated philosophy.
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Which conclusion one comes to follows from a pre-philosophical and philosophically
undecidable decision.
More importantly, one can look back from the conclusion of one line of inquiry
and see the possibility of the other. This, after all, is what I have just done. Following
Lonergan following Thomas, with the aid of the Christian dogmatic context and
Thomas’s speculative innovations and syntheses, the above spelled out a philosophy that
takes the complete intelligibility of the universe as its proper heuristic expectation and so
baptizes the thrust of the human mind towards total explanation. Consequently, a theory
of transcendent divine agency can emerge to fill in precisely how the existence and
intelligibility of the universe is grounded. Nonetheless, the very same theory can reveal,
as it has above, the possibility of an alternative interpretation from within the abstractive
viewpoint of a separated philosophy. Conversely, because the suspicious cosmological
nihilist cannot find data to confirm his or her inverse insight into the explicability of the
universe within the universe itself, he or she is also invited to construct an alternative
interpretation that cannot be conclusively ruled out. A theory of divine concursus,
grounded in the theorem of the supernatural, invites philosophy to discover that what
conclusions it can generate on its own about the fundamental explicability of being are
unavoidably ambiguous.
2. The Specific Medieval Ambiguity
Human action, qua cause, has cooperation with God in common with all created
causes. In this way, human action participates in the general medieval ambiguity. This
was already implied above, insofar as the interpretation an inquirer chooses with regard
to the fundamental explicability of the universe has implications for his or her read of
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what is already known, but also for how he or she will conduct him or herself as an
inquirer (and person) in the future. But this only hints at the further, specific medieval
ambiguity to which the above philosophy of divine agency leads us. Human action
cooperates with God freely, and so as the underlying question of the general medieval
ambiguity was, “what difference does God’s action make for created causes?” the
underlying question of the specific medieval ambiguity is, “what difference does God’s
action make for free human agency?”
As before, the question is easy to answer at first. God acts in every free human
action. God’s action first of all causes free human agents to exist and by the providential
ordering of the cosmos applies us to our effects. But this is not all. Lonergan summarizes
the volitional specifications of this general cooperation as follows:
In the exercise of a formally free act, a person is the cause per se, inasmuch as
having willed the end and deliberated on the basis of this willing of the end, one
now moves oneself to willing the means to the end. Yet God too is a cause per se
of this same exercise of the will. For a cause of a cause is a cause of the effect;
and God causes the act of willing the end, causes the intellectual light by which
one reflects and deliberates, and causes all the external circumstances as well as
one’s interior habits and dispositions. In the specification of this same formally
free act, a person is the cause per se inasmuch as by willing the end one wills this
particular practical judgment to be the final one in accordance with which one
moves to will the good presented by that judgment. Yet God too is a cause per se
of this same specification of the will, since the specification is itself intelligibly
contained in the antecedents of that free act. But there is a triple intelligible nexus
between this free act and its antecedents; therefore, since God causes the
antecedents, he also causes the specification of the free act.5
God therefore also causes the act of the will by which human actions are essentially free
in several ways: first, by kindling in the will desire for some bonum apprehensum;
second, by making the means to this end spatiotemporally available to us; third, by
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illuminating intellectually the process of deliberation by which means are selected;
fourth, by having this same causal efficacy upon all our previous actions such that we
have the dispositions and habits by which we are not just exteriorly related properly to
our chosen end and means, but also interiorly.
These specifications are important for properly understanding how the general
account of cooperation between divine and created causality works in the case of free
human agency, but they do not eliminate the above, general ambiguity. God causes the
will and the mind to be according to their dynamic nature, and causes the order of the
cosmos by which both external and internal premotions apply possible free human agents
to their effects. This causality is as universal in rational, free agents as it is in mindless,
physical causes. The same fundamental ambiguity applies, therefore. Is human action
fundamentally intelligible as a part of the universe or is it only accidentally susceptible to
the manipulations of our evolved intellectual powers and so only proximately intelligible
in the final analysis? From a strictly philosophical vantage, the same pre-philosophical
decision haunts the interpretation of the specific case of free human agency as it did the
case of created causality in general.
There is a further issue in the case of free human causality. In addition to the
radical answer that is God’s irresistible creative action, there is also a proximate answer
to the question, “why does this action exist?” This action, as mine and free, exists or not
because of my choice to effect it or not. This is not to deny that only God is proportionate
to causing existence as an effect, but rather to acknowledge that free human agents have a
special kind of cooperation with God. Causes that lack freedom, if they are proportionate
to an effect and they are brought into the proper relation or disposition to the proper

127
material conditions or circumstances, act of necessity. But God may kindle the desire for
an end in our will, may illuminate our deliberations about some means, may put us in
both the proper external and internal disposition to some action, and yet we may decide
otherwise. These fundamental aspects of our liberty mean that, whatever the antecedents,
free human actions have as their proximate explanation the choices of free human
persons. Liberty with regard to our actions is not something in excess of God’s action in
our action. It is precisely that which God effects in irresistibly acting to cause the reality
of our freedom, both in its essential generality and its effective concreteness. Your
freedom and mine—as free—is God’s instrument in the universe.
We are led to what in a speculative theological horizon is perhaps unproblematic,
but when tackled from within the horizon of a separated philosophy becomes an
inescapable ambiguity. If one’s inquiry is controlled (as a speculative theology must be)
by doctrines of creation, of divine justice, and of redemption, then this freedom must be
considered correlative to the already-affirmed teleology of the moral grain of the universe
and the eschatology of humanity’s (and all of creation’s) ultimate union with God.
However, if one withdraws these doctrinal correlates from the inquiry and instead takes a
separated philosophical approach, one is again faced with a pre-philosophical choice that
makes all the difference for how one interprets the data of free human action. As in the
general ambiguity, which interpretation one takes follows from a pre-philosophical
choice.
This pre-philosophical act of freedom is part of what shapes the ambiguity itself.
We might be led by the general ambiguity to suppose that, parallel with its option to
affirm or deny the fundamental intelligibility of the universe, the specific ambiguity
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presents the option to affirm or deny freedom in one’s own being. Although such a choice
would be likewise pre-philosophical, and thus not necessarily ruled out concretely on
account of performative contradiction, it is at the same time pre-philosophical, and so
would be recognized as a ‘false start’ to any genuinely philosophical account of human
being and freedom. If one’s philosophical inquiry into the intelligibility of the universe of
being leads one to the inverse insight that there is no basic explanation for existence, one
might be troubled by the circularity in suspecting the intelligence that anticipated there
should be, but there is no contradiction. However, if one comes to the philosophical
conclusion that human freedom is not a reality, but then one retrospectively
acknowledges that this process began in a choice to be suspicious about the being of
freedom, the circularity is overshadowed by the obvious contradiction.
The specific ambiguity, however, is not about whether or not there is any freedom
at all, but the significance of the freedom that is. The parallel with the general ambiguity
regards the question of ground. In the general ambiguity, one chooses how to
primordially relate to the intelligible ground of the universe of causes (if any), and in the
specific ambiguity one chooses how to primordially relate to the intelligible ground of
freedom (if any). If I take the pre-philosophical posture towards my freedom that I have it
for some reason, even if that reason is unknown, I can appropriate that agency with an
aim to discern what that reason is and to exercise my freedom with devotion to its
purpose, even if that purpose is unseen. On the other hand, I can just as intelligently take
a posture of suspicion towards my freedom, deciding that in the absence of evidence of
some ground, I am not justified to suppose it has any ground at all. This suspicion will
undoubtedly be confirmed, since there can be no direct data on a transcendent ground.
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From the vantage of this posture, my freedom cannot but be exercised arbitrarily, because
it exists arbitrarily. My only recourse against the imposition of freedom, then, is to
appropriate my freedom for what Camus called “rebellion.” Note that, in either
interpretation, there is no falling for the myth that my freedom is self-grounding, nor any
dodging the fact that, because I am the cause of my acting or not acting, my actions are
my responsibility. Either way, I am free and I must freely choose how to comport myself
to that fact.
3. Realizing the Medieval Ambiguities
To review then, the generic medieval ambiguity concerned the possibility of
comporting one’s self to the question of a transcendent cause of the universe of causes in
one of two basic ways: either as a matter of indifference or of fundamental importance,
on account in either case of the very universality of its efficacy. The specific medieval
ambiguity concerned free human agency among the universe of causes and in relation to
a transcendent cause. The specific medieval ambiguity poses a similar alternative to the
free agent, to comport him or herself to the meaningfulness and purposiveness of his or
her agency in one of two ways: to suppose it has some meaning and purpose (though
transcendent, and so unknown) or as an unavoidable, but nonetheless absurd project. We
also saw how Thomas Aquinas’s solution to the medieval problems of the supernatural
made cognizance of these medieval ambiguities possible. The transcendence of God’s ad
extra action leaves any account of its immanent effects—which is to say, any ontology—
open to one of these two basic, pre-philosophical postures: on the one hand, faith in the
basic explicability of the universe and of human action within it; on the other, suspicion
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that the universe and so human action within it are both mere matters of fact that admit of
no fundamental explanation.
Now, that it became possible to take stock of these ontological ambiguities in
light of Thomas’s synthesis did not mean that, in the near term, anyone actually did. In
order that the illumination of the medieval ambiguities becomes not just possible, but
probable, another factor is required: a modern philosophical mentality. This mentality
eventually forced the medieval ambiguities down stage in the performance of ontology.
Although I have called these ambiguities “medieval” according to the era of speculative
development that made them possible, putting them in the spotlight is a distinctly modern
achievement. This chapter, then, is our pivot from the medieval ambiguities to the
distinctly modern form of the problem of the supernatural.
In what follows, I describe relevant aspects of the modern philosophical mentality
and how, at the turn of the twentieth century, Maurice Blondel approached the medieval
problem of the supernatural in an explicitly modern fashion. Blondel’s treatment of the
problem shows how a modern mentality led him to the medieval ambiguities. I will also
briefly consider Jean Paul Sartre’s Being and Nothingness as an example of an alternative
ontology made possible by the medieval ambiguities considered from within the modern
philosophical mentality. Where Blondel can find no immanent explanation for human
action, but takes this as evidence that there must be a transcendent and supernatural
explanation, Sartre reads the absence of immanent explanation for being as an
inexplicability proper to being in-itself. From the abstractive viewpoint of theology and
what below I will call a “subordinated philosophy,” both interpretations are supported by
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the evidence on the universe of human action precisely because God’s ad extra agency is
universally effective.
3.1. The Modern Philosophical Mentality
What is the “modern philosophical mentality?” What about it makes cognizance
of the medieval ambiguities probable? This modern philosophical mentality has, in my
view, two salient features. First, it is a “separated” philosophy. Its inquiry does not begin
from, nor is it ordered towards illuminating any revealed doctrine. Second, it elevates the
via inventionis—the path of discovery—to a criterion for the validity of knowledge,
where the quality of one’s investigation serves as the measure of the investigation’s
results. Perhaps some will feel I have selected idiosyncratic markers of “the modern” in
philosophy, but these seem to function behind and beneath a number of more
“traditionally” identified features of modern philosophy. A modern aversion to authority
or tradition may be read as a bi-product of a more fundamental, post-medieval
transformation in philosophy’s understanding of its own project. In the modern frame,
theology’s handmaid is now self-employed. The privileging of the via inventionis can be
correlated with the turn to the subject for which modernity is so well known, but that
phrase (“turn to the subject”) carries with it a host of problematically dualistic
assumptions about consciousness and knowledge that tend to muddy the waters. I will
briefly address some of those assumptions below, but for now suffice it to say that
characterizing this focus on the operation of the investigator does not have to be a move
“inside” our heads, nor a move “away” from das Ding an sich. Rather, it amounts
foremost to a demotion of the logical criterion for validating knowledge that drove the
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construction of late-scholastic treatises and early-modern rationalist philosophical
systems.
3.2. Subordinated Philosophy
In the medieval situation, Thomas Aquinas identified two kinds of argument in
theology. He writes,
One kind of argument is directed to removing doubts as to whether something is
so. In such arguments in theology, one relies especially on the authorities that are
recognized by the persons with whom one is disputing ...
But another kind of argument is that of the teacher in the schools. It seeks not to
remove error but to instruct the students so that they understand the truth that the
teacher hopes to convey. In such cases it is important to base one's argument on
reasons that go to the root of the truth in question, that make hearers understand
how what is said is true. Otherwise, if the teacher settles a question simply by an
appeal to authorities, the students will have their certitude that the facts are indeed
as stated; but they will acquire no knowledge or understanding, and they will go
away empty.6
Speculative theology is concerned with the latter form of argumentation. It begins from
difficulties understanding the coherence of doctrines that are already affirmed,
individually and in aggregate, as true by faith and on the authority of the Church. “A
person who is seeking an understanding of the mysteries is not asking,” Lonergan writes
in The Triune God: Systematics, “whether there are mysteries or whether they are true.”7
Instead, speculative theology deploys a subordinated philosophy to better understand how
these already-affirmed doctrinal elements cohere. Subordinated philosophy, therefore,
has its program set for it by the speculative theological endeavor. This does not mean that
subordinated philosophy simply provides logical forms for hashing through the
6
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propositional content of the dogmas. Rather, subordinated philosophy operates with a
relative autonomy to clarify everything in a theological problem that is not itself the
mystery believed by faith. When the work of subordinated philosophy is done, “it leaves
to faith not human problems, nor the human element in religious problems, but the pure
formulation of the point that cannot be encompassed by the human understanding.”8 It
leaves, in other words, that element in the problem that is properly hidden in the mystery
of God. As we saw in the previous chapter, philosophy was not necessarily hampered by
this arrangement. No small philosophical advances were made from within its unfolding.
Beyond this direct treatment of the creaturely element in speculative problems, theology
“also finds in the natural order, as philosophically analyzed, the analogies necessary for
the scientific conception of purely theological data.”9 In the case of the Trinitarian dogma
this is especially important, for there is, strictly speaking, no intrinsic human element in
need of clarification.
Speculative theology becomes a systematic theology when the questions and
answers pursued in cooperation with a subordinated philosophy are sapientially ordered
according to their relative priority. This order of priority can take different forms, but its
underlying purpose is to provide understanding not of this or that element in a theological
problem, but of the whole. Lonergan identifies two basic forms of this ordering: the “via
inventionis” and the “via doctrinae”. Following the via inventionis (as I did in the first
part of the previous chapter detailing the development of Thomas’s philosophy of
agency), the material is organized by the process of inquiry and insight to show how the

8

Bernard Lonergan, Grace and Freedom: Operative Grace in the Thought of St Thomas Aquinas,
eds. Frederick E. Crowe and Robert M. Doran, CWL 1 (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2005), 171.
9

Bernard Lonergan, Grace and Freedom,175.

134
required speculative elements came to view such that the final position is now possible.
Following the via doctrinae (as I did when stating Thomas’s synthetic position on ad
extra divine agency), one can arrange these elements for the purpose of communicating
directly the whole position, so that the answer to any particular question does not
presuppose some answer not already provided. For Lonergan, the via doctrinae “begins
with concepts that are fundamental and especially simple, so that by adding a step at a
time it may proceed in an orderly way to the understanding of an entire science.”10 For
speculative theology the via doctrinae is given pride of place, because its doctrinal
elements are affirmed with certainty on the authority of the Church and the aim is to
understand their coherence to the extent our finite minds are able. The via doctrinae is the
properly systematic presentation of a systematic theology, communicating an imperfect,
analogical, persistently-obscure-but-nonetheless-fruitful understanding in its present state
of always-ongoing development.11
3.3. Separated Philosophy
A separated philosophy, by contrast, does not receive its marching orders from a
theology. It is perhaps obvious that the dogmatic context is that from which a separated
philosophy is separated. Too often, though, this is taken in the flatfooted sense that a
separated philosophy is liberated from the obligation to come to points of doctrine as the
ready-made conclusion to its arguments.12 But for speculative theology in Thomas’s
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medieval mode, philosophy is never working directly towards the doctrines themselves as
conclusions. Rather, separated philosophy is separated from its obligations to answer first
those questions that concern the created element in a theology’s problem(s) of dogmatic
understanding. Separation from a dogmatic context, moreover, does not mean that a
philosophy has no doctrines whatsoever, but rather that its doctrines are not accepted with
certainty on the authority of the Church, of scripture, etc. A separated philosophy’s
doctrines are accepted in the provisional fashion of the dialectician, which is to say they
are accepted until they can be established on independent grounds or overturned. In this
way, for a separated philosophy, credulity and suspicion are placed on equal footing.
How, then, are the doctrines of a separated philosophy established or overturned?
As I suggested above, the modern philosophical mentality makes of the philosophical via
inventionis both a measure for and a form of argumentation about philosophical
doctrines, considered individually or as a unified system. The ideal of coherence proper
to the theological via doctrinae is no longer an appropriate measure of a separated
philosophy’s provisionally accepted doctrines. Separated philosophy installs in its place
the relative rigor and authenticity of the intellectual labors by which various
philosophical doctrines have been derived. How one came to this or that bit of
philosophical insight, for the modern philosophical mentality, becomes a way of
adjudicating the reliability and validity of the insight itself. Moreover, arguing in support
of one’s philosophical doctrine becomes, in no small part, a matter of rehearsing the path
travelled to it. Let us consider below an example of these two elements at work in a
pivotal work of modern thought.
all. See Bertrand Russell, A History of Western Philosophy (New York, NY: Simon and Schuster, 1945),
452–462.
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3.3.1. Descartes’s The Discourse on the Method
René Descartes, in The Discourse on the Method, provides a famous early
example of the modern philosophical mentality for which I have been setting the scene.
My reading may seem to run counter to the widespread, “received” account of
Descartes’s Discourse, especially insofar as it minimizes the sense that he effects a
radical break with medieval metaphysics, trading it in for a skeptical and borderline
solipsistic subjectivism. This “received” reading has Descartes’s turn to methodical doubt
yield self-referential certitude for the ego and inferential certitude of God’s existence.
Once the latter affirmation is revealed as so-much motivated reasoning, however, it is a
rather straight shot (the story goes) to the critical immanentism of Immanuel Kant’s
Critique of Pure Reason. Instead, by identifying what I think is a more fundamental shift
in mentality (philosophy’s separation from a dogmatic context and the installation of the
via inventionis as its criteria of validity), we can come to see how ontology remains a
core, even central concern for Descartes, even though ontology as a method has been deprioritized in favor of epistemology. Still, as I suggested above, this “turn to the subject”
is a secondary effect of this more basic transition that Descartes will help us illustrate
below.
In the Discourse, Descartes expresses his dissatisfaction that, though “it had been
cultivated by the best minds for many centuries,” philosophical doctrines were widely
disputed, with many learned figures defending “different opinions on the same subject.”13
More than this, he expresses his further dissatisfaction that the fashion in which these
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various doctrines were defended amounted to no more than a defense of their
“plausibility.” Their coherence was asserted by something like what above I called a via
doctrinae. This coherence only served to show that these positions could be true, not that
they in fact were. Indeed, this seems to him the chief virtue (read: vice) of the philosophy
of his contemporaries: it “provides us with the means of speaking plausibly about
anything.”14 Even logic seems to him a device for rigorously and carefully
communicating to others what one thinks one already knows, or (worse) speaking
rigorously and carefully to others about that of which one is ignorant.15 It does not, in any
case, seem to hold much value for Descartes in generating knowledge de novo. While he
in many places affirms his devotion to the teachings and authority of the Church, he
assiduously denies that he has possession of the elevations of grace necessary for direct
insight into matters theological.16 Because he feels inadequate to evaluate those doctrines
independently, those teachings cannot themselves serve as the kind of philosophical
ground for the philosophical doctrines of which Descartes found himself bereft.
Consequently, Descartes’s philosophy is going to be a separated philosophy.
As famous as Descartes has become for his methodical doubt, Descartes begins
the Discourse with an affirmation of reason that one might easily overlook. “Good sense
is the most evenly distributed thing in the world.” Moreover, “the power of judging
correctly and of distinguishing the true from the false… is naturally equal in all men(.)”
Facility in applying reason well, however, is distributed unevenly.17 In other words,
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reason as a native power in human beings is unproblematic; the problem comes when
reason has to be concretized by application to reality. Consequently, Descartes’s
persuasive procedure consists in sharing with his reader the path he takes on the ways to
his philosophical doctrines, thereby detailing the application of his powers of reasoning
to the problem of knowledge. He even gives a kind of short intellectual biography to
frame his investigation.18 The method by which he derived and (in his own estimation)
grounded his doctrines features centrally in this rehearsal. Surveying the path to his
philosophical doctrine and its attendant method will, Descartes tells us, provide what is
required that “everyone may come to a judgment about it.”19 Notice what Descartes has
done: he has proposed from the beginning that his via inventionis—his path of
discovery—should serve as the criterion by which his philosophical doctrines should be
measured and evaluated. Moreover, he has explicitly appealed to the transcendence and
so cognitional disproportion of revealed doctrines to human minds to justify pursuing a
separated, rather than subordinated philosophical project. We have in Descartes, then, an
instance of the modern philosophical mentality where its two salient features serve an
integral function.
Descartes’s philosophical method comes with a host of problematic assumptions.
He assumes that philosophical principles must function like geometric axioms. He
assumes that this geometric approximation means a philosophical method can be
followed automatically insofar as one knows the rules of operation.20 He assumes that
there is a hard binary in knowledge between what is certain and what is dubitable and that
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it justifies universal methodical doubt.21 Indeed, he assumes that universal methodical
doubt is possible at all. He assumes that individual control of thought is obviously to be
preferred to the communal aggregation of understanding.22 Several of these
assumptions—about methodical doubt and about the individual control of thought
especially—lend credence to the impression that the modern philosophical mentality is
foremost a skeptical turn inward to the subject and away from the world of really real
things. But Descartes does not come to a philosophical viewpoint “trapped” inside the
mind of the subject. His basic position is not merely epistemological, but also explicitly
metaphysical. Cogito ergo sum implies that thinking is indubitable to itself, but also, let
us not forget, explicitly asserts that thinking is. Thought turned to itself is at once a fact,
an activity, and an apprehension of being. Thinking recognizes itself in act, and this act
exists. It exists in that which I cannot but call “I”, and so exists substantially. But
substantially existing things have essences, and so Descartes determines that the thing
which I call “I” is a “thinking thing.”23
It is important, therefore, not to be led too swiftly down a “subjectivist” or
“immanentist” road by what Descartes is arguing because he is discussing thought or
because the history of philosophy tends to emphasize it. Having just established that
thinking can know itself as being, he wonders whether those thoughts a thinking thing
thinks, because they are about entities other than its own thinking, have an extra-mental
reality—whether they have what he will later call res extensa, distinct from res cogitans.
That Descartes imports a dualistic, “in-here” and “out-there” distinction conflicts with his
21
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own insistence that what keeps people from apprehending the force of his arguments is a
failure to “rise above” the sensible in their thinking, so that “everything which seems
unimaginable seems to them unintelligible.”24 Descartes’s dualism betrays his own
failure to follow all the way through on his methodical doubt of the sensible. Although he
insists himself that it is the insensible intellect that knows being, and not the senses, he
makes of the extended and sensible a distinct “nature.”25 Nonetheless, though we might
wish Descartes had taken up a more intellectualist realism in general, the above muddle
turns out to be beside my main point. Descartes’s foundational position only serves his
philosophical aims if it is a metaphysical position. To defend his metaphysical doctrine,
Descartes appeals to his process of inquiry as the criterion for the validity of his
knowledge. He explicitly deploys his via inventionis as the argument for the verity of his
position. In this way, Descartes’s project is modern because it operates in separation from
the dictates of a dogmatic theological project and it gives intellectual operation pride of
place as its internal criterion of validity.
3.4. Maurice Blondel’s Modern Philosophical Mentality
Let us turn now from that brief illustration of the modern philosophical mentality
to its substantive influence on the problem of the supernatural and the medieval
ambiguities of being. If the medieval solution to the problem of the supernatural made
cognizance of the medieval ambiguities possible and the modern philosophical mentality
made it probable, Maurice Blondel’s philosophy of action made it actual. On the eve of
the twentieth century, Blondel made bold to raise the problem of the supernatural in a
24
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thoroughly modern way for a modern audience.26 By articulating the medieval solution to
the medieval problem of the supernatural in a thoroughly modern fashion, Blondel can
make the attendant medieval ambiguities apparent to the modern mind, preparing the
ground for the genuinely modern form of the problem of the supernatural to arise. The
following, then, will ask and answer a series of questions about Blondel’s philosophy of
action and the supernatural. How is Blondel’s approach modern? How does it raise the
medieval problem of the supernatural in this modern fashion? How does it answer that
problem in a modern way? How does it articulate the medieval ambiguities in light of this
answer? Finally, in what ways does Blondel’s modern philosophical approach to the
problem of the supernatural fail to be yet-fully-modern?
3.4.1. Blondel’s Modern Philosophical Method
Blondel called his philosophical method a “method of immanence.”27 It consists
in “trying to equate, in our own consciousness, what we appear to think and to will and to
do with what we do and will and think in actual fact(.)”28 It recognizes that any and every
idea of the transcendent is just that: an idea, and not the transcendent itself. Therefore,

26

We will come to see that Blondel’s philosophy, though its procedure is modern in the ways
described above, still it does not yet set out to face a modern form of the problem of the supernatural, nor
does he therefore alight upon a corresponding modern solution.
27

Blondel’s most famous excursus on philosophical method can be found in an essay written
shortly after the publication of L’Action (1893) in 1896, “Lettre sur les exigences de la pensée
contemporaine en matiere d'apologétique et sur la méthode de la philosophie dans l'étude du probleme
religieux,” since translated and published in English under the somewhat misleading, but rather more pithy
title, “The Letter on Apologetics” (Maurice Blondel, The Letter on Apologetics and History and Dogma
[Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1994]). Blondel would later become embroiled in the Francophone debates
about the possibility of Christian philosophy. For an excellent overview and a handful of newly translated
primary texts, see Gregory B. Sadler, Reason Fulfilled by Revelation: The 1930s Christian Philosophy
Debates in France (Washington, D.C.: Catholic University of America Press, 2011). Henri de Lubac’s
synthesizing intervention is also well worth tracking down (Henri de Lubac, "On Christian Philosophy,"
Communio 19 [Fall 1992]: 478–506).
28

Blondel, Letter on Apologetics, 157.

142
short of the transcendent revealing itself to us supernaturally, we must critically
investigate it by surveying and evaluating our immanent notions and motives.29 Blondel
specified the method of immanence in distinction from a philosophically unfounded
“doctrine of immanence.” The doctrine of immanence tries to “make a transcendent truth
of the negation of the transcendent or of the supernatural… content (with) explaining the
manifold interdependent and heterogeneous aspects of thought by one another and to
reintegrate all forms of life into the unity of a single determinism(.)”30 Blondel was
convinced that a philosophical doctrine of immanence, a priori foreclosing the
transcendent and supernatural from philosophical discourse, was incompatible with
thought that proceeds according to modern philosophy’s highest principles and
aspirations. Moreover, he thought that “the only possible religious philosophy, which is
truly religious and truly a philosophy, results from these principles.”31 Though he was
quite explicit that the secularizing doctrine of immanence was modern philosophy’s great
error, Blondel thought of the method of immanence as one of modern philosophy’s great
achievements.32
Blondel was fond of such conceptual pairings, often giving them mnemonically
impossible appellations: the willed will and the willing will; afference and efference,33
integrism and integralism,34 mobiles and motives,35 etc. This pair in particular—the
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method of immanence and the doctrine of immanence—crystallizes Blondel’s
philosophical approach. Blondel did not tend to oppose an idea or philosophical outlook
by brute force. He instead showed how an ostensibly self-standing idea betrays its
incompleteness by its internal structure. He writes of this technique,
We must, taking within ourselves all consciousnesses, become the intimate
accomplice of all, in order to see if they bear within themselves their own
justification or condemnation. They have to become arbiters of themselves; they
have to see where their most frank and their most interior will would lead them;
they have to learn what they do without knowing it, and what they already know
without willing it and without doing it.36
When Blondel accused modern, secular philosophies of adhering to a doctrine of
immanence, he did not just accuse them of being unfairly hostile to religion in general or
theology in particular. Nor did he merely point out the scotoma of prejudice in their
worldview and its effect on their philosophies. By pointing out the doctrine of
immanence at work in modern, secular philosophies, Blondel accused philosophers of
being insufficiently modern in their approach. Instead of attacking the anti-religious selfunderstanding of modern philosophy headlong, Blondel subverted it, insisting modern
philosophy follow its own core methodological commitments to their limit. There is no
rectilinear genealogy of decline or wish-dream of repristination at work in Blondel’s
criticism of modern philosophy. Blondel encouraged modern philosophy to be both more
philosophical and more modern, not less so. Only in this way could modern philosophy
show to the modern mind the necessity of making the supernatural a philosophic term
(albeit in a methodically controlled and, as we will see, strictly heuristic sense).
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Blondel’s philosophy of action, then, is self-consciously modern philosophy. In
what way is it modern? It shares the two basic commitments outlined above as “the
modern philosophical mentality.” First, it is separated philosophy, unsubordinated to a
dogmatic context. Second, it treats the philosopher’s via inventionis—that is, his path of
philosophical investigation and discovery—as the basic criterion of validity, even truth.
Theologians and Christian philosophers sometimes see these elements of modern
philosophy as inimical to the prospect of integrating philosophy with Christian faith.
Separated philosophy seems to a priori rule inadmissible a core Christian commitment:
that there are revealed and authoritative doctrines and that these doctrines are true. The
elevation of the via inventionis to a criterion of validity and truth seems a fortiori to
foreclose the very category of revealed doctrine. After all, if conclusions can only be
verified to the extent the philosopher can exposit the validity of their derivation, then
doctrines of supernatural provenance cannot be verified or, in the strongest form of the
claim, be true at all. The startling genius of Action appears when these basic
commitments are shown as the very source of philosophy’s necessary affirmation of the
supernatural in general and supernatural religion in particular.
Blondel contends that a critical attitude towards the authority of religiously
revealed doctrines can be the very thing that makes modern, separated philosophy
practicable for Christians. True, the dogmas of faith cannot be entered into philosophic
discourse as is, nor can they anymore control its procedure or direct its outcomes. But
Blondel’s radicalized method of immanence also excludes the philosophical doctrine that
only purely immanent accounts of reality are admissible as philosophic explanation. This
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position would arbitrarily privilege certain prospective doctrines over others.37 Modern
philosophy must be willing to admit doctrines containing transcendent terms so long as
they have been derived according to the method of immanence. Thus, Blondel’s
argument in Action shows how the modern commitment to philosophy’s autonomy
should prevent modern philosophers from excluding the supernatural from their
philosophies. “It would be strange, therefore,” he writes, “if it were scientific to exclude
what it is not scientific to admit(.)”38 Taking the separated-ness of philosophy to mean
that the supernatural, a priori, cannot be a term in modern philosophy makes this
exclusion itself into an inviolable doctrine, subordinating philosophy to a secularizing
program. This ironically violates the principle behind an appropriately modern “method
of immanence” and only gives these philosophies the appearance of separated autonomy.
For Blondel, modern philosophy gives pride of place to autonomy and autochthony.
Indeed, his notion of what counts as philosophical immanence is controlled by these twin
characteristics.39
We begin to see how Blondel’s is a “method of immanence” for an even more
basic reason. His refusal to privilege any doctrine presupposes a commitment to only
considering doctrines insofar as they are the product of human reasoning and willing.
37
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True, prospective philosophical doctrines can enter into Blondel’s philosophical dialectic
from any quarter (including, it turns out, that of supernatural religion). However, only
those doctrines that can be evaluated and verified according to the native resources of the
philosopher can survive this dialectic to be affirmed and not merely entertained. From a
certain angle, this is what it means to call his notion of modern philosophy ‘critical’: it
can give an account of itself both as a body of doctrine, but also as giving rise to and even
verifying those doctrines. “The difficulty,” Blondel writes, “is to introduce nothing
external or artificial into this profound drama of life; it is, if need be, to correct reason
and the will through reason and the will themselves.”40 But recourse to the via inventionis
in this way means that all affirmed philosophical doctrines presuppose their own
proportionality to human powers of reasoning. Hence Blondel’s appellation: a method of
immanence.
3.4.2. Blondel’s Modern Form of the Medieval Problem
Blondel’s “critique of life and science of practice” in Action is modern because it
proceeds under these twin conditions of the modern philosophical mentality. How then
does Blondel’s philosophy of action raise the medieval problem of the supernatural in a
modern way? First of all, we can contrast it with Aquinas’s way of raising the problem.
Blondel does not a priori privilege or refuse to consider any plausible philosophical
doctrine. Even more than this, if his via inventionis will demonstrate the truth of his
conclusion and not just its plausibility, then Blondel must rigorously survey and
dialectically disqualify other explanations of human action. He writes,
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As I approach the science of action, then, I can take nothing for granted, no facts,
no principles, no duties. It is to strip myself of every precarious support that I
have been working…We must enter into all prejudices, as if they were legitimate,
into all errors, as if they were sincere, into all passions, as if they had the
generosity they boast of, into all philosophical systems, as if each one held in its
grip the infinite truth it thinks it has cornered.41
Thus, where Thomas considers alternative opinions in the ancillary space provided for
objections, Blondel centers the internal logic of a succession of philosophical doctrines
purporting to provide an adequate explanation of human action on their own. Where
Thomas incisively reveals the mistaken assumptions behind mistaken objections, Blondel
goes to great pains showing how these candidates for the complete explanation of action
fail to meet even their own internal criteria for validity. The aesthete makes a singleminded purpose of distractedly flitting from project to project.42 The nihilist cannot
detach his or her denial of meaning from the “something” it denies.43 The positive
scientist cannot provide sense data on the intelligibilities he or she finds in what is
observed.44 The secular humanist cannot avoid being superstitious in his or her
repudiation of superstition.45 Because the rigor of Blondel’s demonstration relies on
showing his phenomenological procedure, he cannot rely on an analytic argument that
would exclude these perspectives a priori. According to his method of immanence,
41
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Blondel must take up an a posteriori procedure, and so he moves methodically from
arena to arena of human action, from doctrine to prospective doctrine, excluding every
purely immanent candidate.
It is common to hear expositors of Blondel emphasize how his philosophy
demonstrates the necessity of the supernatural by following the élan of the human will
from its interior movement, through its various efforts to satisfy itself, and then out
beyond the limits of the whole universe, showing that nothing in creation is adequate to
the native desire of the human will. In the contemporary, anglophone controversy over
the surnaturel, this is often equated with the theologian’s notion of a natural desire to see
God.46 Blondel, of course, does in part argue according to this trajectory and did affirm
something like the natural desire to see God (he called it the “trans-natural” character of
the human will in his defense of Social Catholicism).47 But if one attends only to
Blondel’s analysis of the will’s infinite dynamism and desire, one can overlook the way
in which Blondel installs the medieval problem of the supernatural in the very heart of
Action.
Blondel shows how even the most sincere and sophisticated effort to explain
human action does not just fail in its highest aspiration to explain human destiny per se. A
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fortiori, he shows that it fails at any and every level of analysis.48 Whether at the first
stirring of our interior life or our orientation towards creation as a whole or anywhere in
between, whether one appeals to the positive sciences, the structure of rational agency
itself, or to the universal moral law or any other doctrine, there always remains missing
some explanatory element, some required something that cannot be disclosed
philosophically. The causal circle cannot be rounded off with only immanently derived
terms. The progressive expansion of Blondel’s inquiry reveals not just the élan of the
human will, but also the exhaustive, “deterministic” nature of his philosophical survey of
human action. It is not just that each level of analysis fails to answer the ultimate question
of human action, but it even fails to give an adequate account of itself at that level. If one
will admit only immanently derived philosophical terms, one runs inevitably into the
reality that none of these can provide a complete explanation of human action. Thus
Blondel raises the medieval problem of the supernatural—albeit generalized and
undifferentiated—in a distinctly modern fashion. He suggests that the way in which
modern philosophy championed immanence did not excise the transcendent once and for
all, but only provisionally bracketed it. Eventually, if what one wants is complete
explanation, the borrowed explicability of the immanent was always going to have to be
returned to its transcendent source. Of course, as we will see below in the section on
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Sartre’s Being and Nothingness, if one is willing to give up ontological explanation per
se, then the theoretical debt to the transcendent is effectively cancelled.
3.4.4. Blondel’s Modern Form of The Medieval Solution
How does Blondel answer the medieval problem posed in his modern idiom? In a
sense, he responds to the medieval problem with a version of the medieval solution, but
transformed by the strictures of his modern philosophical method. The aggregation of
explanatory failures in which his phenomenology of human action results provides the
warrant for a negative, but heuristic conclusion: there remains “one thing necessary” to
explain human action and it cannot be produced by human thinking or willing. It is
something that must be supposed on account of the fact of human action, but that
philosophy cannot produce according to its via inventionis. This is, for Blondel, the
philosophical meaning of the term “supernatural”: a heuristic term indicating this “one
thing necessary.” The term “supernatural” indicates an answer to a question. It is the
question with which Action begins: “does human life make sense and does man have a
destiny?”49 Action appears to be free and purposive, and yet we cannot avoid action and
find ourselves in the middle of it without knowing what its purpose is. For Blondel, the
supernatural is that which we must will in order to act freely and for our action to find its
purpose.
The theologian, however, must not jump too quickly to some ready-made sense of
the supernatural and its place in the drama of human being. Because Blondel’s
philosophy is separated from the Christian doctrinal context, his “supernatural” cannot be
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read as synonymous with, for example, Lonergan’s ens supernaturale or de Lubac’s
surnaturel.50 First of all, within the frame set by Blondel’s method of immanence, the
supernatural is an answer anticipated, but not yet known. Blondel’s investigation reaches
the very limit of the universe of human action and does not comprehend its term. It seems
to be an answer that, by a method of immanence, cannot be known. But that there is some
answer seems a necessary presupposition. Blondel has to his own satisfaction already
ruled out doctrines of aesthetic indifference and nihilism as prospective answers to his
question, though we will see below that perhaps this exclusion was not yet sufficiently
worked out and will return in a more radical and so more serious form. Nonetheless,
Blondel argues that the answer to the question of action cannot be that there is no answer.
Though philosophy must anticipate an answer, no answer can be forthcoming. As we will
see, there is a certain moral squeamishness to Blondel’s conclusion on this point; it may
well be that both the question and the anticipation that it must have an answer are a kind
of illusion that modern philosophy’s skeptical aspect ought to expose and repudiate, even
if it means all philosophy is ultimately self-immolating. But Blondel believes too much in
philosophy as a practice for this kamikaze line of reasoning. For him, the supernatural
serves as a heuristic term standing in place of the answer that cannot but be anticipated by
philosophy. The supernatural, thus, is what modern philosophy would know if it could
answer Blondel’s question of action.
This negative implication is not totally fruitless. It has philosophic value in its
heuristic function: the supernatural is, even as unknown, that “one thing necessary.”51
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This one thing necessary is produced in every action. There is no arena of human action
in which it is not operative. By extension, it is willed in willing any realized action (what
Blondel calls the “willing will”). Although the human agent cannot fail to will that the
supernatural be operative in his or her action, the supernatural is not in any action
because a human agent wills it to be. The will, for Blondel as for Thomas, is an
intellectual faculty. Thus, when the human agent wills an idea of some determinate action
(Blondel’s “willed will”), reason presents a manifold of appetites (“mobiles”) to the will
as a multiplicity of ideas (“motives”) and one of these ideas is promoted by the will for
execution.52 Consequently, what cannot be willed also cannot be thought, because that
which is willed is always already presented by reason for consideration. The thought of
an action never provides the one thing necessary to reason, let alone to action itself.
Neither does reflection on an effected action comprehend the one thing necessary, though
reflection must affirm that it is operative. Therefore, modern philosophy cannot
completely explain human action in general or (per Blondel’s under-appreciated and
more radical claim) any human action in particular. It cannot provide in its concepts the
one thing necessary to all, any, and every action. But modern philosophy also cannot a
priori rule out the supernatural as a heuristic term without violating its own root
principles that a) all doctrines can be considered, b) no prospective doctrine gets special
status, c) the rigor and expanse of inquiry is its measure, and d) the soundness of a
philosophy is the soundness of its method. Thus, Blondel’s notion of the supernatural
stands as that which would explain human action to thought, in the concrete realizes
every human action, and yet cannot be produced in and by human volition or thought.
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Though Blondel does not rely on Thomas for the scaffolding beneath his
philosophy of action, it turns out his modern form of the answer to the medieval problem
of the supernatural comports nicely with the solution offered in the previous chapter.
Every human action relies upon a transcendent term to be rendered explicable. This term
must be operative in every action for that action to itself be actual. Thus, the reliance of
every human action upon the operativity of the transcendent term amounts to cooperation
between the immanent and the transcendent. Blondel does not consider the broader case
of cooperation between the transcendent agent and finite causes in general. He begins
with the unique case of human causality and the intensifications that come along with its
free mode of agency. Thus, the reliance of human agency upon transcendent agency and
the problem of free, rational cooperation with transcendent agency are carried forward
together in his investigation. Though the generic medieval ambiguity can only be found
in Blondel’s Action by implication, it both begins with and culminates quite explicitly in
the specific medieval ambiguity. We saw above Blondel ask generally about the
explicability of human freedom, but he comes to specify his question with regard to the
significance of human freedom before its transcendent cooperator: the supernatural. In
the next section, we see how Blondel poses the specific medieval ambiguity as an
existential dilemma brought about by his philosophic recognition of the supernatural.
3.4.4. Blondel’s Modern Articulation of the Specific Medieval Ambiguity
Once the supernatural becomes an explicit term in philosophy, it at the same time
becomes also an active idea in the life of the philosopher. In the mode of this idea, the
supernatural poses a dilemma to the philosopher as a person: there is necessarily
something I cannot know or determine at the heart of my action. It is necessary to my
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actions and may even have been mobilizing my action in some invisible way. But now
appearing under this heuristic term, the supernatural functions as more than an invisible
and unknown appetite. It can be a motive for my action, something willed purposively.
Blondel thinks that every human agent faces this choice in the course of living a life, but
the philosopher knows this dilemma not by mere implication or with the simple sincerity
of the morally circumspect. No, the philosopher faces this dilemma with critical rigor.
Because this choice is present to me as an idea—however slight, however heuristic—it
can itself be an object of my willing. Because the one thing necessary is necessary in and
for all human action, I may explicitly and affirmatively will it in and with my determinate
actions. Blondel speaks of willing the supernatural in this way as “ratifying” the
supernatural and its place in one’s living. Now, plainly the supernatural cannot be willed
in and of itself by human agents. It can, at this stage, only be thought and willed as a
known unknown. But even this formal ratification occurs under a terribly difficult
constraint: if I choose to explicitly will the supernatural in and with my various finite
human actions, I must relinquish a certain power to determine what I will. For in ratifying
the supernatural in my agency, I knowingly will an unknown. Blondel speaks of this as
the “mortification” of action.53 In order to will what is necessary for my action (and so, in
fact, to be fully autonomous in the literal sense), I have to include in my willing an
acknowledgement and acceptance of the fact that my action is not completely my own. In
order to grasp fully human autonomy, I have to embrace the fundamental heteronomy of
my action and to submit the significance of my action to something I cannot fully
determine.
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This already-uncanny alternative, between refusing to ratify the supernatural in
my action (presumably by somehow acting against its transcendent source) or ratifying
the supernatural by willing in my human way that the supernatural operate integrally with
my action (as it necessarily must), comes with a further wrinkle. To this point we have
considered the supernatural insofar as it is a heuristic term and so the prospect of willing
the supernatural has been restricted to this notional sense. But if willing the supernatural
in our finite actions would amount to anything more than an empty formality, changing
nothing about how we live, we require some mediation of the supernatural. If we would
will the supernatural in any determinate way, it must be rendered susceptible to the
proportion of our volitional and rational powers. Consequently, Blondel argues that the
development of human freedom calls out for not just a notional acknowledgement that
our action comes from a transcendent source, but what Blondel calls a “literal”
supernatural practice by which our ratification of the one thing necessary can be
concretized. In a word, the development of human freedom calls out for religion. In
religion, the supernatural operates in our agency with the same necessity as always,
except now we can explicitly or “literally” co-operate with it in the fullness of free,
purposive agency. We are invited to enact by our willed will more fully that which our
willing will silently desires and intends.54
Because this mediation accommodates our finitude so that our lives can carry out
the ratification invited by the critical acknowledgment of the supernatural, modern
philosophy can in principle work out a number of further heuristic determinations for its
character. Blondel, by his own admission, allowed his deeply formed Catholic
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imagination to overdetermine his derivation of these characteristics in Action.55 But he
corrects this tendency in a later, revised version of the work, excising these passages and
substantially reworking them in a volume called La philosophie et l’esprit Chretien. Even
if the particular content of Blondel’s treatment of this mediating “supernatural religion”
violates the principles of modern philosophical method in Action (and this point is
debatable; Blondel’s dissatisfaction may have owed more to persistent misinterpretation
of these passages than their inherent failure), the task itself fits squarely within his vision
of the modern philosophic method of immanence pushed to such a radical extent that it
reveals the impossibility of a doctrine of immanence. In Blondel’s hands, modern
philosophy has to admit that considering religious phenomena as supernatural is
admissible, even though philosophy cannot penetrate into the supernatural content
thereof. Such content would only be available materially in the religious practice as
concretely lived, formally recognizable only to the eyes of faith. Adequate reflection
upon it would remain the province of the theologians.
Blondel does consider what might follow from the alternate choice, to resist the
influence of the supernatural in one’s action. Action is ineluctable, of course, and so one
has to take some action to oppose the necessary operation of the supernatural in one’s
action. But this amounts to implicitly accepting the gift of realized action in order to
explicitly reject it. This state of contradiction constitutes what Blondel calls “the death of
action.” One cannot make nothing of the actions realized in cooperation with the
supernatural, but one wills that—if they cannot be entirely my own—they would not be.
Blondel considers this a kind of perdition for human agency. These actions, once
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effected, cannot not have been and so have an indelibly eternal valence to them, such that
Blondel describes our relationship to them as like that of a man tied to his own corpse
forever.56 It is, as Augustine had it, a kind of living death.
3.4.5. Blondel’s Contribution
We can see how Blondel’s conclusions comport with the medieval solution to the
medieval problem of the supernatural, albeit as transformed by the strictures of a
separated modern philosophy. The explicability of human action (and the world in which
it operates) relies upon the efficacy of a transcendent term. So what does Blondel add?
He contributes the explicit “modern” mentality in which the medieval solution appears
with its attendant ambiguities. His inquiry begins not from the effort to understand a
supernaturally revealed doctrine, but the native situation of human action considered
according to the method of immanence. The results of his inquiry derive their validity
from their ability to make sense not of supernaturally revealed doctrines in light of
available philosophical opinions, but of philosophical doctrines that would purport to
completely explain human action to the satisfaction of human intelligence. His
philosophical investigation culminates in the anticipation of (indeed, need for) a
transcendent term explaining what, on Blondel’s analysis, is only proximately, but not
completely intelligible to human intelligence: the concrete universe of human action. This
anticipation cannot be unambiguously satisfied, because if there is a transcendent term,
there can be no human actions that, as human, produce it.
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Therefore, Blondel provides the most robust articulation of modern philosophy’s
basic alternative up to that point. Separated, modern philosophy can either a) deploy the
discovered necessity of its anticipation to generate a heuristic for the transcendent term
required for complete explanation, extrapolating from its own proximate successes in
action and understanding to affirm that, though it cannot be produced within a method of
immanence, there must be a transcendent term; or b) philosophy can alternatively
conclude from the absence (and, indeed, impossibility) of immanent data on the
transcendent term that this anticipation is misleading, rejecting the actuality of a
transcendent term and so also the demand for complete explanation. Strictly speaking,
however, one cannot find refuge in agnosticism on this question. One either desires
complete explanation or one does not. There is no third, neutral position to occupy on the
question. However, one can simply decide not to ask the question, but this is explicitly
anti-philosophical and obscurantist/quietist and so amounts to a tacit decision to not
pursue complete explanation.
Either option is selected on the basis of the same available data, the same
methodical outlook, and in response to the same absence of data where one would expect
some intelligible term. The reason for selecting one option over the other resides,
therefore, in the free choice of the subject facing this irreducibly ambiguous situation.
Subsequent to this choice, either option can be intelligently pursued, though the status of
either option as rational is complicated by the “knock-on” effect of this pre-philosophical
choice on a philosopher’s operative notion of rationality. This will be of the utmost
importance in assessing the conflicts between the philosophical positions that follow
from each pre-philosophical alternative posed by the medieval ambiguities of being.
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These ambiguities regarding human action and its universe can become the object of both
modern separated philosophical inquiry (as in Blondel’s Action) and modern
subordinated philosophical inquiry (as here). Both forms of philosophy can thematize the
ur-choice from which these two basic postures originate and be clear about philosophical
differences that emerge from them. In the main, a modern separated philosophy cannot
decide on the issue in the absence of data and data cannot be forthcoming. Modern
philosophy can at best come to find these medieval ambiguities already waiting for it in
the very structure of the medieval solution to the problem of the supernatural.
3.5. Sartre’s Modern Philosophical Alternative
Blondel’s analysis of the life and death of action, however, fails to consider
another framing of the basic option faced by human agency, one that he thought he had
foreclosed in his discussion of nihilism.57 Blondel’s account of action’s perdition operates
on the belief that the operativity of the supernatural in human action has been so
thoroughly demonstrated by his investigation that it cannot be notionally accepted or
rejected as a conclusion, but only practically accepted through the process of cooperative
mortification or rejected by an attempt to refuse cooperation with God. Now, Blondel’s
alternative is one way to frame what I have been calling the specific medieval ambiguity:
a philosophically undecidable alternative between acting as though human freedom has a
fundamental, but transcendent meaning or purpose or, on the other hand, acting as though
the liberty to determine our actions is, in its autonomy, basically arbitrary and
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inexplicable, lacking any fundamental meaning or purpose. But Blondel frames the
dilemma (as every philosopher must) from the vantage of one who has already, in a prephilosophical way, decided with regard to the transcendent meaningfulness of his own
freedom—and so, by extension, made a decision to operate out of a presumption of
complete explicability for the being of human action and the being of the universe in
which it unfolds.58
One is free, however, to interpret the broad strokes of Blondel’s argument and its
conclusions another way. Perhaps the gap in explanation that Blondel finds, not just at the
extremity of action’s orientation to destiny, but in every nook and cranny of its universe,
does not evince a deficiency in the phenomenality of the immanent. Perhaps it reveals a
deficiency—indeed, a negativity—in philosophy itself. Perhaps Blondel’s philosophical
procedure evinces a philosophically unjustified “practical prejudice” in favor of
ontological explicability. The evidence that supports Blondel’s supernatural realism
might also support an atheistic, existentialist nihilism. This would not be the simple,
straightforward nihilism Blondel considered at the beginning of Action that wants to
wave away the problem of action by cheap appeal to nothingness. No, it would be a
wisened nihilism aware of its own penchant for illusion and ‘bad faith’, full of the
knowledge that it cannot but pose a problem for which there is no answer—or better, for
which the answer is nothing. Blondel wrote of a process of mortification for the sake of
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liberation, of losing one’s life in order to more fully receive it as a gift. But under the
weight of his own Christian imagination, he did not (and perhaps could not) consider a
philosophy that takes death as the limit and measure of its authenticity. One can call to
mind a philosophy that would transcend every boundary, not in order to approximate the
boundlessness of God, but to approximate the indeterminacy of human being per se.
Blondel does not seem to notice that his demonstration suggests this ambiguity running
deeper than the alternative he envisions. Nonetheless, it is an ambiguity made available to
modern thought by the medieval solutions to the problem of the supernatural. It has
stowed away in the very logic of a transcendent cause of every created cause on which
Blondel’s philosophy of action relies. His radicalization of the method of immanence
transported this medieval implication into a modern philosophical milieu and, by
centering the problem of action, lifted it up just below the surface of modern Catholic
thought. Below, we will consider one version of this alternative alternative, embodied by
Sartre’s Being and Nothingness.
3.5.1. The Generic Medieval Ambiguity and Sartre’s Being and Nothingness
Blondel’s philosophical approach rests on a pre-philosophical commitment to
explaining completely what is. The various determinations of determinate being need to
be explained and his philosophy discovers that what philosophy cannot do is explain any
of them completely. The supernatural is imposed on modern philosophy because it is
precisely the being of determinate being that needs explanation and no immanent term
proves adequate to the task. The supernatural is Blondel’s heuristic indication of that in
which an explanation of determinate being insofar as it is would consist. We might note
as well that, for Blondel, although the various determinations of determinate being are at
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least partially intelligible (supposing one sets aside the infinite remainder that is the
supernatural), determinateness itself needs no explanation. Determinateness (beingdeterminate, we might say) is a kind of negative quality born by finite beings, a shadow
cast by being at all. When thought in terms of a fundamental relation to an infinite
“supernatural,” determinate being is (to borrow a turn of phrase from Paul Ricoeur),
“struck with nothingness.” To be finite, temporal, immanent, etc. is to be (again in
Ricoeur’s words), “surrounded by nothingness.” This nothingness is not and cannot be an
explanation for determinate being, because, for this philosophical posture, nothing is
explained by nothing. It is simply the fact of a “radical ontological difference that
separates the creature from the creator.”59 In sum, then, Blondel’s basic ideal of
philosophical rationality—resting on his pre-philosophic commitment to completely
explaining what is—includes the entailments that being needs to be explained and
determinateness itself need not be explained because it cannot be explained.
As noted above, this normative ideal of philosophical rationality, embedded in a
particular posture one brings to the philosophical task as an activity, has an alternative
and it rests no less on a pre-philosophic decision, commitment, and posture. Jean Paul
Sartre’s Being and Nothingness is instructive here because it embodies this alternative
and so helps us to indicate in a more concrete fashion what I have been calling the
medieval ambiguities of being. For Sartre, it is not the being of determinate being which
calls out for explanation, but its determinateness. “Being,” he writes, “is empty of all
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other determination than identity with itself(.)”60 Being, because it is “absolute plenitude
and entire positivity” seems to need no explanation.61 Determinateness, on the other
hand, needs some explanation. For Sartre, “being can not be the support of any
differentiated quality.” Something needs to “release” the “undifferentiated mass of being”
that it might be a world of particularized and relativized beings.62 What effects this
release and so explains determinateness for Sartre? Nothingness. “Thus reversing the
statement of Spinoza,” Sartre writes, “we could say that every negation is determination.”
At first blush, the difference between Blondel and Sartre on this point may seem
minor, perhaps a matter of emphasis. After all, one might point out that they agree
“nothing” explains determinateness. This agreement, however, is merely verbal. Sartre
and Blondel take opposed philosophical postures and it is my contention that this
opposition owes a) to differing pre-philosophical attitudes towards the meaning of what is
and b) a basic ontological ambiguity that poses this choice to any philosopher prior to any
philosophical act. To reiterate then, for Blondel being is in need of explanation, both in
general and in its concrete determinations, but the determinateness of these
determinations does not need to be and cannot be explained. For Sartre, by contrast,
being in-itself calls for no explanation, but determinateness by contrast needs to be
accounted for. We can diagnose Blondel’s basic philosophical posture because it is the
necessary practical presupposition behind his entire argument in Action. What is it about
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Sartre’s philosophical procedure, then, that leads me to think he holds a posture opposed,
even inverse to Blondel’s?
For Sartre, what can be said of being in-itself is that being is. He writes,
... being is what is. In the in-itself there is not a particle of being which is not
wholly within itself without distance. When being is thus conceived there is not
the slightest suspicion of duality in it; this is what we mean when we say that the
density of being of the in-itself is infinite… The in-itself is full of itself, and no
more total plenitude can be imagined, no more perfect equivalence of content to
container. There is not the slightest emptiness in being, not the tiniest crack
through which nothingness might slip in.63
Being cannot be absolutely and at the same time be relative to something, qualified by
something, or somehow determined. Being cannot, in itself, even be “present to” itself.
Sartre explains,
This presence to itself has often been taken for a plenitude of existence, and a
strong prejudice prevalent among philosophers causes them to attribute to
consciousness the highest rank in being… Actually, presence to always implies
duality, at least a virtual separation. The presence of being to itself implies a
detachment on the part of being in relation to itself. The coincidence of identity is
the veritable plenitude of being exactly because in this coincidence there is left no
place for any negativity… Presence to self, on the contrary, supposes that an
impalpable fissure has slipped into being. If being is present to itself, it is because
it is not wholly itself.64
For this reason, being-in-itself is absolutely and can be relative to nothing. This means
that making being present to itself, being-for-itself (i.e. the being that characterizes
conscious human reality) brings nothingness to being through the very transcendence of
its reflexive distance.65 Thus, Sartre characterizes conscious human reality as selfnihilating—as a nothingness with borrowed being that being can be present-to. It is, by
extension, through conscious human reality that the various determinations (explained by
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the nothingness of world-transcending consciousness) come to things: possibility,
necessity, impossibility, and so on. But this nothingness of the determinateness of the
various determinations is founded upon the fact of a self-nihilating being-for-itself.
Conscious human reality is separated from being only by this nothing given in its
transcendence of the world as consciousness. It is the cause of the nothingness of
determination (i.e. determinateness) and so it can be a term of explanation for
determinateness “within the limits of the real.”66 Throughout the phenomenological and
dialectical machinations between the in-itself and the for-itself of Being and Nothingness,
it is being-dependent “nothingness” which explains the determinateness of determinate
being. This nothingness, in other words, is present-to-as-related and so constitutes beingexplicable. No transcendent term can serve this explicability function since all
transcendence is a relativity, a dependent realm of nothing. Explanation can only come
from within the world present-to being-for-itself because explicability is constituted
along with it. Determinateness needs to be explained because determinateness is what
can be explained.67
Sartre’s philosophical posture towards being seems on its face to be quite
ontologically positive. As we have seen, Sartre heaps metaphysical superlatives on beingin-itself. However, it turns out that nothingness carries the day philosophically, since the
borrowed existence of nothingness admits attestation of any—pardon the pun—
substantive kind. The being of being-in-itself resists even the assertion of identity (“A is
66
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This approach is almost precisely inverse to Blondel’s. For Blondel, existence itself is that
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A”), since the unity at the heart of identity is nonetheless a determination introduced by
being-for-itself.68 Put another way, Sartre’s philosophy lives concretely as a nihilism, for
that of which it can speak is only the nothingness that it brings to being. It is a nihilism
despite its avowal to itself that it is an existentialism. It devotes itself to the explanation
of nothingness and denies that what is can be explained. Moreover, insofar as the basic
posture of his philosophical inquiry consists in a pre-philosophical attitude that does not
endeavor to understand being, Sartre’s philosophy in fact has decided to be a nihilism—
or, more accurately, Sartre has decided his philosophy will be a nihilism. In a bit of irony,
Being and Nothingness turns out to be a work of ‘bad faith’, a great body of philosophical
argumentation insisting to itself that it is not what it is: the product of a basic, prephilosophical decision to act as though being is inexplicable.69
On the other hand, if I am right that all philosophical ontology must begin from
such a basic, pre-philosophical decision about how the philosopher shall comport him or
herself to being, that Being and Nothingness is in bad faith does not compromise the
internal validity of Sartre’s argument, at least according to the ideal of rationality
corresponding to such a commitment. We may say descriptively, by way of weighing the
evidence for the medieval ambiguity of being, that contingency and determinateness give
a certain nothingness together with the positivity of what exists in the world of human
reality. A philosophy which reads being as a mere matter of fact and the determinateness
of what is as a question thus takes a basic interpretative posture vis-à-vis the data on
offer. This basic posture, however, has to be taken prior to any investigation of
determinate being, because it constitutes the overall character of the investigation itself. It
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is, in fact, not so much a decision about the object of philosophical inquiry as it is about
its operative subjectivity. Through its anticipatory ideals, the posture of the operative
philosophical subject invests philosophical inquiry with its immanent norms and it
implies an ideal of rationality against which the results of any inquiry must be measured.
To critique Sartre’s argument for failing to meet its own ideals is one matter, but to
demand it meet another ideal notion of rationality is to ask the philosopher to make a
different existential decision on the basis of ambiguous data—namely, the data on being a
conscious, inquiring agent. Such a request amounts not to an exercise in philosophical
dialectic, but rather an invitation to convert to another way of life. The notion of such a
request also tips us towards the place held by the specific medieval ambiguity in Being
and Nothingness.
3.5.2. The Specific Medieval Ambiguity in Being and Nothingness
By focusing on Sartre’s ontology, I have tried to suggest that Being and
Nothingness embodies an opposed alternative to Blondel’s account of the generic
medieval ambiguity from within the modern philosophical mentality. But what of the
specific ambiguity that regards human freedom and agency? How can holding Sartre’s
account of freedom and agency up beside Blondel’s help us to better appreciate the
ambiguity of human freedom after Thomas’s solution to the medieval problem of the
supernatural? In both cases, we find that the basic posture of their ontology is carried
through, framing their theory of freedom. Moreover, we will find that both ontological
postures can be thematized in terms of the theory of freedom by which it is framed, so
that the circle of reflexion can be closed according to the ideal of rationality immanent to
either posture.
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We have already seen how, for Blondel, the being of determinate being calls out
for explanation, but determinateness itself does not need to be explained. Between being
and determinateness, philosophy can offer some partial account of the various
determinations of determinate being in their various equilibria, but cannot ultimately
provide complete explanation for any determinate being at any level. And we have also
seen that Blondel frames the inquiry that arrives at this heuristic ontological conclusion
by a question about the meaningfulness of human action. In Blondel’s case, the
ontological conclusion is derived by generalizing from the specific case of human
agency. Because human action has its being and so explanation and so meaningfulness
beyond itself, but moreover beyond even the universe in which it acts, Blondel is able to
argue that though the being of our action calls out for explanation like every other
determinate being, a philosophy of action has to affirm that there is some transcendent,
supernatural ground to the meaningfulness of our action. However, a philosophy of action
cannot produce this ground, much as our willing does not of itself produce the being of
our action. Human freedom, then, provides some explanation for the determinations of
being in which human actions consist insofar as it places before itself the determinate
purposes for which it acts. But as to why the whole complex of motives, decisions, and
actions is, philosophy cannot say. The agent instead faces Blondel’s version of the
alternative: to act either in a manner that supposes there is some unknown meaning for
action and aims to cooperate in some mediated and finite way with its supernatural
purpose or to reject the heteronomy implied by this heuristic conclusion and aim to act in
such a way that rejects cooperation with any supernatural meaning or purpose.
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For Sartre, freedom is the being of the for-itself and, though any exercise of
freedom in action contains causes, motives, and ends, “freedom has no essence.”70 Much
like being-in-itself, the freedom that being-for-itself is has no explanation. All of the
ontological superlatives that could be heaped onto being-in-itself can, in freedom, be
transferred to being-for-itself insofar as it expresses itself in action. As being is what is,
so freedom is what is free, what “cannot cease being free,” and so is, famously,
“condemned to be free.” Bad faith can, thus, be understood as the effort of freedom to
“hide its freedom from itself.”71 The act, like knowledge, can only be a matter of
affirmation for philosophy: it simply is and is free. Once this “nihilating rupture with the
world [of the in-itself]” is effected and the act is, then we may speak of the experience of
the act and the philosophical discernment of its causes, motives, and ends. But we may
speak of them for the same reason we may speak of any determination of being—because
its very determinateness is what is explicable. But all of these determinations of action
are non-being. They are projections in the transcendence of conscious human reality of
what is not, of non-being. And so Sartre gives the example of the laborer who only finds
a sufficient reason for revolution in the projection beyond his daily circumstances of a
different set of circumstances which do not exist and yet, in their nothingness, render his
life suddenly intolerable.72 But note that the cause of the worker’s will to revolt resides
not in the being of his circumstances, but only inside himself. He has made himself
miserable and so he is the true cause of his own will to revolt. Therefore, even when we
turn to elucidate the determinations of human action, we find that, although they formally
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admit of explanation, what explains them is “nothing”. For our actions, Sartre says in
Existentialism is a Humanism, “we are left alone and without excuse.” Once cast into the
world, we are responsible for everything we do.73
Above I indicated that one might accuse Sartre’s philosophy of being in bad faith.
This accusation rests on an internal ambiguity that haunts these modern realizations of
the specific medieval ambiguity. It is the same internal ambiguity Blondel exploits to
reveal the insufficiency of every effort to explain action in purely immanent terms. This
ambiguity resides between a philosophy considered as an intention, a thinking, an activity
and a philosophy considered as an intended, as a body of thought, as a product. I have
already said that both Blondel and Sartre adopt a pre-philosophical posture towards the
practice of philosophical investigation and its object (as I hold every philosopher of being
or action must). Adopting this posture amounts to a decision, a commitment to follow in
one’s philosophy a certain course of action. It devotes the philosopher to a way of
philosophizing. This way of philosophizing, in turn, constrains the sort of philosophy that
he or she will likely produce. However, because this pre-philosophical decision does not
determine the philosophical product (for the exercise of intelligence has immanent norms
of its own that can be corrupted, even subverted, but never entirely suppressed without
ceasing thought altogether), the philosophy that is intended, thought, produced is all too
rarely an impeccably apt thematization of the basic comportment to being and/or freedom
that gave it rise. Indeed, Blondel and Sartre, both in different ways, imply that this
internal ambiguity is as philosophically undecidable as the ontological ambiguities
themselves. For Blondel, the impracticable character of the “one thing necessary” means
73
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that any philosophy that includes an element claiming to meet his anticipation of
complete explanation must be a philosophy inadequate to the reality of even the action of
thought that produced it. For Sartre, because freedom is prior to thought and freedom is
always other than what can be said about it, any philosophy of freedom (even, he does
not seem to notice, his own) has to be alienated from the being of freedom in the
nothingness of conscious human reality.
Nonetheless, it turns out that neither Blondel nor Sartre manages to give an
account of the pre-philosophical condition that constrains his own thought: an exercise of
freedom with regard to how to determinately realize the task of philosophizing. A more
fully articulated and genuinely modern philosophy of the medieval ambiguities would
make explicit the de facto choice faced prior to philosophizing. However, because any
philosophy must proceed from such a choice, that explicitation would have to be
expressed via a doubling, in which the alternative is narrated from within one horizon of
commitment and then re-narrated from within the other. The anticipation at the heart of
the modern philosophical mentality that the philosopher’s via inventionis will serve as a
criterion of validity calls out for this rigorous double explicitation. Unavoidably, one of
these narrations would consist in an act of ventriloquizing that could never quite throw its
own voice entirely away. In the case of this study, I cannot disavow my own basic
comportment to being and to freedom as fundamentally, but transcendently explicable
and I cannot deny that my characterization of Sartre’s alternative is, in ways both evident
to me and probably subterranean too, marked by my practical prejudice for Blondel’s
philosophical posture. But there is no need to effect such a disavowal, since the ideal
norm of rationality governing my philosophical task comes to bear on it from within the
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horizon opened up by my practical prejudice for explicability. Modern philosophy’s
separation from a dogmatic context precludes an appeal to the doctrines of a higher, more
certain science like theology that could settle the matter in the extrinsic fashion
appropriate to a subordinated philosophy (even if I find Lonergan’s retrieval of Thomas
on the transcendence of God’s creative and redemptive agency convincing).
Thus, even when a philosopher gives voice to his or her basic pre-philosophical
posture towards philosophizing and, subsequent to this avowal, pursues it with singleminded devotion, still the ambiguity is not extinguished. From Blondel’s perspective,
such a basic decision does have a reason, but it is precisely this reason that philosophy
cannot produce by its philosophizing. Rather, a philosophy can only show its faith in the
reality of some transcendent meaning and purpose by its intellectual works. Philosophy’s
very resoluteness with regard to the supernatural foundation of its practice and its
products is a source of instability for an authentically modern philosophy: the most
important part of its via inventionis cannot be produced to validate itself. Sartre, on the
other hand, would deny that, even if the causes, motives, and ends of its determination
can be experienced and described, the act of freedom in which philosophy begins has any
essence. It needs no explanation because it can have no explanation. It is simply a matter
of fact for which the philosopher is responsible, left alone and without excuse.
4. Conclusion
Readers may notice how I have hewed away from the more usual controversies
about grace in which Blondel’s name is sometimes invoked. I have not, however, taken
this tack in order to dodge the problematic of grace. Rather, in both this chapter and its
predecessor, I have considered the relation between divine and created agency that would
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provide the categories and analogies for a speculative theology of either creation or
grace. In the previous chapter we considered that relation according to the subordinated
philosophical approach characteristic of the medieval theological mentality. At the
beginning of this chapter, I gave some indication of the ambiguity that could result from
the solution to the medieval problem of the supernatural, but subsequent to a change in
philosophical and/or scientific method. Then we considered the same relation in light of
just such a change in method. I have called this the modern philosophical mentality and
characterized it as a general method in separated philosophy that takes its via inventionis
for its criterion of validity.
This has been a transitional chapter, pivoting between a detailed account of
medieval achievements and the fully modern problem of the supernatural we will finally
encounter at the end of the next chapter. Here we saw modern philosophical minds
appropriate the generic and specific ambiguities made possible by theorematic
achievements of the high Middle Ages. We saw the knock on effects of the medieval
solution manifest in these modern philosophical ontologies as an irreducible ambiguity. It
is an ambiguity manifest in the radically different philosophical postures taken by
Blondel and Sartre. It is an ambiguity manifest in Blondel’s basic alternative in the face
of the “one thing necessary.” It is an ambiguity manifest in the temptation to ‘bad faith’
diagnosed by Sartre. It is an ambiguity manifest in both Sartre’s and Blondel’s failure to
fully take stock of the philosophically undecidable, pre-philosophical act of freedom
behind their philosophies of being and freedom. It is an ambiguity manifest in the fact
that, while narrating these ambiguities, I too had to confess to my own practical prejudice
in favor of one pole over the other and its effects on my study here.
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This ambiguity has various elements, but its root grows up from a pair of
ontological ambiguities faced by the inquiring agent, one generic and the other specific.
The inquiring agent encounters a world of beings that are not completely explicable on
their own and must decide to pursue complete explanation or not. The inquiring agent
must decide, in general, to act from the anticipation that being is completely explicable
(even if complete explanation perpetually eludes every determinate inquiry) or if being
simply is a matter of fact, the pursuit of any explanation for which would amount to a
flight into non-being, to a philosophical problem that arises when language has “gone on
holiday.”74 The inquiring agent must decide, specifically, if his or her action, originating
in his or her freedom but realizing itself among every other determinate being, has a basic
meaningfulness, a fundamental purpose. But every act of freedom has its proximate
meaning and purpose in the freedom of the agent him or herself, a determinate being the
fundamental explanation of which always eludes philosophy. The free agent must decide
whether to act as though his or her freedom has some meaning and purpose (even if that
meaning/purpose is transcendent and so unknown) or if he or she will act as though
freedom has no essence and so, like very other being, is a mere matter of fact admitting
no explanation, and so no meaning and no purpose. This specific ambiguity in turn
rebounds upon the generic ambiguity, since the free agent’s posture towards his or her
own freedom includes the prospect of pursuing philosophical inquiry as one of its
possible exercises of freedom. In this way, the circle of ambiguity closes upon its own
philosophical undecidability for those who inhabit a modern philosophical mentality.
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It remains to ask: how can it be that philosophers have left behind a medieval
mentality of speculative theology and subordinated philosophy to inhabit this modern
philosophical mentality instead? Why, if the modern mentality results in such
confounding ambiguity, do they not just beat a hasty retreat back into the state of mind
that served St. Thomas so well? The answer to this quandary will occupy us in Chapter 4.
The question has to do with the mediation, but especially the constitution of the fully
human world by human and divine meanings. This further element will usher onto the
scene what I believe is the genuinely modern problem of the supernatural.

CHAPTER 4: THE MODERN PROBLEM OF THE SUPERNATURAL
To move from the medieval problem of the supernatural to what I am calling the
modern problem of the supernatural requires that we make a significant transition. In the
previous chapter, we explored how the modern philosophical mentality rendered probable
a philosophical cognizance of the medieval ambiguities of being. This realization
occurred in an intellectual context at some remove from the medieval theological
mentality that made the medieval ambiguities merely possible for subordinated
philosophy. This realization also occurred at the nexus of a set of questions about
atheism, secularism, individualism, politics, and history. In the first chapter we noted
some of these questions insofar as they appear in but are also sidelined by the
contemporary controversy over the supernatural. In this chapter, I argue that the problem
underlying these questions is distinct from and irreducible to the set of medieval
questions that made up the horizon of the medieval problem and so the horizon of
Thomas’s medieval solution thereto. In order to articulate how the modern problem is
distinct and irreducible, to elucidate its character, and to communicate its force requires
that we make this transition. It requires I show how the modern problem is insoluble by
means of the medieval solution or, indeed, any metaphysical theory at all. Indeed, neither
possession of a solution to the medieval problem of the supernatural, nor a grasp of the
medieval ambiguities of being, nor a critical, but pre-philosophical commitment to the
explicability of being and of free human actions can of themselves resolve the modern
problem. Rather, possessing these at most makes it possible for us to recognize how the
twenty-first-century questions about the supernatural contain a distinct and irreducible
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modern problem of the supernatural. I have expressed this problem by the somewhat
informal question, “What is God doing in free human action?” What difference is God
making in human freedom and its products? What is God up to in the world generated by
these? How do we discern the substance of God’s action in a world constituted by freely
constructed human meanings?
In the following, I address the more obvious “modern” problem of the
supernatural—whether there is a natural desire for God—with what may amount to
scandalous brevity. From there, I consider the more fundamental modern problem of the
supernatural and whether it can be addressed by means of metaphysical analysis. We will
see that metaphysical analysis of the modern problem only serves to restate the problem.
This restatement, however, can be leveraged to show why the modern problem is
insusceptible to metaphysical analysis as a solution. It can also help us distinguish the
elements in the problem that undergird this metaphysical insolubility and from these we
may generate some heuristic determinations of that in which a solution would consist.
The fifth and final chapter, after some review, will consist in a brief sketch coordinating
these elements into a heuristic model for the solution to the modern problem of the
supernatural.
1. The Natural Desire to Know God
Belatedly, I might consider an objection to my procedure so far. In this work
ostensibly on the controversy over the supernatural, we have yet to discuss at any length
the central point of disagreement both in the francophone debate of the 1940s and its
contemporary anglophone cousin: the natural desire to know God. Much of the
contemporary debate over the supernatural has been sparked by Lawrence Feingold’s
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weighty tome on the topic, The Natural Desire to See God According to St Thomas
Aquinas and His Interpreters.1 Was it not this very question that de Lubac raised in his
effort to find the roots of modern secularism, atheism, materialism, etc. in decadent
scholastic theology?2 If we are now turning to the modern problem of the supernatural,
then must we not engage with this question of the natural desire for God directly and at
length? Yes and no. In what follows, I engage the question directly, but only briefly. My
brevity will owe, ultimately, to my reasoned conviction that in fact this question is a) a
microcosm of the undifferentiation endemic to the contemporary controversy, insofar as
it intends to pose a medieval metaphysical solution to a modern problem irreducible
thereto, but also b) even an adequate metaphysical answer to this precise question can
only restate the ambiguity to which Thomas’s medieval solution to the problem of the
supernatural led us by way of the modern philosophical mentality described in Chapter 3.
Henri de Lubac and others appeal to the Thomist credentials of the doctrine that
there is a natural desire to know God by his essence (videre Deum per essentium). Both
Feingold and Steven A. Long make reference to Summa theologiae 1–2, q.3, a. 8 central
for their framing of the topic.3 The respondeo is worth quoting in its entirety:
Final and perfect happiness can consist in nothing else than the vision of the
Divine Essence. To make this clear, two points must be observed. First, that man
is not perfectly happy, so long as something remains for him to desire and seek:
secondly that the perfection of any power is determined by the nature of its object.
Now the object of the intellect is “what a thing is,” i.e. the essence of a thing,
1
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according to De anima III, 6. Wherefore the intellect attains perfection, in so far
as it knows the essence of a thing. If therefore an intellect knows the essence of
some effect, whereby it is not possible to know the essence of the cause, i.e. to
know of the cause “what it is;” that intellect cannot be said to reach that cause
simply, although it may be able to gather from the effect the knowledge that the
cause is. Consequently, when man knows an effect, and knows that it has a cause,
there naturally remains in the man the desire to know about the cause, “what it
is.” And this desire is one of wonder, and causes inquiry, as is stated in the
beginning of the Metaphysics (I, 2). For instance, if a man, knowing the eclipse of
the sun, considers that it must be due to some cause, and knows not what the
cause is, he wonders about it, and from wondering proceeds to inquire. Nor does
this inquiry cease until he arrives at knowledge of the essence of the cause. If
therefore the human intellect, knowing the essence of some created effect, knows
no more of God than, “that He is,” the perfection of that intellect does not yet
reach simply the First Cause, but there remains in it the natural desire to seek the
cause. Wherefore it is not yet perfectly happy. Consequently, for perfect
happiness, the intellect needs to reach the very essence of the First Cause. And
thus it will have its perfection through union with God as with that object, in
which alone Man’s happiness consists, as stated in a. 1, 7 and q. 2, a. 8.
The very desire that we have by nature to know the quiddity of things is also, in
the limit, a desire for God. Moreover, because the God we desire to know as cause is
disproportionate to our unaided ability to know, our natural desire for God is also a
natural desire for the supernatural, for a communication of the divine nature. Moreover,
because the will is a rational faculty, the desire of the will for the summum bonum is also
a natural desire for the supernatural, for some participation in the divine life. The
theologian knows that this desire is not in vain, because he or she affirms with the
certainty of faith that the Beatific Vision and so spiritual union with God is promised to
the elect. When we consider the human being concretely, the neo-de Lubacian contends,
there is in us by nature an innate desire for the communication of God that is supernatural
grace.
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Certain neo-neo-scholastics object to such a prima facie reading of this passage
and others like it.4 Feingold and Long, for example, observe that the desire described is
“elicited.”5 This is to say that the desire to know “what” God is has as its condition some
prior knowledge, i.e. “that” God is cause of creation. Thus it cannot be a natural—which
is to say, innate—desire to know God by God’s essence.6 A corollary governing
objections of this kind is that the natural desire, if it is natural and innate, is a priori (even
unconscious, on Feingold’s read), but if it is “elicited,” then it is a posteriori, and so
manifestly not natural. Long, in fact, goes further to make the remarkable claim that to
desire to know God “under the ratio of ‘cause of the world,’” is “strictly speaking not
truly to desire God, Who is infinitely more than cause of the world.”7 The desire to know
God as the cause of contingent, finite being may have God as its material object, but does
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not have God’s essence as its formal object.8 How can a desire and its proper fulfillment
not have the same formal object? By metaphysical analysis, are not operations specified
by their objects?
We alert to a fundamental problem here, however. The desire to know as desire
must always will an end or object, to use Long’s terms, under a ratio that is “accidentally
denominated” of that which would fulfill the desire. For what is desired is the quiddity,
but if the intellect could present to the will a concept derived from the desired quiddity,
the intellect would already be in possession of that which it desires to know. Long’s
example gives this away. He claims that desiring to know God under the concept “cause
of the world” is like desiring to know Einstein under the concept “man wearing a
raincoat.”9 It is true, of course, that desiring to know the man in the raincoat (who
happens to be Einstein) is only materially, and not formally specified as a desire to know
Einstein. However, desiring to know “the man called Einstein” is also only materially and
not formally a desire to know the person who is identical with the famous physicist. The
proper noun “Einstein” is predicated of the person identical with the famous physicist no
less accidentally than “man wearing a raincoat.” And, more to the point, if I already know
the famous physicist, I can hardly be said to desire to know him according to the formal
understanding on which that knowledge rests.
Lonergan makes this same point with considerable brevity in his essay, “The
Natural Desire to Know God”:
The desire [to know] and its fulfillment must have the same material object. But a
desire to understand cannot have the same formal object as the fulfilling act of
8
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understanding. A desire to understand is specified by what we already know. The
fulfilling act is specified by what as yet we do not know.10
We can see, then, how Long and those who level this objection to the natural
desire to know God elide the formal object (God as known to exist) specifying the desire
to know God’s essence and that formal object (Beatific Vision) specifying the act which
would fulfill that desire.
The foregoing analysis considers the desire to know any particular quiddity and
specifically considers it as desire. But we might also consider the natural desire to know
in general. The essential and adequate object of intellect is the transcendental ens.
Whatever can be known is, and besides what is there is nothing. We express our human
intellect’s desire for this object by two basic kinds of question, “quid sit?” and “an sit?”11
Not even the doctrinaire Kantian will deny that human beings may ask, “an sit?” about
anything at all, including God. But a rational and affirmative answer to a question is a
fulfillment of the desire expressed by the question. However, we affirm that God exists
by extrinsic denomination, saying that it is true of God that He is the necessarily existing
cause of every contingently existing being on the supposition that contingent things in
fact exist.
Concomitantly, we may ask “quid sit?” about anything at all as well, including
God. Asking quid sit Deus expresses a desire to know God’s essence specified by the
knowledge of God’s existence. It is indeed an elicited desire. However, desiring to know
the essence of any being is a natural operation of the human intellect: it requires no
10
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acquired habit, nor the aid of supernatural grace.12 Moreover, desiring to know the
essence of God as specified by knowledge of His existence is not excluded from the field
of the intellect’s essential object, for besides ens there is nothing. Thus we see that the
desire to know in general is natural in origin and transcendental in its object. The specific
desire to know God is no exception when considered as desire. The elicited character of
the desire to know God by His essence impinges on its naturalness not at all.
If it is objected that this sense of “natural” is not commonly what is meant by a
natural desire to know God by His essence, but rather de Lubac and others have in mind
an apriori tending towards God as end, we can note that the desiring desire to know has
ens as its object and God is. Indeed, God is infinitely and so “infinitely more” than any
creature we might inquire about according to some particular desired desire.13 Thus it is
that we can say the mobilizing wonder diagnosed in human nature by Aristotle in the
Metaphysics is, as to the formal object specifying its fulfillment, a desire for God.14
Lonergan again:
We are not content to ask quid sit solely with regard to material things, and we are
not content with merely analogical knowledge of immaterial things. We keep on
asking why, and we desist ultimately not because we do not desire but because we
recognize our impotence to satisfy our desire. Even the Kantian, who denies to
speculative intellect any knowledge of God, nonetheless appeals to some
transcendental illusion to account for our desire. The fact seems to be that, just as
the natural desire expressed by the question, an sit, has its range fixed by the
adequate object of intellect, so also the natural desire expressed by the question,
12
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quid sit, has an equal range. Since, then, acts are specified by their objects, and
the object of natural desire is the transcendental, ens, we may say that the desire
of our intellects is natural in origin and transcendental in its object… [and] the
question, quid sit Deus, expresses a desire that arises naturally as soon as one
knows the existence of God. This is but a corollary of the twofold affirmation that
the desire to understand is natural and transcendental. Moreover, analogical
knowledge of God does not satisfy this desire completely: not only is this clear a
posteriori from the fact that natural theology and Trinitarian theory are not
completely satisfying but only what we have to take because we cannot do better;
it also is evident a priori since analogical knowledge is knowledge not only of
similarity but of difference as well, and so of the limitations inevitably resulting
from the difference. Hence, it is only proper knowledge of God that fully can
meet the question, quid sit Deus.15
We must note (as Lonergan does subsequently) that this desire considered as desire
“neither includes nor excludes the Blessed Trinity,” even if the theologian may affirm by
an act of supernatural faith that this desire is only properly fulfilled by an act of
understanding specified by the substance of the beatific vision as its formal object. That
conclusion, of course, is theological and not properly philosophical. “It can be thought,”
Lonergan writes, “only because one has the faith, knows the fact of the beatific vision,
and so must accept its possibility.”16 Affirmation of potency, as ever, is derived from
act.17
The philosopher, however, is in a rather different position. Human beings do not
possess intellect simpliciter. Rather, our intellect comes to be in potency brought to act by
illuminated phantasm. As Aristotle had it, “intellect grasps forms in images,” which is to
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say by inquiry into the sensible.18 While the field of the sensible is restricted, the
transcendental ens is unrestricted, for besides being there is nothing. Thus, the
philosopher faces a paradox: it would seem that, because the naturally attainable
fulfillment of our desire to know is restricted, so too should the desire be. But, Lonergan
observes, “The facts are otherwise.”19 There is nothing about which we cannot ask, “quid
sit?” or “an sit?” because nothing is excluded from the range of our natural desire to
know. Thus, the essential object of our intellects qua intellect infinitely outstrips the
totality of proportionate objects (quidditas rei materialis) of our intellects considered
concretely. Thus, the wonder mobilizing the philosopher to discovery and reasoning and
the episodic triumph of rational judgment may, it turns out, itself prove an absurdity. The
task of finite spirit appears Sisyphean. Such is the negative pole of the general medieval
ambiguity.
But if the human intellect has a field of proportionate objects, could we not call
complete and adequate knowledge of that field a proper end of the human intellect, one in
which some natural, if imperfect felicity could be found? Could we not have as our
completely intelligible, but purely natural end knowledge of creatures and of God insofar
as God is their creator? Could we not worship God as source of creaturely being and
divine the natural law from the theonomic order among creatures?20 Yes and no.
Certainly, any knowledge of creatures, of any quidditas rei materialis, brings with it a
eudaimonic satisfaction. Also, aggregate knowledge of the whole of proportionate being
is in principle possible for the unaided human intellect. Further, the existence of God may
18
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be affirmed on the basis of a valid inference that the totality of contingent finite beings
must have a necessary and infinite cause. Still, knowledge of what the cause of
contingent finite being is would necessarily elude us. We can know that there is sufficient
reason for creaturely being, but not without divine aid what that reason is in itself. And
this is no merely extrinsic matter to the intelligibility of that which depends upon the
sufficiency of reason. For if I do not know the sufficient reason of creaturely being,
whatever else I may know about creatures, I still as yet do not know why they exist, but
only that they exist and that their existence is in principle intelligible. But if I do not
know why something exists, I hardly know that thing completely. And so in the end the
aggregate knowledge of creaturely being, no less than the universal existence of
creaturely being depends entirely upon God. This dependence is absolute, for the
difference between existence and non-existence is absolute. As a consequence, if
separated rather than merely distinguished from its founding relation to the God who is,
the proportionate end of the human intellect proves to be nothing at all. This, then, signals
the important role played by natural knowledge of God’s existence: it heuristically
indicates where the causal order of being continues infinitely beyond the ken of human
minds, situating the restricted field proportionate to human knowledge within the
unrestricted intelligibility that provides its proximate integrity.
If my treatment of this widely controverted point seems terse (and, in places, tart),
it is because I am convinced that the thesis on the natural desire to know God, especially
when considered according to separated philosophy, amounts in the end only to a
restatement of the medieval ambiguity articulated in Ch. 3, albeit in terms of a medieval
metaphysical psychology. To desire to know God under the ratio of cause of finite,
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contingent being is simply to have affirmed that there is a sufficient reason for finite,
contingent being and to ask what it is. If, however, one denies that there is some
sufficient reason for the existence of finite, contingent being (perhaps on the basis of the
paradox into which affirmation seems to lead philosophical reasoning), it would be
absurd to thus ask what that sufficient reason is. Conversely, if there is no sufficient
reason for finite, contingent being, then being is not at bottom completely intelligible and
the partial intelligibility one finds is not part of any whole, thus in fact no part at all.
Being is mere matter of fact. Thus we see that the activity of inquiry itself must be judged
worth pursuing on the basis of an intelligibility desired, but in principle beyond the
attainment of the human intellect and so of any separated philosophy. Concretely, what is
posed to the philosopher conceptually as a paradox is posed existentially as a prephilosophical decision for or against the complete intelligibility of being (and so, the
theologian knows, materially for or against God).
What has been posed in the last century as the problem of the supernatural is, I
contend, not the modern problem of the supernatural properly so-called, but a residue of
efforts to think up to the mind of Thomas Aquinas on the medieval problem, using his
medieval terms but only rarely achieving his medieval solution. The medieval solution
consists necessarily (though in the case of grace, not sufficiently) in the application of the
theorem of the supernatural. We may say without contradiction or competition that God
acts in all of my actions, making them actual and intelligible. Even when my willing
outstrips the proportion of my efficacy, it is God that makes my desiring make sense at
all and so lets it be as desiring. But this conclusion cannot be drawn unambiguously in a
separated philosophy. This ambiguity, however, fails to invalidate the conclusion. Rather,
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taking cognizance of the ambiguity allows us to recognize what Blondel insisted on at the
end of the nineteenth century: that there is infinitely more in action than in thought.21
If a tidy solution to the quandaries of the natural desire to know God like the one
sketched above only manages to restate the medieval ambiguity of being, then we have
still not yet posed the modern problem of the supernatural. Perhaps we can pose the
question according to Aristotle’s two basic questions. In Chapter 2, we answered a kind
of ‘an sit’ question. We followed Lonergan’s reconstruction of Thomas’s metaphysical
argument for divine concursus. We saw elucidated the theoretical conditions for the
possibility that God is at work in all our actions. We saw that these conditions can be
affirmed. In turn, we affirmed that God acts in every free human action. But as we may
desire to know the essence of the God that is the cause of every creature (and who thus
operates in every created cause), we can more specifically ask after the nature of God’s
operation in free human action. If we commit ourselves to the pre-philosophical decision
that such a question is worth asking, if we commit ourselves to the hypothesis that free
human action is fundamentally intelligible, then the theologian naturally wonders after
what the philosopher could not hope to know: “What is God doing in human action?”
This question cannot be answered by more metaphysics. This question does not ask for
the synchronic and causal conditions of possibility for God’s involvement in free human
action. Instead, it asks after the diachronic manifestation of God’s providential and
21
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redemptive intent in and through human actions. It is, in other words, a hermeneutical
question.
Still, if the contemporary controversy over the supernatural has been any
indication, the abstract universality, the logical control, and the disclosure of formal
necessity offered by metaphysical analysis will continue to prove too tempting to set
down, however provisionally. Therefore, in what follows I spell out why the modern
problem of the supernatural cannot be answered metaphysically.
2. A Metaphysical Attempt to Answer the Modern Problem
My effort to elucidate why the modern problem of the supernatural cannot be
solved exclusively in terms of metaphysics proceeds in two parts. In the first part, we see
that a metaphysical answer to the question, “what is God doing in human action?” only
restates the problem. In the second part, we will see that the problem thus restated is
manifestly and unavoidably diachronic and hermeneutical.
What is God doing in free human action, metaphysically speaking? Thomas says
God is “governing” it.22 Lonergan spells out four ways in which God governs free human
actions. God governs the will’s willing of the end, the specification of the free act as to its
means, the exercise of the free act once means have been decided upon, and the whole
series of an individual’s free acts.
God governs the will willing the end of free human action by what Lonergan calls
“the direct exercise of power” (immediatio virtutis).23 God is the immediate cause of an
22
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act of willing insofar as God creates and conserves the will. God not only causes the will
to be itself according to its essence, but also beyond essence in the actuality of its
operation that wills the end.24 God also governs the intellect in its operation by which the
end is presented to the will and in this same direct or immediate manner, i.e. through
creation and conservation. God governs too the will’s willing of the end as mediate cause
(mediatio suppositi), applying causes to their effects and adapting causes to be
instruments of His will.25 Thus, God applies the agent objects of sensation to the senses,
applies the senses in act to the intellect, and applies the agent intellect to the passive
intellect, thereby illuminating the phantasms impressed there.26 Thus, God governs the
operation of the will with regard to the end by causing the will and its operations to be at
all (immediatio virtutis), but also by arranging the spatiotemporal conjunction and
disposition of the intellect and will with regard to the agent objects that bring them to act
in space and time through the order of the universe (mediatio suppositi).27
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God also governs the specification of our free acts whereby we select the means
through which to reach our intended end.28 God effects this governance by ordering
through application all the intelligible factors that contribute to it. God orders the matter
of the act, which is to say the circumstances that bound feasibility and so the range of
means really available. God orders the subject of the act through his governance by
application of our habits and dispositions of the body, the senses, the intellect, and the
will. He also governs the subject of free acts through his governance by creation and
conservation of the intellectual light of deliberation and the love for the end motivating
our deliberations. In the explicitly theological register, we may also add that God governs
so many of our free acts by the grace that makes them possible, through application in
supernatural habits and through creation and conservation in the gift of enlightenment of
our intellect and inspiration of our wills.29 As I argued at length in chapter 2, God also
governs the exercise of our free actions through the transitive relation of causality that is
divine concursus. As agents, we are not proportionate to have existence as an effect, but
the effects of the exercise of our free actions exist. God, thus, causes both this existential
efficacy in our action, but also the operation by which we commit ourselves to realizing
it. God causes our causing, and so is cause of our effects. This is no less true when we are
moved than when we move ourselves.
Finally, Lonergan argues that God is solely the cause of the entire series of an
individual’s free actions. Lonergan offers both conceptual and concrete support for this
claim. Causes, he reminds us, are one in themselves, but an individual’s acts are multiple.
Therefore, even if one intends and chooses the series as a whole, that act itself would be
28
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part of the series, for “no one act of a person is simultaneous with all that person’s
acts.”30 Concretely, Lonergan points out, we experience our freedom as effective here
and now, such that “it is not today’s freedom but tomorrow’s that is going to carry out the
resolution made today.”31 Indeed, this inescapable temporality rules out the prospect that
we might have causal mastery of the whole series of our actions. No, God wills the order
of every ordered series in his infinite wisdom and so is the cause per se of each person’s
free acts.
The above elucidation of God’s governance of human action, however
compendious, only restates the modern problem. Each point in Lonergan’s catalogue of
God’s governance of free human action serves to specify the formal content of a decision
to affirm the positive pole of the specific medieval ambiguity, of a decision to operate on
the heuristic anticipation that free human action is ultimately intelligible. Each point fills
out a respect in which we affirm, yes, there is an explanation for the being of free human
action. That explanation is what the theologian means by God. Moreover, by providing
free human action with its efficacy (and so being), God does not deprive it of its liberty.
The metaphysical answer tells us that free human actions are intelligible because of their
dependence upon God and so also that God is acting in them. No doubt we can, by
learning what human actions are, learn what God is doing in making them to be. This is
of the utmost importance in answer to an sit questions about the work of God in human
actions. Nonetheless, it produces a trivial answer to quid sit questions about the same:
whatever God knows, wills, or does necessarily is, but only with the minimal necessity

30

Ibid., 333.

31

Ibid.

194
resulting from the supposition of itself.32 That triviality with regard to the quiddity of
God’s ad extra agency grounded the medieval ambiguities of being we saw in Chapter 3.
If by asking, “what is God doing in human action?” we want to know the intelligible
nexus between free human action as the freely produced effects of God’s action and the
end for and towards which they are governed and effected by God, this sheds no light at
all. We have as yet no purchase on what God is doing in free human action.
3. The Impossibility of a Metaphysical Answer
My argument for the impossibility of answering the modern problem of the
supernatural metaphysically will itself be primarily metaphysical. This might seem odd
on its face. Although the metaphysical attempt to answer the modern problem only
restates the problem, we need not consider that approach entirely fruitless. In principle,
careful exposition of this metaphysical restatement should serve to both articulate the
elements of the problem and also to communicate its force. We might, through analysis,
reveal not just the fact that a metaphysical approach cannot answer the modern problem,
but also reveal some of the reasons why it cannot do so and thereby uncover some
determinations of the problem itself.
I have expressed the modern problem of the supernatural by the somewhat
informal question, “What is God doing in free human action?” Diffusely and at length in
Chapter 2, but more directly and tersely in this chapter I have considered “what God is
doing.” I have, in other words, kept the focus on God’s ad extra agency in human action.
Free human action in itself has gone little defined, except when considered as the object
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of God’s action. In what follows, a close look at Lonergan’s account of Thomas’s
metaphysical psychology of volition provides both the needed articulation of the modern
problem and communication of its force. This close look consists in a metaphysical
analysis reducing free human action to its principle in free acts of the will, and so
involves a reconstruction of Lonergan’s Thomist theory of will. For my purposes,
underlining the role of meaning in human volition proves most important. The
constitutive function of meaning in human action, fundamental for human action as free,
reveals why the modern problem of the supernatural is a) diachronic, b) hermeneutical,
and c) irreducible to metaphysical solutions.
3.2 Metaphysical Analysis of Free Human Action
In Chapter 3, we reviewed Thomas’s augmentation of Aristotle’s theory of action.
There we saw that within a unitary action, a single ‘movement,’ the patient or effect or
product is distinguished on the basis of its dependence upon another—the agent—for its
act. Agency, then, is predicated extrinsically from the existence of an effect really
dependent upon the agent for its act. Within this general metaphysical framework, how
are free human actions to be distinguished? First, we need to acknowledge a looming
ambiguity. Action can be taken to mean the movement as a unitary whole within which
agent and patient/effect/product are distinguished. We might approximately associate
Aristotle’s use of poiesis with this sense of ‘action’. However, action can also refer to the
effect or product itself, and here we might associate, with matching approximation,
Aristotle’s sense of praxis. I will do my best to be clear about which sense I am
employing along the way, referring to the former sense with ‘action-as-movement’ and
‘action-as-effect.’
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How are free human actions (in either sense) discerned as both free and human?
There is a temptation, because agents are predicated as such extrinsically, to think we
must distinguish free human action on the basis of the ‘action-as-effect’ itself. For
example, we might suppose that those actions that go unimpeded are thereby free. Of
course, that which is impeded does not come to be at all and without an extant
effect/product, there is no action to speak of, much less a free and human one. If it is
objected that there is an effect, but it is simply not the effect intended, this also tips us
away from the effect/product as the determinant of an action as free. For effects do not
have intentions, but rational agents do, and so implicitly we must distinguish free human
actions on the basis of the agent.
If we cannot distinguish the free and human character of an action-as-movement
on the basis of its effect/product, then we turn to its other term: the agent. How is agency
distinguished as free and human from the agent? We will proceed by metaphysical
analysis, which is to say by reduction to principles. Thus we move from the objects of an
act to the nature of the act and then from the nature of the power to act thusly to the
nature of the being that possesses that power. We might begin by positing vaguely and
heuristically that the object of free human action is “some good.” Now, this does not
carry us very far, because every being that becomes in time and space tends toward
“some good.” These goods-as-ends remain in need of specification. Here we find that
metaphysical analysis takes on a dialectical nature, pivoting between terms to gain
traction. Thus, we may specify goods by their proportion to the nature of the acts,
powers, and natures that tend toward them.
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Humans, we know, tend toward nutritive ends. While this distinguishes human
actions from the actions of the inanimate, we have this specific tending in common with
all living things. Humans also tend towards sensible goods (the ‘pleasurable’). Moreover,
we tend towards nutritive goods under the aspect of their sensible goodness perceived. In
other words, our desire for nutritive goods depends upon, in the concrete, our tending
towards sensible goods. However, we have this tending in common with all sentient
living things and so it gets us only so much closer to specifying actions as free and
human. Finally, then, humans also tend towards intelligible goods, as evinced by the
desire to know for its own sake and the love we have for knowledge possessed. This, at
least according to present knowledge of the cosmos, seems a uniquely human tending.
Moreover, we tend towards nutritive and sensible goods under the aspect of their
intelligible goodness as known. In other words, our desire for nutritive goods depends, in
the concrete, on our tending towards intelligible goods like the goods of order in which
agriculture consists, for example. Our desire for sensible goods also, in the concrete,
depends on our tending towards intelligible goods, as evinced by the intellectual
character of our delight in the beautiful.33
Thus the objects of human actions are desired or loved under two aspects:
primarily as good, but secondarily and integrally as intelligible. Of course, intelligibility
and goodness pertain to everything towards which any being tends, since bonum is
among the transcendentals of being. This does not help us specify actions as free and
human, however. Every end towards which a being tends in its becoming is, insofar as it
is, intelligible and good. Noting that they are desired as good and intelligible does aid our
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specification, however. We may say that, although free human actions produce effects
that are intelligible and good (like all effective actions), specifically free and human
actions follow from prior acts of knowing and desiring as their ontological principle.
Consequently, the potency for these acts is called a ‘rational appetite.’34 But prattle of the
Thomist definition for the will only occasionally raises the essential questions: what is
rationality? How does rationality modify the tending in which appetite consists? These
questions will occupy us now.
3.2 What is Rationality?
Fundamentally, rationality is an intellectual process. But when we think of
intellectual process, we may think only of the forms of inference “found in an
abbreviated and very formal textbook on deductive logic.”35 We might, in other words,
think of rationality as a fairly mechanical process whereby concepts and their contents
are assembled into arguments according to rules or laws. These rules or laws, then, are
what we learn in logic courses and rationality would consist in their rigorous application.
But such a process would be merely intelligible and not as such intellectual. It would be
what Lonergan calls a “natural process.” He notes three differences between a natural
process and an intellectual process. He writes,
(First) the intelligibility of natural process is passive and potential: it is what can
be understood; it is not an understanding; it is a potential object of intellect, but it
is not the very stuff of intellect. (Second), the intelligibility of natural process is
the intelligibility of some specific natural law, say, the law of inverse squares, but
never the intelligibility of the very idea of intelligible law. Thirdly, the
34
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intelligibility of natural process is imposed from without: natures act intelligibly,
not because they are intelligent, for they are not, but because they are concretions
of divine ideas and a divine plan.36
Intellectual process, then, will be not just intelligible, but also intelligent.
Intellectual process is not just governed by laws or rules, but is generative of laws/rules.
Thus these governing principles are not heteronomous to intellectual process. Intellectual
process is not just governed by intelligible law, but creates, constitutes, and so grounds,
“the intelligibility-in-act of law.”37 In this sense, intellectual process is autonomous,
rather than automatic.
Even more significantly, intellectual process is not merely the autonomous
assemblage of ready-made concepts generated through “metaphysical mechanics.”38
“Conceptualization comes as the term and product,” Lonergan writes, “of a process of
reasoning.”39 If an intellectual process produces concepts, the autonomous process of
deductive, syllogistic reasoning is therefore not basic, but a derived form of rationality.
The rationality of deductive inference rests on a still-more-basic rationality. As I have
previously argued, any positive philosophy that would come to ultimately unambiguous
conclusions in ontology operates on the presupposition that “all causation is intelligible,”
and so “any effect has sufficient ground in its cause.”40 Concepts are the result of a
process and so are, in that sense, effects dependent on their cause as sufficient ground.
Moreover, concepts are the result of a specifically intellectual process, and so their
sufficient ground is not just intelligible, but intelligent. This ground cannot be
36
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intelligence merely in potency, and therefore the ground cannot be the intellectual power
as such. No, the ground of concepts must be intelligence in act, for effects receive their
act from their cause. But intelligence in act is intellectual operation. It is intelligere,
understanding. The sufficient ground of the concept-as-effect is “a knowing” and it is
“operative precisely as a knowing, knowing itself to be sufficient.”41
This intelligent intelligibility, according to Lonergan, is the “basic and essential
rationality of rational consciousness” to be observed “in all concepts.”42 But here we run
up against the limits of metaphysical analysis alone. Lonergan argues that Thomas seems
to have noticed this limitation in his effort to follow Aristotle’s lead on these questions,
for Thomas abandoned to ti ên einai and its Latin equivalent.43 He notes that Thomas
only rarely invokes the Latin equivalent of to ti ên einai outside of the commentaries on
Aristotle. When he makes reference to it there, he often identifies it with essential
definition itself, though sometimes more specifically with the ground of essential
definition.44 Lonergan thinks that Aristotle’s by-the-way efforts to isolate the concrete
apprehension of form from the abstract articulation of essential definition in concepts
proved unsatisfactory to Thomas and that Thomas consequently chose a different
strategy. Lonergan explains the difficulty:
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The Aristotelian term [to ti ên einai] was a logical effort to isolate understanding
and form, and one has only to consider the difficulties of such isolation to grasp
why Aquinas dropped this Aristotelian effort as abortive and proceeded on lines
of his own. Because the act of understanding–the intelligere proprie–is prior to,
and cause of, conceptualization, because expression is only through
conceptualization, any attempt to fix the act of understanding, except by way of
introspective description, involves its own partial failure; for any such attempt is
an expression, and expression is no longer understanding and already concept.45
Thomas turned instead to Aristotle’s emphasis on the role of diagrams in
mathematical discovery, and so augmented the logical technique of metaphysical analysis
with introspective, psychological description. “We can all experience in ourselves that,
when we try to understand something,” Thomas writes, “we form for ourselves images,
by way of examples, in which as it were we inspect what we desire to understand.”46 The
need for diagrams in mathematics (whereby necessary and immobile forms are
represented multiply) provided Thomas his heuristic for what would be more generally
the case: abstract definitions of things are derived from their multiple representation in
concrete things.47 I will follow Thomas and Lonergan in pairing these techniques,
metaphysical analysis and psychological description, toward three complementary ends.
First, it will help concretize the causal relation between intelligere and the emanatio
intelligibilis of the concept. Second, it will clarify the function of the concept in
rationality considered more widely, from its origin in sense to its termination in true
judgments of fact to the development of a scientia. Finally, it will prepare us to speak
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articulately and with detailed control of the rational element in willing, and by extension
in free human action.
I have already noted that concepts depend on intellectual operation to bring them
to act. Human intellect, however, is not perpetually in act like God’s.48 “We shout our
rare 'Eurekas' with Archimedes,” Lonergan writes, “but for the most part we have to
reason(.)”49 What brings human intellect into act, to operation? For Lonergan, following
Thomas, it is quidditas rei materialis. How does this come about? In and through
phantasm illuminated by agent intellect. But, again, it is easy enough to trot out these
terms and their metaphysical determinations and yet to remain obtuse to their meaning.
So let us break down cognitional process along two lines: according to a metaphysical
analysis and a parallel psychological description.
As we noted in discussion of application in Chapter 2, it is not sufficient for a
cause that it be in act to produce its effect. It must also be in proper disposition and
relation to the material of this effect, as a lit match cannot ignite a candle’s wick if each
would remain in its opposed corner of a room. So it is too with the agent object of
understanding. The intelligibility in act of a material being cannot bring the intellect to
act unless it is in the right relation to the intellect. Quidditas rei materialis, by virtue of
its substantial materiality, comes into relation with or disposition to other beings in space
and time. The intellect, of course, is immaterial, and so does not come into relation with
or disposition to its objects spatiotemporally. But besides intellect, there is sense. Sense is
intentional, but also materially dependent on its bodily organ. Thus, integral to the
48
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process by which intellect comes to act is the application of sensible objects to the sense
powers of a human being, whereby the sensible in act serves as agent object to sight or
hearing, etc., bringing them to act, to operation. Thus is sensibility, in its intentional
rather than material mode, able to bring quidditas rei materialis into the proper relation
with the intellect so that its role as agent object might be realized.
But the spatiotemporal disposition of material being is not the only instance of
application needful to bring intellect to act. So also there is needed a proper spiritual or
immaterial disposition. This, in my view, is the metaphysical function of the agent
intellect as a specifically efficient potency in the intellectual faculty.50 The agent intellect
is that which brings the intellect into right disposition to and relation with the quiddity
now present intentionally in and through sensation. The effect of this disposing function
falls not only upon the intellect in an illuminating and preparatory fashion, but also upon
the sensations themselves, organizing and selecting among sensations that which is
potentially relevant for understanding. It is the effect of this organizing and selecting
function that distinguishes phantasms from mere sensations. Once the proper material and
spiritual applications have been effected, the intelligible in act immanent in the sensible
in act and illuminated by the light of agent intellect may bring the intellect to act.51 Then
what is sensed is also understood.
Alongside this metaphysical analysis of powers, operations, objects, and
application, so too it is helpful to consider a description of the same process under its
psychological—which is to say, conscious—aspect. One has perhaps had the experience
50
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of ‘spacing out’ or being ‘lost in thought.’ In such experiences, we do not cease to be
conscious, nor do we cease to have consciousness of the flow of sensation. We see, hear,
smell, taste, and feel during such episodes. But it is so little organized, so little selected,
deemed (if I may speak poetically) of so little relevance to our waxing or waning
curiosity that it goes un-attended-to and largely unremembered. If, rather than fading into
twilight consciousness, one puzzles and if one puzzles not over the imagined, but over the
presently perceived, then one finds the pattern of experience highly organized, highly
selective according to the heuristic force of some incipient question. This question is
operative, one may recall in retrospect, as a criterion of relevance that tunes out the hum
of the HVAC system, but sees the lines of some diagram or hears the words of the lecture
in sharp relief. Such are phantasms, not as a function or object of metaphysical analysis,
but as experienced. One may tinker with the relevant sensible matter for as long as the
tension of inquisitive consciousness can be maintained. One may lose heart and go in
search of some anesthetizing distraction from the discomfort of inquisitive consciousness,
but also one may be relieved of this tension by the sudden—indeed, instantaneous—shift
from perplexity to apprehension, from not-understanding to understanding. This
transition is from understanding as a live and desired possibility to understanding as a
reality of one’s conscious experience. It can be the result from a change in disposition
among the sensed (perhaps one re-organizes the diagrams or fixes upon a new example),
but it can also result from a change in disposition internal to one’s consciousness (a
renewed attentiveness, a re-phrasing of the operative question, or a newfound willingness
to realize the significance of what one has seen or heard all along). In any case, the effect
is the same: the synchronic ‘flash’ of insight.
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We are nearly ready now, having considered both metaphysically and
psychologically the process by which intellect comes to act, to turn back to the basic
rationality that consists in the process by which intellect in act produces a concept or
verbum mentis. But first we must make a few notes. Recall that intelligere is, as far as it
goes, a knowing. It is the immediate apprehension of its object as immanent in
phantasms. This immediacy, of course, is an integral element in the realism proper to any
genuinely Thomist theory of knowledge. However, this immediacy has certain limitations
that can be enumerated both metaphysically and by psychological description.
Metaphysically considered, that which is immediately related can admit of no further
application, for any change in relation would deprive the intellect of its agent object, and
so that on which it depends for its act. In this way, the human act of understanding
considered in itself and in isolation cannot be called ‘rational,’ for once it is in act, it does
not admit of process. The act of understanding, even if considered as the actuality of a
movement from potency to act, is a synchronic instant that cannot serve as part of a
diachronic process. To borrow Augustine’s language from the Confessions, the act of
understanding is a pure and complete intending that does not admit of the distention
required for consciousness of temporal duration.52 Without temporal duration, of course,
there can be no diachronic process. Finally, intelligibility is distinguished from the
sensible, and so is insensible per se. Consequently, it cannot of itself be the agent object
for the human intellect and so cannot produce the effects in the human intellect in which
an intellectual process would consist.
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In addition to these metaphysical limitations, the immediate grasp of quiddity by
an act of understanding has limits that can be described psychologically. What is
immediately experienced is experienced indistinctly.53 The experience of understanding,
the ‘flash’ of insight, is of the understanding itself and also of the understood. One does
in fact experience a knowing in the experience of understanding. Still, the act and its
object are not distinguished in the experiencing, as seeing is at once experienced as a
seeing and also always as a seeing-this. The immediacy of the apprehension and the
apprehended makes the apprehension itself, as conscious and intentional, necessarily
indistinct. For, if it were distinct, it would not be immediate, but rather mediated by the
difference by which it is distinguished.54 Moreover, the change from potentially
understanding to actually understanding is a synchronic, punctual transformation from
one state to an opposed state without gradation or overlap. The experience of this
transition can be remembered, but as remembered it is likewise no longer immediate. As
immediate and punctual, the act of understanding is not available to serve as the object of
inquiry’s tension, and so not available to the on-going experience of intellectual process.
But intellectual process does not terminate with insight into phantasm. As
Lonergan writes,
For human understanding, though it has its object in the phantasm and knows it in
the phantasm, yet is not content with an object in this state. It pivots on itself to
produce for itself another object which is the inner word as ratio, intentio,
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definitio, quod quid est. And this pivoting and production… is an operation of
rational consciousness.55
We are now prepared to consider this production of the concept, this procession of the
verbum mentis in some detail according both to a metaphysical analysis and to a
psychological description. Metaphysically speaking, there are two kinds of procession.
There is the emergence of a perfection in and from what is perfected, as when we saw
above the emergence of an act of understanding in and from the intellect. This is a
processio operationis.56 There is also the procession of the verbum mentis, of a concept
from an act of understanding. This is a processio operati. It is the emergence of one thing
from another. But lest we think of concepts as extrinsically related to the understanding
that produces them, we need to also distinguish two kinds of acts. There are those acts
that consist in movement whereby, once the movement is complete, the act ceases. “One
cannot at once be walking a given distance and have walked it, be being cured and have
been cured, be learning something and have learned it.57” Such an act is called an actus
imperfecti. What is moved is in potency, what is in potency is imperfect, and so that
movement is the act of the imperfect.58 Thus, the reasoning that gave rise to the act of
understanding, the tinkering with the phantasm under the guidance of inquiry’s tension
and agent intellect’s illumination, all of this is a movement in the sense of actus
imperfecti. The act of understanding itself, however, is “the act of something that exists
in act, inasmuch as it exists in act,” and “the act of something brought to completion
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inasmuch as it is complete.”59 Such is an actus perfecti. Such acts are not intrinsically
temporal, though we shall see that this transcendence of temporality allows them to have
a governing function in intellectual process as rational.
Concepts proceed by a processio operati. They emerge from something else in act
rather than as an act in and from something in potency. The verbum mentis proceeds from
an act of understanding and is produced by that understanding as an effect.60 However,
this procession is, as we said, not only intelligible, but also intelligent. It is the basic
rationality that belongs to concepts. Consequently, the procession of the concept must be
simultaneous with the act of understanding.61 If the concept itself is to have the character
of rationality in its intelligent and intelligible dependence on an act of understanding,
then the concept must also express the content of the act of understanding.62 But in the
production of the concept, both of these conditions are met because intelligere is, in and
of itself, an actus perfecti. Because it is the act of a temporal nature, so long as it is in act,
it endures through time in act. As enduring in act simultaneously with the procession of
the verbum mentis, intelligere thus governs the production of concepts.63 This intelligent
governance of concepts founds their rationality, as I noted above. They emerge according
59
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to a law, but also according to that which is the source of intelligible law. This
governance of the concept by understanding also allows the concepts themselves to serve
as agent objects in the intellectual process of deductive reasoning in a manner that is, by
extension, likewise rational. Inference is rational not just when it proceeds according to
logical rules, but when it proceeds according to the autonomy of the intellectual operation
from which intelligible law issues.
If the production of the concept, however, is considered only in terms of
metaphysical mechanics, a point of central importance will be lost. When considered only
in terms of the conditions of possible causal efficacy, it remains unclear why the
procession of a verbum mentis should be likened unto the speaking (dicere) of a word at
all. Where my emphasis on rationality as a process ultimately undergirds my claim that
the modern problem is irreducibly diachronic, my contention that the procession of the
verbum mentis is an act of meaning founds my claim that the modern problem of the
supernatural is irreducibly hermeneutical. The following provides the psychological
description and analysis of concept production on which that claim rests.
As the coming-to-act of understanding is experienced, so too is the procession of
the verbum mentis.64 Above we noted that intelligere is experienced immediately and
synchronically. Still, this act is intentional and so it has an object, which is to say a
content, an ‘about.’ This content or ‘about’ can be considered in its objective aspect and
we can enunciate this consideration by the question, “what did I understand?” Nor is this
question unfamiliar to the inquisitive, who having labored with the phantasm and the
tension of inquiry, who perhaps basked briefly in the relief of tension provided by insight,
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and yet who may recall the momentary terror that accompanies putting this question to
one’s self or having it put to one by a teacher or colleague. This is a dramatic moment in
intellectual process, for the flash of insight can, if neglected, fade into obscurity and its
content can be ‘lost.’ What did you understand? “Ah, damn, I lost it. I can no longer
remember.” Fortunately, this question has an answer. The ‘about’ of our insights can be
formulated, can be expressed both to ourselves and to others.65
This question, though it verbally resembles a question for understanding (quid
est?), is in fact a question for recognition and recollection. It cannot be a question for
understanding, since what it asks after is already understood. Rather, it anticipates and
directs attention to something in consciousness that is a) distinct and distinguishable
among the various elements in the flow of conscious experience, b) is both intelligible
and expressive of conscious intelligence, and c) is available for further reasoning and
intellectual procedure. In brief, it is a question ordered to consciousness of the verbum
mentis. The concept, then, is both distinguishable from the act of insight, but it is also
distinguishable in experience from the immediacy of that act. Indeed, the concept made
distinct distinguishes the understood from the understanding, but nonetheless
distinguishes it as understood. If I am attentive to that I have understood, the concept
selects what I have understood. In this way, the concept is significant in consciousness. It
both carries and refers to the content of intelligere. It is, in other words, the product of an
act of meaning. This meaning, because it means what is both intelligible and intelligent
(i.e. the substance of intellect in act), does not have the extrinsic significance of the
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material sign, which signifies, refers to, and carries meaning by convention. Rather, it is
the primitive and basic form of meaning. It is important not to miss that the basic
rationality of the concept consists in a mediation of meaning.
The above only considers the production of the concept as distinct, as generative
of distinctness, and as an expression of intelligence. This act of meaning that produces
the concept, the procession of the verbum mentis is primarily and substantially
intellectual. But it is at the same time an integrally imaginal, phantasmatic construction.
If it were not, the concept could not play a role in any ongoing intellectual procedure. It
could not enter into any process of logical inference. It could not contribute to the
generation and derivation of a scientia. For we do not stop with the sense that we might
‘really have it,’ nor even with the enunciation of what it is we have in answer to our
questions. No, the work of intellect continues. We wonder, for example, whether what we
have understood in the phantasms is correct, i.e. whether it is adequate as an answer to
our question(s) and whether that adequacy owes to the truth. Where we considered
inquiry as asking quid sit? now we recall how we also ask an sit? The apprehension of
sufficient evidence, the grasp of the virtually unconditioned in which true judgment
consist is itself an operation of the intellect, brought about by the composition of the
phantasmatic element of the evidence and the phantasmatic expression of understanding
that is the concept under the light of agent intellect.66 This reflective intelligere also
issues in a verbum mentis, only it has the much simpler character of an affirmative or
negative declaration: yes or no, true or false. Moreover, where we judge our
understandings correct and so true, we wonder further: what broader significance does
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this knowledge have? Where does it fit within what else I have come to know and,
heuristically, what I hope to discover through further inquiry. Such is the role of concepts
in the generation of a science, not through the automatic derivation of implications by the
mechanical application of rules, but by yet-more-inquiry and yet-more-understanding.
Why can the concept play such a role, mediating meaningfully between some
initial act of intelligere and subsequent reflective inquiry or derivation of a science? The
answer lies in the originating act of all intellectual procedure: advertence to phantasm, the
illumination of the agent intellect, and the grasp of intelligibility in images. The verbum
mentis expresses what understanding apprehends in a mode suitable for its role in the
ongoing process of inquiry. But this mode is, broadly speaking, phantasmatic. The
concept is, in addition to being intelligible and an expression of intelligence, also an
immanent intellectual image, for our reasoning depends essentially on the sensible or
imaginable. It functions on some loose analogy with the diagram, providing a mental
object “in which the intelligible species shines forth as an exemplar(.)”67 But some
images are more suitable to showing forth their intelligibility than others. As any student
can attest, many supposedly intellectual images are too ambiguous, able to be interpreted
in too many differing respects. And so the concept is a properly intellectual image,
specially constructed to convey immanently the substance of the understanding it
expresses and only the substance of the understanding it expresses. It is precisely in this
respect that intelligere as actus perfecti governs the production of concepts: it accrues
only those phantasmatic elements strictly relevant to the intelligible species expressed
thereby. Still, where the quiddity apprehended is unitary, the phantasmatic is analogous
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to the material, and so is multiple. Thus, the concept is a construction, both of the
intelligible with the phantasmatic, but also of available, relevant phantasmatic materials.
The concept can make present the intelligible species distinctly and in accord with the
fact what is known no longer needs to be discovered by fresh insight, but only recognized
or recalled habitually. The intelligible species so recalled, we may proceed to further
inquire about, to verify, to synthesize into a science what we know by insight into
phantasms. Without the constructed verba, we would understand in the immediate flash
of apprehension but could not reason from our understanding, could not verify the
correctness of our insights, and so could not develop our knowledge unto a science. What
we have understood would not be available to us to recall or to be carried into our
reasoning processes.
Even though the verbum mentis has an imaginal quality to it, it is not, in
Lonergan’s language, just some “impoverished replica” of the thing understood.68 It need
not resemble the properties of what is understood, as the word fire is neither hot nor
bright, but only allow us to recall what we have understood about what is hot and bright,
and why it is so. Again, one may try, through words that are neither hot nor bright
themselves, to evoke the heat and light of a flame, but the definition of combustion will
eschew such descriptions. The search for essential definition that gives rise to concepts
does not want to know what fire is like, but why combustion is itself. Anything irrelevant
to expressing our understanding of the essence of combustion is excluded from the
definition. Now, this verbal parsimony is an effect of the prior parsimony of autonomous
intellectual process. What the verbum mentis carries forward from an act of
68
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understanding expresses what was apprehended intellectually and only what was
apprehended intellectually. If one knows the essential definition of a circle (to return
again to the role of diagrams in mathematics) one can see the uniformity of a plane curve
and also apprehend the necessity that its radii be equal. But only the uniformity can be
seen. The necessity is known by an act of understanding, not an act of perception.
Consequently, the definition of a circle includes equality of radii and neglects to mention
the uniformity of the curve produced thereby. In this way, the abstractness of concepts
does not impoverish the rich experience of concrete objects, because concepts do not aim
to provide a degraded picture of absent things. Instead, concepts inject into the flow of
experience the fruits of intellectual apprehension and so enrich the field of consciousness
with rationally constructed objects. Moreover, by expressing intelligence in act with a
basic and essential rationality, concepts link together acts of intelligere into the derived
intellectual processes in which both logical inference and scientific elaboration consist.
3.3 The Rationality of the Will
If the foregoing has, in its detail and preliminary nature, tried my reader’s
patience, perhaps allow me to set down the main point of the above: human rationality
consists in an autonomous intellectual process integrally mediated by meaning and
productive of constructed verba or concepts. Human rationality, because it consists in a
process, is irreducibly diachronic. Because the process is intellectual and not merely
intelligible, it is neither mechanical nor automatic, but rather autonomous. Because the
nature of intellectual act consists in the immediate and so indistinct apprehension of form,
intellectual process is mediated by some distinct expression of what has been
apprehended. The expression of these mediating objects (verba or concepts) is
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consequently an act of meaning. Finally, because subsequent acts of understanding have
the same nature as preceding acts—that is, they have quidditas rei materialis for their
agent object—the mediating objects of human rationality bear, in addition to their
intelligible content, some phantasmatic element. This allows them to be properly
disposed as agent object for subsequent intellectual acts, including the acts of true
judgment in which knowledge of being consists. But the intelligent combination of
diverse elements into a unity is a construction, a factum. In conceptualization, then, we
may see how rationality, autonomy, mediation, poiesis, and knowledge function
integrally.
Our central preoccupation remains. In what way is the will a rational appetite and
how does this rationality ground the liberty of human action? How does rationality as
conceived above modify the tending in which the movement of the will consists and the
actions follow from it?
Thomas repeatedly affirms that the operation of the will proceeds from a word in
the intellect.69 Thus, in addition to reflective insight into the verity of the understanding
expressed by our concepts and the assemblage of a scientia from the systematization of
our true understandings, we may append ‘willing’ to the list of subsequent operations for
which a verbum mentis would serve as agent object. It is tempting to skip to the end of
our inquiry and affirm that the will is a rational appetite with the borrowed, basic
rationality of the concept. Thus, acts of the will would be considered free according to the
borrowed autonomy of the intellectual process that gave rise to them. And this is true as
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far as it goes. What remains opaque is whether a remote and borrowed rationality (and so
autonomy) is sufficient to render the tending in which our rational appetite consists both
rational and free.
A genuine, albeit preliminary advance is made by recognizing that a certain
freedom is bestowed on our rational appetite by the concept from which its operation
follows. The concept has been generated by an autonomous intellectual process, and so,
as object of the act of willing, it is willed in accord with the autonomous principle on
which it depends. This includes both the autonomy of the agent intellect at work in the
process of reasoning over the phantasms and the autonomy of construction or poiesis at
work in the expression of what is understood through the compound of its intelligible
species and the phantasmatic element to which it is joined. But the will is essentially
ordered to the summum bonum, and so is itself generative of the intelligible ‘ought’
pertaining to willing any particular good. Thus, we anticipate an autonomy proper to the
will itself.
Since the concept is the agent object of the will in act, we may ask whether there
are conditions for the application of the concept to the will.70 Because the human being is
inherently temporal, there must be some application of the agent object of even spiritual
acts to the matter of its potentially operated effect. Thus, as with the processio
operationis of intelligere in the intellect, there is a preparatory disposition of both the
power and of the object.71 The will, then, disposes itself to the good immanent in the
phantasmatic element in the concept by its essential tending towards the good in general,
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but more specifically and concretely by its antecedent habits. Still even more concretely,
I would suggest that the will also disposes itself towards particular verified concepts in a
manner analogous to reflective inquiry and that can also be expressed in a question: ought
this be? Perhaps the concept, constructed with an eye towards verification, is also well
disposed towards the evaluative function of the will, but then perhaps not. In either case,
we may say that the concept itself must be brought into proper disposition to the will by a
felicitous (re-)construction, coordinating its phantasmatic and valuative aspects. The
concept, in other words, must be rendered meaningful in an evaluative and not just
intellectual sense.72 These prior dispositive conditions having been met, then, the good
incipiently apprehended in the verified concept may bring the will to act such that an act
of velle emerges in the will. Thus, for Lonergan, “as proceeding from the inner word, [the
act of love is] 'processio operati.'”73
From another angle, though, velle is disanalogous to the act of understanding from
which a concept proceeds. Considered not as the term of a process of something like
inquiry, and so as the term of an actus imperfecti, but instead considered as an operative
operation of the will, and so as an actus perfecti in itself, an act of willing is more
properly analogized to the reflective intelligere from which a judgment of fact
proceeds.74 The reflective act of intellect consists in an apprehension that is expressed by
a verbum as well, i.e. by an affirmative ‘yes’ or a negative ‘no’ with regard to the concept
whose content it borrows. This affirmative act and expression, then, are the knowing in
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which cognitional process properly terminates. The reflective act, as actus perfecti,
endures through time to govern subsequent intellectual procedure in accord with what is
actively known and contemplated. By analogy to the affirmative act of the intellect in a
judgment of fact, the act of willing is an actus perfecti that a) endures through time and
governs subsequent volitional procedures, b) has a borrowed content in what is meant by
the concept it ‘affirms’ or ‘negates,’ and c) is basically polar in its response, consisting in
an unqualified ‘affirmation,’ a total ‘negation,’ or a spectrally delimited state of intensity
tending towards one or the other.
Velle is further analogous to a judgment of fact insofar as the movement, the
tending in which appetite and aversion consist are mediated by an uttered ‘yes’ and ‘no.’
In other words, willing in act and as expressed in a judgment of value is analogous to
reflective intelligere in act and expressed in a judgment of fact. Still, it is only analogous,
for the affirmative act and expression of the will in act is also a motive, a proximate,
proper, and rational principle of movement. A judgment of fact may occasion further
intellectual procedure, but only extrinsically and per accidens. Willing in act and
expressed in a judgment of value, by contrast, is the per se cause of some movement. In
turn, the good immanent in the concept is in general the agent object of willing in act, but
thereby also a mobile, a rationally-generated “object-for-which” of a movement.75
A number of problems present themselves at this point. Is the borrowed autonomy
of the concept, or even the proper autonomy of the judgment of value’s ‘ought’ adequate
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to render the movement following from velle a free act? If the knowledge expressed in
the verified concept is of what is, then is the action that follows from an act of the will
and a judgment of value superfluous? If the good apprehended in a judgment of value is,
what could need to be done?
What is the movement that manifests the will in act? As knowledge is not a single
intellectual act, but a compound of acts in an intellectual process, neither is willing a
single movement, but a compound of movements in a volitional process. First from the
actus perfecti of the will’s operation there proceeds the affirmative or negative utterance
of the judgment of value. By the mediation of this affirmative or negative word, the actus
imperfecti of deliberation about means to the willed good proceeds, which is itself unto
the actus perfecti of willing the selected means, unto the final practical judgment, which
is in turn unto the further actus imperfecti by which the whole person labors to realize his
or her intention.76 Let us consider these in more detail. The object of velle’s motivation is
some being-conceived apprehended according to its being-valuable, being-good. This
apprehension, as I said, is manifest in a mediating word and motivated movement taking
responsibility for the being of such a being-conceived and being-valued according to the
autonomous ‘ought’ generated by the will in act (understood on analogy with the beingin-act of intelligible law generated by intelligere).77 This movement from the operation of
the will mediated by the judgment of value is first to the discernment of means and it is
governed by the actus perfecti of willing the good and mediated by a judgment of value.
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Under the government of this enduring operation and through the judgment of value’s
mediating verbum, a subordinate intellectual process hypothetically constructs means that
would be both effective and feasible. Alternative means must be evaluated, but this
process of evaluation also proceeds under the enduring governance of the original act of
willing. This process applies the good apprehended and affirmed, as well as its borrowed
intellectual content, to the deliberative process, but also places it under the dual
autonomy of intellectual process and of the will’s ‘ought’.
This deliberative process, when considered intellectually, can go on indefinitely.
There can be no apodictic argument that concludes it with certainty. Any apodictic
argument would require affirmation of the fulfilled conditions that would render the
hypothetical relation between means and the end virtually unconditioned.78 However,
among the necessary conditions, so long as deliberation continues, one remains
necessarily unfulfilled: a decision to enact the means motivated by the end intended.
What fulfills this condition, allowing the practical project to go forward? Initially, it is the
will-in-act moving itself to terminate the process of deliberation and utter a final practical
judgment as to the selected means. This willing of means is, of course, also a velle and so
an actus perfecti. Accordingly, it manifests its affirmation first in an uttered ‘yes’ that
communicates the motivation mobilized by a conceptualized good. In this case, the good
conceived consists in those means good for realizing what ought to be. Again, this
decision is not just a notional ‘yes,’ but also a motivated movement. Once means have
been selected to an end intended, there remains only to decide, “yes, I will act,” and so to
go forth into matter, and to shepherd into being what ought to be. The compound actus
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For the notion of the virtually unconditioned grasped by a judgment of fact, see Lonergan,
Insight, 305–6.
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perfecti of willing the means to the end intended endures through time, governing the
actus imperfecti by which the entire embodied person moves to bring about the good as
an existing effect. But to will this compound of volitional acts in an ordered series is to
will not only that order, but also the principle of order for its own sake as value, the
terminal object of willing’s ‘ought’.79
It is a point of philosophical doctrine that this complete, compound movement of
the will is free. But is it only free because it borrows the autonomy of the concept on
which it follows? Or is it free ultimately free because of the autonomy of the ‘ought’ the
will in act generates? The freedom of the complete, compound act of the will is likewise
complete only in a compound of elements, and so not reducible to a single element. It is
true that the complete compound act of the will is free with the borrowed freedom of
rationality’s basic autonomy and the proper freedom of velle’s ‘ought’. But this is to say
that the will is free insofar as acts of human willing are materially and formally
constituted by meaning. They are materially constituted by meaning insofar as the
deliberative process generates its hypothetical means through an intellectual process both
autonomously generative of constructed, phantasmatic expressions of intellect in act and
governed by the autonomy of velle’s ‘ought’. Human acts of willing are formally
constituted by meaning insofar as the process of deliberation is governed by and issues
from willing brought to act and specified by the good meant in an autonomously
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“For the will is such that it not only desires good ordered in an intelligible way but also desires
it because of the principle of that order, that is, the end–in other words, it desires value.” Lonergan, The
Triune God: Systematics, 674.
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constructed expression of intellect in act. In other words, the very substance of the act of
willing and so the autonomy of its determinate ‘ought’ is a meaning.80
The borrowed and originating autonomy of human acts of willing is matched by a
formal freedom pertaining to the will as operated by itself. Complete and compound acts
of the will are formally free in two ways. First, there is the freedom of specification. The
means selected are not necessary on the supposition of anything else. Thus, the selection
of means in light of this indeterminacy reveals an integral liberty of the will to specify for
itself the concretization of its own efficacy. Second, there is the freedom of exercise.
Because the means selected are not selected as the term of an apodictic argument, in
order for the volitional procedure issuing in a free action to be rational, the will must
move itself both to the termination of the deliberative process of discerning and
evaluating means and also to settling upon a practical judgment and a course of action. In
brief, the complete compound act of the will is free insofar as it includes the decision to
act or not, and this decision constitutes the outstanding condition on which the action as a
contingent effect depends.81
The foregoing has been haunted by an aporia. Does the gnoseological affirmation
of being in the verified concept, from which an originating act of willing the end may
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This is an elaboration of what I take Lonergan to mean by the ‘virtually’ free act of the will.
Now, Lonergan means that willing the end is virtually free on the supposition that it produces a formally
free act of the will. Willing the end, no matter how rationally, cannot be that in which freedom of the will
per se consists because it is not an act whereby the will moves itself, but in which the will is moved by its
agent object, the good as immanent in a word. For Lonergan’s distinction between formally and virtually
free acts of the will, see Lonergan, “God’s Knowledge and Will,” 327. See also Lonergan, Grace and
Freedom: Operative Grace in the Thought of St. Thomas Aquinas, eds. Frederick E. Crowe, Robert M.
Doran, CWL 1 (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2000), 96–8, 318–21.
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“In the exercise of a formally free act, a person is the cause per se, inasmuch as having willed
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to the end… In the specification of this same formally free act, a person is the cause per se inasmuch as by
willing the end one wills this particular practical judgment to be the final one in accordance with which one
moves to will the good presented by that judgment.” Lonergan, “God’s Knowledge and Will,” 329.
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follow, render the action manifesting that act superfluous? For what is willed as an end is
the good known in a word, immanent in a concept. But what is good by reason of itself is
a whole and a unity. It is intelligible, complete, and existing, for the good is concrete.82
The good known in a word, immanent in a concept, can be at most whole, unitary, and
intelligible. It might even be virtually complete, insofar as the more perfect the act of
intelligere from which the word proceeds, the more the good known therein will
approach perfection. But the good known in a word merely as known in a word cannot be
existing, nor really complete. And if it were, no practical means could prove needful, nor
any actus imperfecti going forth in matter would be required to realize our volitional
intentions. We might say, therefore, that the will ‘knows’ the good in a word ‘spoken’ in
the subjunctive mood. Indeed, precisely because it is uttered in the subjunctive mood, it
can be willed as the end of a volitional process that contains and, moreover, terminates in
the actus imperfecti of a practical project.
A distinction is called for, then, between the ‘ought’ of what is and the ‘ought’ of
what is not. Admittedly, I have in the foregoing been eliding this needful distinction to
underline the distinct autonomy proper to the operation of the will. I have, in other words,
been focusing on the productive element in the will. But we began from the concept
affirmed in the judgment of fact and it is in the reflective ‘yes’ that being is known as a
matter of fact. Such verba are not uttered in the subjunctive mood, but in the declarative.
The convertibility of the transcendentals constrains us to say that the will might come to
act with regard to the goodness coterminously present in such a word so uttered. But if
the ‘ought’ that issues from the will in act pertains to that which already is, has this
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willing become superfluous or even futile on my model of the rational appetite? Not at
all. We need only distinguish the desire to realize some end in accord with the will’s
‘ought’ from the love one may have for some reality that similarly accords with the will’s
‘ought.’ For there is no contradiction or futility in recognizing that what ought to be in
fact is.
Of course, this resolves only the objective difficulty. The subjective question
remains: is willing an already extant end manifest in the same manner as willing an end
desired? Does love show itself immediately in a movement? And if the movement is to
that which is and is precisely as in possession of its prior conditions, then is not this
manifesting movement superfluous or futile? But the Thomist definition of love includes
a hint to this conundrum. Love, on this view, is to will good to something. There is now
not just the intentional object of love in the uttered word, the expressed concept, but there
is also the substantial object of love to which the lover may be really related. Thus the
originating movement of the will is analogous in the way detailed above to a judgment
that, as a matter of fact, this extant being is good and to value its being, to recognize that
it ought to be. Thus, the immanent actus imperfecti that follows from and is governed by
the will’s originating actus perfecti is not the hypothetical construction of means that
would fulfill the end’s prerequisite conditions, but rather a kind of commitment, a stirring
to readiness to serve and support, to contribute to and participate in, to cooperate with
(insofar as I am able) the continued being of this being that ought to be.83 Human loving
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This is an elaboration of what I take Lonergan to mean when he speaks of love as by nature
uniting the mind affectively to the object loved. See Lonergan, The Triune God: Systematics, 679: “Second,
it may seem as if the procession of Love, like the procession of the Word, is also a generation, since in both
cases God proceeds from God. But against this is the fact that it is of the nature of generation that there not
only proceeds that which is similar in nature [to its principle], but also that that which proceeds is similar
by reason of the procession itself. Now, by its very nature the procession of an inner word is such that what
is conceived in the word is the very same thing as what is understood by the intellect. But by its very nature
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is, in this way, a state of waiting-on the beloved, both in the sense of an attentive
preparedness and in the sense of an other-oriented service. In this way, by love one wills
a being’s own goodness to it as both object-which is loved and the object-to-which the
good is willed in love. We might say that such love, insofar as it is in accord with the
autonomy of the will’s ‘ought’, ratifies the being of a being insofar as it is good.84
2.3 Some Conclusions About Free Human Actions
Human actions are free with a human freedom. It is a freedom to act or not to act.
It is a freedom to determine which of a multiplicity of feasible means will determine
one’s course of action. It is, in this regard, a freedom of independence. It is also a
freedom governed by velle’s ‘ought,’ a law it properly produces for itself. Further, it is a
freedom that proceeds rationally in accord with a borrowed intellectual law. Human
freedom, in this regard, is a freedom of autonomy. This freedom proceeds both as
processio operationis and processio operati, for verba produce the exercise of freedom as
an operation in the will, but also as a product that above I have called “action-as-effect.”
This has a perhaps startling implication. Where we found human knowledge
mediated by meaning through the integral process of conceptualization, we here find free
human actions at once mediated by, but also fundamentally constituted by meaning. The
key here is the subjunctive mood in which the verba initiating volitional process are
‘uttered’ (dicere) in a judgment of value. These verba serve a mediating function in the
the procession of love is such that it does not reproduce its object in the mind but rather that the mind joins
and unites itself affectively with the object loved.” See also ibid., 675.
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exercise of human freedom, mediating between good apprehended and the deliberation
about means, between the course of action as intelligently conceived and as substantially
pursued. The verba, however, also serve a constitutive function. They are the agent object
of volitional process. They govern and so order the series of acts in which the process
consists. But what intelligibly orders a multiplicity into an identifiable whole (“this
action”) is the formal cause of that whole.
Finally, the substantial practical project that proceeds from a complete volitional
process is governed by and so ordered to this meaning-constituted intention expressed by
the verba. They function, then, as the essential telos of that project’s being-towards
essence, its actus imperfecti. We may say, for example, that while fire depends as a
natural effect on intelligible causal pre-conditions to come to act, the free human action
called “arson” depends on a meaningful decision to come to act and so into being. In
other words, arson is arson because of what the action-as-effect means. Human actions,
then, are independent and autonomous, and so recognizably free. What I have labored to
reveal above is the manner in which human actions are both mediated, but also formally
constituted by meanings and that these meanings emerge poetically no less than
autonomously. Human actions are carried rationally from motivation to reality by the
mediating affirmations or negations uttered in judgments of value. But prior to this, they
are founded upon the compound constructions of intellect and imagination that we affirm
in judgments of fact and that express our insights into our experience. These
constructions express a meant and express it rationally. Thus, insofar as the will is a
rational appetite, the constitutive function of meaning in human actions is as integral to
their freedom as conceptualization and rationality is to knowledge.
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4. Articulating the Modern Problem of the Supernatural
At long last, the elements are assembled to articulate the modern problem of the
supernatural adequately. Heretofore I have expressed the modern problem by the question
“what is God doing in free human action?” We have explored according to the logical
techniques of metaphysics and the phenomenological techniques of psychological
description both “what God is doing…” and “… free human action.” We saw that what
God is doing is governing human action by creation, conservation, and application. God
operates our free agency as an instrument of his will. But still this did not reveal to us
what God is accomplishing by this governance. Perhaps, though, our analysis of free
human action provided a created analogue for God’s uncreated free action? Could we not
ask after God’s intended end and motivation for which he acts through our actions? But
God’s end and motivation is His love for the divine goodness, which is in se ineffable
and mysterious.85 Could we get somewhere by asking after God’s selected means to this
transcendent end? We already know the answer to this question: our free actions—in
concert with the order of the universe as a whole—are God’s selected means. All of this
we have in other ways asked and answered before. The modern problem cannot be solved
by metaphysical analysis.
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Lonergan, “God’s Knowledge and Will,” 309–11: “In God’s single act of willing, the sole
motive, the sole intended end or end of the agent, is the divine goodness itself. We, of course, can will
means to the end not only for the sake of the end but also for their own sake. So, for example, we will to
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other goodness adds to divine goodness, it is quite impossible that another goodness could provide any
other motive whatsoever over and above the divine goodness itself.” See also Summa theologiae 1, q. 19, a.
2, ad 2m, 3m, 4m; a. 4, ad 3m; a. 5 c.; q. 20, a. 2 c.
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Fortunately, our analysis of free human action has shaken loose an additional
element: those meanings formally constitutive of our actions. The constitutive function of
meaning in free human action calls out for a technique we have not yet deployed.
Metaphysical analysis only tells us that the constituted acts are, are free, and are
meaningful. Psychological description represents the experience of the various acts and
their conscious qualities, sequences, etc. A technique specially suited for apprehending
meanings immanent in the material artifacts of poetical process is needed. Human actions
go forth in matter, marking the material with our intentions. Moreover, human actions are
constituted by meaning such that their effects are rendered compounds of the
intelligibility meant by the action and the materiality in which it is expressed. Finally,
because human acts are not just formally, but also, so to speak, existentially constituted
by meaning, the entire field of human action and its effects is by extension produced by
the constitutive function of those meanings. The field of the meaningful cannot be
reduced to pure intelligibility, for that would sacrifice the very rationality on which
theory depends. Nor can it be reduced to the material, for in the field of free human
action, there are no purely material acts.86
Still, the totality of human action is not synthesized into a single project. There
exists no kingdom of ends.87 It is, rather, aggregated into enterprises at various scales and
of various kinds. These enterprises at once give rise to and are founded upon common
funds of meaning and value. But a community fund of meanings and values for an
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aggregate of persons is a culture.88 As the practical projects of any one person are never
hatched entirely de novo, but emerge in accord with available experiences, ideas, and ongoing enterprises, so that person’s actions arise in an intelligible nexus of these. Thus,
free human actions are at once principally constitutive of cultures and also materially
constituted by culture.
Whether in regard to my own actions, those of another person, or the aggregate
whole of the human community, in order to answer the question that expresses the
modern problem of the supernatural, “what is God doing in free human action?” there is
required a theological hermeneutics of culture. This prospective technique is theological
insofar as makes the quiddity of divine meaning in history the object of its investigation.
It is a hermeneutical technique insofar as it aims, not at elucidating the conditions of the
factual, nor describing the experience of the material, but interpreting the significance of
the expressed, the meaningfully accomplished. Finally, it is ‘of culture’ in that it centers
culture as the matter, the ‘text’ in which the cooperation of divine and human meaning
immanently resides.
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“Besides the classicist, there also is the empirical notion of culture. It is the set of meanings and
values that informs a way of life. It may remain unchanged for ages. It may be in process of slow
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a common field of experience, a common mode of understanding, a common measure of judgment, and a
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Of course, matter is a principle of individuation. Cultures are, as expression of
aggregate human communities, de facto multiple. At the same time, the divine concursus
is universal. Thus, we alight upon that which makes this problem of interpreting divine
meaning expressed in the concrete multiplicity of human cultures modern. The classical
ideal of science, that would reduce the contingent to the necessary, suits a classical notion
of culture. If there is one normative culture, then in human matters one could reduce the
contingent variations (and ‘deficiencies’) to their necessary principles (or failures of their
efficacy). But the products of human freedom are necessary only on the presupposition of
themselves. They are contingent, and moreover contingent upon something which
contingently moves itself to act. So too are the meanings that formally constitute
freedom’s expression. As we have already seen, a metaphysical reduction will over and
over again fail to gain traction on the part of the problem that is of the greatest
consequence: meaning.
The modern ideal of science, however, accords with our basic medieval
commitment to God’s transcendent causality. Modern science in the broad sense speaks
only of verified possibilities, eschewing the antique division of the cosmos into necessary
and contingent.89 This, in turn, accords with the empirical notion of culture at the core of
the problem here articulated. To ask what God is doing in free human action in this
modern way—the only way that can get any traction—is to ask after the divine meaning
expressed in every human culture in a field extending indefinitely through time and
across geography. The technique proportionate to this problem—a theological
hermeneutics of culture—cannot produce a synchronic theory to resolve, once and for all,
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the modern problem as posed. Nor can it settle for a phenomenology of religious
experience or the like. Rather, its task is irreducibly diachronic, going on as long as
human history does. But it is a matter of fact that intelligence intends unity. How can this
technique address the modern problem of the supernatural in a manner that gives rise to
more than a mere catalogue of differences? In the subsequent, fifth, and final chapter, I
briefly suggest how, by reflecting upon its own unfolding procedure, a theological
hermeneutics of culture might generate and refine a method that will order the series of
scholarly acts in which any effort to address the modern problem will recurrently consist.
4. Conclusion
Perhaps it is clearer now why I gave such short shrift to the more obvious,
putatively modern form of the problem of the supernatural, the question of the natural
desire to know God. That specific metaphysical problem and the medieval, metaphysical
solutions put forward to address it can do no more than restate the genuinely modern
problem of the supernatural. How are we to discern what God is up to in free human
action and in its cultural and historical products? Indeed, we pushed the metaphysical
restatements of this question as far as far as they would go. We considered divine
governance of human action and found that our question remained. We considered the
nature of those free acts of the will on which free human actions rest and we considered
too the rationality on which volitional acts rest. We found again that the question
remained. What is God doing in free human actions?
Pushing these restatements, however, was not an act of stubborn futility, nor a
reductio ad absurdum. It revealed within the metaphysical efforts to address the problems
of the supernatural, of God’s ad extra agency in free human action, a residue of a higher
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problem. This residue we found in the function of meaning within the rational and
volitional processes on which free human action rests. Because meaning has an integral,
mediating, and constitutive function in the prerequisite processes of free human action,
we can now see how I made good on my promise to demonstrate that the modern
problem of the supernatural is diachronic and hermeneutical. Moreover, we were able to
discern on the basis of this diachronic hermeneutical residue some determinations by
which to anticipate the solution to the modern problem. A diachronic and hermeneutical
problem calls out for a diachronic and hermeneutical solution. So I proposed a
theological hermeneutics of culture that is irreducible to either metaphysical analysis or
phenomenological description and that in fact must consist in the on-going, cumulative,
progressive, and critical application of a technique, which is to say of a method. It is to a
brief sketch of that method’s criteria for adequacy that we turn in the next, indeed final
chapter.

CHAPTER 5: CONCLUSION
Up to now we have accumulated a number of problems, distinctions, theorems,
solutions, mentalities, ambiguities, and techniques. As I bring this study to a close, it is
time to review these and how they coalesce to complete my constructive proposal. There
are two problems of the supernatural and the modern diachronic and hermeneutical
problem is irreducible to the medieval metaphysical problem. Moreover, whether these
problems would be resolved by recourse to a negative or a positive solution depends on
how one responds to the ambiguities of being, i.e. what pre-philosophical posture of
human freedom one takes before the problems themselves. Thomas Aquinas’s solution to
the medieval problem rests upon the decision to construe the world as fundamentally
susceptible to explanation. Blondel and Sartre showed us two ways in which the modern
philosophical mentality helped to make this decision explicit rather than tacit. The
irreducibility of the modern problem to the medieval solution rested as well on a
commitment to the complete explicability of being, but viewed through the lens of
Thomas’s affirmation of universal cooperation. From this vantage, we see that
interpreting “what God is doing in human action” requires explaining all of the data on
God’s work in history. Moreover, we saw that, because human action is formally
constituted by meaning, the data on God’s work in history will be data on the meaningful
products of human agency. To this end, I suggested the development of a theological
hermeneutics of culture that would investigate what human action has concretely meant
in its cooperation with God.
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Admittedly, my notion of a theological hermeneutics of culture amounts to no
more than a heuristic indication of the technique required. We distinguished the modern
problem from the medieval problem and solution on the grounds that the former must be
diachronic and hermeneutical, but the latter is synchronic and theoretical. But there are
many theologies, many hermeneutics, and many cultures. Consequently, these basic
determinations are not of themselves adequate as criteria for the technique by which to
address the modern problem of the supernatural. Some further determinations are needed
to guide in the development of this technique from anticipation to reality. In other words,
a more developed heuristic is needful. After a brief review of the ground already covered,
developing such a heuristic will be our task in this short final chapter. My controlling
image for this heuristic consists in three Cartesian planes, intersecting as a Y-, an X-, and
a Z-axis. Along the Y-axis one would plot theories of transcendence. Along the X-axis,
one would plot differences of traditional/cultural context. Along the Z-axis one would
plot axiologial transformations of intellectual, moral, religious, and theological
authenticity and so the dynamics of what Lonergan has called progress, decline, and
redemption.1

1

Lonergan explains these “differentials” with an analogy from Newton’s planetary theory: “It was
about 1937-38 that I became interested in a theoretical analysis of history. I worked out an analysis on the
model of a threefold approximation. Newton's planetary theory had a first approximation in the first law of
motion: bodies move in a straight line with constant velocity unless some force intervenes. There was a
second approximation when the addition of the law of gravity between the sun and the planet yielded an
elliptical orbit for the planet. A third approximation was reached when the influence of the gravity of the
planets on one another is taken into account to reveal the perturbed ellipses in which the planets actually
move. The point to this model is, of course, that in the intellectual construction of reality it is not any of the
earlier stages of the construction but only the final product that actually exists. Planets do not move in
straight lines nor in properly elliptical orbits; but these conceptions are needed to arrive at the perturbed
ellipses in which they actually do move. In my rather theological analysis of human history, my first
approximation was the assumption that men always do what is intelligent and reasonable, and its
implication was an ever increasing progress. The second approximation was the radical inverse insight that
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The notion of a theological hermeneutics of culture addressed the subjective
determinations of the modern problem, insofar as free human actions issue from a
rational process that is mediated and constituted by meaning. These three axes serve to
indicate and organize, we will see, the objective data to which a theological hermeneutics
of culture will be applied. The scale of the task posed by integrating these three axes into
the unity called for by understanding suggests that the development and application of
this technique will have to be cooperative. Furthermore, the application of this technique
will also have to be adaptive to the concreteness of its object. However, because the
application of the technique will have to be cooperative and adaptive, but also because
this cooperation and adaptation is to be effected by free human agents, there will be
needed some reflection on the relative successes and failures of the technique and its
application. Finally, the products of this reflection will need to be cooperatively and
adaptively applied to the cumulative and progressive application of the technique to the
data. Thus, the theological hermeneutics of culture will also need to be a critical,
cooperative, and methodical theology.
The theology indicated by these heuristic determinations constitutes the only
viable genre of response to the modern problem of the supernatural. Insofar as it is

men can be biased, and so unintelligent and unreasonable in their choices and decisions. The third
approximation was the redemptive process resulting from God's gift of his grace to individuals and from
the manifestation of his love in Christ Jesus. The whole idea was presented in chapter twenty of Insight.
The sundry forms of bias were presented in chapters six and seven on common sense. The notion of moral
impotence, which I had studied in some detail when working on Aquinas' notion of gratia operans in my
dissertation, was worked out in chapter eighteen on the possibility of ethics” Lonergan, “Insight Revisited,”
in A Second Collection, eds. Robert M. Doran and John D. Dadosky (Toronto: University of Toronto Press,
2016), 228–9.
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critical, it can be at home in the modern philosophical mentality and its demand for via
inventionis validation. Insofar as it is adaptive and methodical, it is open in principle to
scholarly reflection upon any and every culture. The nature of my integrating “Cartesian”
scheme does not just allow for, but positively calls for the scholarly coordination of
inquiries into multiple traditions/cultures insofar as they generate reflections on what God
has done (and is doing) in history. This is true on the side of the object(s) under scholarly
investigation, but it is also true on the side of the theologizing subject. Dealing with the
data that raise the modern problem of the supernatural on the modern problem’s terms
poses a theological task that, even if we could freeze time and turn off the tap of history,
fairly drowns the scholarly imagination. Thus, the theological hermeneutics of culture
must also become a cooperative theology. But before investigating more thoroughly the
consequences of integrating theology’s three axes, let us review how we came to the
precipice of a modern solution to the modern problem of the supernatural.
1. Summary of the Foregoing Constructive Proposal
In Chapter 1, we jumped into the controversy over the supernatural as it stands
now, revived in the twenty-first century in much the same terms it was contested at the
middle of the twentieth. By drawing a parallel between the argumentative strategies
deployed in the 1940s and in the early decades of this century, I tried to show that the
debate is if not per se intractable, then de facto at a stalemate. In response to this
intractability, I proposed that part of the problem with the problem of the supernatural is
that it consists not in a single, but a pair of theological issues. The first is a long-standing
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medieval metaphysical quandary about how divine and human agency can both be at
work in creation without crowding each other out. I have called this the medieval
problem of the supernatural. The second problem asks how this cooperation between
human beings and God can be discerned not in synchronic metaphysical terms, but in the
existential subject, in historical process, and in the kaleidoscopic panoply of human
cultures across both time and geography. I contended, against the overwhelming
tendency of the literature on the contemporary controversy, that the modern problem is
irreducible to the medieval one. Thus, possessing a solution to the latter does not of itself
grant one an adequate solution to the former. I also argued that in order to address the
modern problem adequately, we cannot simply dismiss the medieval problem. A
mistaken position on the metaphysics of cooperation between human beings and God will
set inquiry into the modern problem off on a goose chase for divine action unsullied by
human taint. This in turn eventually leads some to the skeptical conclusion that God’s
agency in history cannot be known, because everywhere one looks there are only human
meanings. And so we saw that both mid-century and contemporary Thomists are correct
with regard to the indispensability of the Thomist metaphysical achievement, but the
adherents of the Nouvelle théologie and their neo-de Lubacian inheritors are also correct
that this achievement is ultimately insufficient to address problems of “our age,” though I
might construe the historical boundaries of “our age” more broadly than someone like
Daniélou.
Having construed the medieval problem in terms of operation, of action, and so as
a theological problem of divine and human cooperation, in Chapter 2 I engaged in a

238

lengthy retrieval of Lonergan’s interpretation of St. Thomas on God’s ad extra agency.
We considered Thomas’s theory of cooperation in general, with special reference to the
problematics of grace that occasioned Aquinas’ breakthroughs and to the synthetic
position on divine and human cooperation it implies. Lonergan showed us how the advent
of the theorem of the supernatural elucidated a need for grace beyond changes in the
states of human nature vis-à-vis sin. Human beings have an ontologically fundamental
need for grace to make us proportionate to acts meriting eternal life, whether we are
under sin’s law of death or not. This theorem demonstrates its mobility, however, insofar
as it also indicates the compatibility of this need for grace with the integrity of our
created freedom. It makes a general theory of concursus possible by which we can say
how free human action cooperates with God’s providential action without being
denatured. The theorem of the supernatural also makes a special theory of cooperative
grace possible as well. By the latter we can say how it is that human beings cooperate
with God in actions beyond the proportion of our powers without impinging on the
integrity of our freedom either. Furthermore, we saw how the notion of “entitative
disproportion” at the heart of the theorem of the supernatural also distinguishes the
general case of concursus from the specific instance of cooperative grace.
In Chapter 3, we saw how the general—which is to say, the philosophical—
application of the theorem of the supernatural suggests what I have called the medieval
ambiguity of being. By divine concursus every created cause is caused as to its existence
by God, for only God is proportionate to existence as an effect. But this invites one of
two basic attitudes with regard to the divine causality: either it makes the greatest
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possible difference (for without it, there would be nothing at all) or it makes no difference
at all (for everything that is exists). One can quite easily take existence for granted—that
is, take it as a mere matter of fact—and set about investigating the world of finite beings
entirely without reference to a transcendent agent. One can come to think that the
question of fundamental explanation is not a question worth asking at all. This decision
with regard to the meaningfulness of the question of being reflects back upon itself. One
is invited to read the task of investigating finite being as but one more contingent being in
the universe for which it is meaningless to demand a fundamental explanation.
Alternately, one can take a more mystical posture with regard to human inquiry, setting it
(and all other human action with it) within a cosmos whose ultimate explanation (and so
purpose) is at once preeminently real but also ultimately hidden in the mystery of God’s
transcendent self-knowledge. Because both of these postures concern the meaningfulness
and worthwhileness of asking and answering questions at all, adopting one or the other is
necessarily a pre-philosophical exercise of freedom.
Just because the medieval ambiguities of being became possible with the
appearance of Thomas’s theory of concursus in the thirteenth century did not mean that
cognizance of it became probable straight away. Thus, I argued that a modern
philosophical mentality came on the scene, realizing explicit advertence to the medieval
ambiguities. This mentality is marked by its insistence on a separated, rather than
subordinated philosophy and the elevation of its via inventionis to a criterion of validity
for its conclusions. Within this mentality, I turned to two examples of how, according to
each pole of the ambiguity, the modern philosophical mentality would come to articulate
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the ambiguities of being. In Maurice Blondel we saw a cumulative and progressive
analysis of the explanatory role that God’s ad extra agency would play if it were not
excluded by the modern philosophical mentality’s method of immanence. This
explanatory lacuna persists, Blondel showed us, in every possible arena of
phenomenological examination and yet cannot be closed except by a pre-philosophical
exercise of freedom—namely, a commitment to the transcendent, supernatural
explicability of being in general and human action specifically. Sartre, by contrast, begins
from an opposed pre-philosophical commitment that being simply is and so (as being)
admits no explanation. Free human action likewise is and so then is also explained by
nothing, such that any kind of rationalization of our actions proves a bad faith avoidance
of responsibility. The explanation of our actions is simply that we freely chose to act.
With Blondel, I acknowledged holding to the basic, if transcendent explicability of being
and human action. Thus I could indicate by contrast that Sartre’s philosophy is a
philosophy in bad faith insofar as it offers philosophical justifications for its basic
commitment, even though it rests on a pre-philosophic act of freedom. This does not
make the pre-philosophical choice posed by the medieval ambiguity of being
philosophically decidable. However, it does unmask the pretension of existential atheism
to establish itself as the only rational philosophy of action or foreclose the affirmation of
transcendent meaningfulness as a good faith exercise of human freedom.
In Chapter 4, after briefly considering the perhaps more familiar candidate for the
modern problem of the supernatural, the question of the natural desire to know God, I set
out to show that the genuinely modern problem of the supernatural is in fact insusceptible

241

to the techniques of metaphysical analysis. Moreover, I argued that aiming to address the
question of what God is doing in human action by means of such metaphysical
techniques would only succeed in restating the problem itself, rather than answering it.
We turned this apparent dead-end to our advantage, for we were able to develop some
determinations of the modern problem from these metaphysical restatements. Thus we
trained our metaphysical analysis on human action itself, determining that, as free and
human, it issues from acts of the will. We then considered the will in detail as ‘rational
appetite,’ first by a lengthy excursus on the intellectual process of rationality itself and
then the rationality of free human acts by extension. We made something of an uncanny
discovery in this process: human rationality, in its most fundamental form, is mediated by
meaning. Further, we found that acts of the rational appetite are not just mediated, but
also constituted by meaning, for they proceed in the first place from a word, a verbum.
The constitutive function of meaning in human action proved the key to
articulating the modern problem of the supernatural. Human action is historical. It
emerges as meaningful from a diachronic process. Moreover, it emerges from a world of
meaning that also has emerged from a meaning-mediated, meaning-constituted
diachronic process. Free human agents are formed and constrained by the horizon set out
by the aggregation of these actions and their products. The shared horizon of a
community of free human agents is a culture, and so it is in cultures that the evidence on
what God is doing in free human action coalesces into its matrices of relevance.
However, cultures are many and explanation is unitary. How then can there be any
solution to the modern problem of the supernatural? I indicated heuristically a technique
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for investigating these networks of data on the modern problem of the supernatural. I
called this technique a “theological hermeneutics of culture.” But the unity of a shared
technique is not enough, for that is only a subjective unity. There is needed also a unity of
results. For this, the technique must be developed, through reflection and refinement, into
a method that yields cumulative and progressive results. What remains is to indicate the
criteria for any methodical solution to the modern problem of the supernatural.
2. The Axes of Critical Cooperative Methodical Theology
Which brings us to this final task: spelling out the significance of my heuristic
scheme for applying a theological hermeneutics of culture to the data on the modern
problem of the supernatural. Any theology that would meet the modern problem of the
supernatural should be coordinated across three axes. We will imagine them intersecting
in the manner of Cartesian planes. First, such a theology must include at least an
implicitly operative notion by which to speak of God in some distinction from everything
else. For this, we imagine a Y-axis on which to plot notions of transcendence.2 Second, if
theology would resist charges of naïveté, chauvinism, parochialism, or special pleading,
it must further make the critical step of understanding, evaluating, and discerning the
principle of differences between itself and its others. For this, we imagine an X-axis on
which to plot cultural or “contextual” differences. Third, a critical theology is not yet a
methodical theology. A methodical theology takes stock of the conditions under which
2

That the Y-axis is for plotting notions of transcendence does not prejudge whether theologies
will affirm a strong or weak transcendence, or deny divine transcendence altogether. However, insofar as
the exigency for this scheme rests on Thomas’s medieval solution to the medieval problem of the
supernatural—namely, a strong theory of divine transcendence—it unavoidably presupposes that other
doctrines of god will be coordinated with reference to it.
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theologies have made progress and/or suffered decline, aiming to regularize the
conditions of progress in pursuit of cumulative results.3 A methodical theology has a
theory of the dynamics of its own intellectual history and aims at taking the relevant
conditions in hand to guide the process into the future. For this, we imagine a Z-axis on
which to plot genetic developments according to the differential transformations of
progress, decline, and redemption. Coordinated across these three axes, a critical
methodical theology can take shape. Let us take each axis in turn, and then we can
conclude by discussing why this scheme calls out for an unprecedented scholarly
cooperation in stern and vertiginous terms.
2.1. Transcendence
For a time, the tendency to think of God as a being among beings stymied St.
Augustine’s inarguably powerful theological mind.4 Still, his breakthrough unto the
eternality and immateriality of God took a nascent form, operating as a basic doctrinal
commitment controlled by an operative grammar.5 His apprehension of God’s

3

The manner in which I have built the modern problem of the supernatural atop Thomas’s
solution to the medieval problem of the supernatural would be one example of such speculative
accumulation.
4

For Augustine’s first person account of this struggle, see St. Augustine, The Confessions of St.
Augustine, trans. John K. Ryan (New York, NY: Image, 2014).
5

By “grammar” here I mean something like what Kathryn Tanner calls “ruled structures of
theological talk and their function.” For Tanner, “theological statements work to establish Christian
vocabularies and the usage rules appropriate for those expressions. In doing so, frameworks for discourse
are constituted within which it makes sense to talk about God and try to conform one’s self to Christian
truths.” Though Tanner does consider speculative questions of divine agency, she does* so in accord with
the Anglo-American analytic and pragmatist traditions of deriving theorematic content from the
relationships among signs in a discourse, rather than by a more empirico-inductive path of analogy proper
to the Aristotelian and Thomist tradition of metaphysical reasoning. See Tanner, Kathryn, God and
Creation in Christian Theology: Tyranny or Empowerment? (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1988), 10–13.

244

transcendence meant that certain ways of speaking were inadmissible both as dogmatic
formulation and speculative construction. Still, we can surmise that Augustine was not
thereby able to articulate a speculative theorem that allowed the cascade of corresponding
speculative theological problems to be resolved. Recall from Chapter 2 how Augustine
posits the distinction between operative and cooperative grace without explaining
precisely how it answered the speculative difficulty driving denial of the gratuity of grace
and/or the reality of human freedom. It was not until the medieval theorem of the
supernatural came on the scene with Albert the Great, Philip the Chancellor, and Thomas
Aquinas that these difficulties could be faced head on. A more adequate theory of
transcendence allowed whole areas of theological inquiry to fall into a single view—and,
indeed, within the purview of a series of sufficiently diligent and prolific geniuses.
We may note several such figures who tip Christian theology into new epochs by
the force of their commitment to a central, organizing theory of transcendence.
Schleiermarcher’s insight that the absolute transcendence of God, thought within the
horizon of a robust philosophical romanticism and idealism, suggested that the absolute
dependence of creatures could itself be an (albeit indeterminate) state of consciousness
(Gefühl). The miraculous perfection of this Gefühl in Christ controlled Schleiermacher’s
entire speculative response to the traditional loci of Christian theology in his
Glaubenslehre.6 In this fashion, he was able to produce what is among the most
genuinely systematic systematic theologies, controlled throughout by a single notion. But
even when they are rather less systematic in structure, all theologies require at least an
6

See Friedrich Schleiermacher, Christian Faith, eds. C. L. Kelsey and T. N. Tice, trans. T. N.
Tice, C. L. Kelsey, and E. Lawler (Louisville, KY: Westminster John Knox Press, 2016).
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implied, controlling position along this “Y-axis” concerning transcendence. This is no
less true if that position involves a denial of transcendence (Feuerbach) or radical
modification of the notion (Process Theology). Moreover, all theologies necessarily
benefit from that controlling principle of grammatical control finding theoretical
elaboration, as we see in the development between Schleiermacher’s speeches and
Christian Faith.
2.2. Context
Any “great man” theory of theological development raises the problem of
adjudicating between the speculative visions of various theological schools and their
masters. There arises the intellectual gridlock by which adherents of one system level
extrinsic critiques at the adherents of another system for violations of their inherited first
principles. When one speaks of “decadent scholasticism,” one element of the imputed
decadence consists in this deductive intractability. Moreover, responsible scholarship
anymore recognizes that one ought not anachronistically or a-contextually hold the
systems of major figures up to one another for brute comparison. Rather, one should
make theoretical evaluations in light of the cultural circumstances under which their
thought was developed and set down. This, at first blush, seems to bring in the question
of history, but in fact such considerations pertain more properly to questions of what we
might call “context” or culture.
We may note that Thomas’s moral theory is conditioned (though not determined)
by its contemporary controversies in ways that make it only comparable by analogy to,
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for example, Kant’s moral philosophy and its contemporary debates.7 There are genuine
points of contact, but substantive, even essential differences must be surveyed and
controlled for. What goes for the agents of a theology goes too for its object(s). Indeed,
this is the very heart of the modern problem of the supernatural: that God’s work is
manifest in the artifacts of cultural making precisely as cultural artifacts and in the
making qua making. Thus, accounts of what God wrought in first-century Palestine can
be compared and contrasted with what God has done, say, on the Indian subcontinent
certainly, but only in terms of the cultural artifacts that persist in our world from theirs.
This brings challenges, though they do not at all constitute an impossibility. Still, a
certain analogical heuristic has to be followed lest the worst sins of interreligious
polemics go uncritically repeated.
These differences in context—whether individuated by historical epoch,
geographical distance, or simply subcultural/demographic divisions—can be coordinated.
Because they have a unitary principle functioning as the variable from which their
variations originate, to the extent that they emerge authentically and are intelligible, they
possess a necessarily analogical relationship with one another. However, in Chapter 4 I
argued that theology cannot proceed by reducing these differences to their principle of
variation and that they cannot be bracketed metaphysically. As a result such artifacts
must be investigated according to their place in the concrete social, cultural, inter7

See for example Jean Porter’s retrieval of the scholastic concept of the natural law and its
relationship to modern and contemporary approaches thereto (Jean Porter, Nature as Reason: A Thomistic
Theory of the Natural Law (Grand Rapids, MI: Wm. B. Eerdmans, 2005), 1–52; see also Susan Neiman’s
account of the moral theological debates into which Kant’s moral theory emerged in Evil in Modern
Thought (Susan Neiman, Evil in Modern Thought, an Alternative History of Philosophy [Princeton, NJ:
Princeton University Press, 2015), 14–83.
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personal, or religious order in which they are situated, which is itself constituted by
human meanings, values, and actions.
To represent this vector of investigation, we have the “X-axis.” Along this axis,
differences internal to a religious or theological tradition/culture would be at turns
distinguished and catalogued, but also correlated. At the same time, each religious or
theological tradition/culture would maintain a view to the investigation of parallel or
adjacent religious or theological traditions/cultures occurring alongside. To advert again
to the work of David Burrell, we see an example of one such tandem investigation in
Towards a Jewish-Christian-Muslim Theology.8 Though the Jewish, Christian, and
Muslim tracks converge on the work of Thomas Aquinas, Burrell is able to show how
consonant but as-yet-incompatible positions developed under rather different religious
and cultural pressures. Thus, he avoids the temptation to read later synthesis and
development back through the traditions, imposing an occlusive sameness upon them. In
this way, analogous positions can be given their due in terms of both similarity and
difference and a properly theoretical approach to theology can be wedded to a critical and
historically conscious theology.
We should further note that Burrell’s project not only coordinates these
investigations according to their socio-cultural similarities and differences. To do so
would reduce theologians to sociologists of knowledge. It is not enough to take
cognizance of this horizontal, X-axis of religious thought and practice. Its coordinates
8

2011).

David Burrell, Towards a Jewish-Christian-Muslim Theology (Malden, MA: Wiley-Blackwell,

248

need to be at the same time correlated, as we see in Burrell, according to the theorematic
positions on transcendence along the Y-axis. Theology cannot forget to speak explicitly
of what God has done and is doing in the world, even when it recognizes that it always at
once speaks of and from diverse human worlds. On the other hand, if I note that the
failure to take theology’s X-axis into account risks naïveté, chauvinism, parochialism, or
special pleading, I still leave out the arguably more serious critiques of power that
mobilize so many “contextual” theologies, but that topic is rather more apropos of the Zaxis to which we turn now.
2.3. History
One might be tempted to identify the X-axis with contemporaneous differences of
context and the Z-axis with historically discrete differences of context, and so the X-axis
with geography and the Z-axis with “history.” This should be avoided. First, digital
globalization has put to the sword the idea that cultural communities are identifiable with
geographical proximities. Second, history is not strictly speaking reducible to temporal
succession, but is constituted by meanings and values that are always susceptible to
configuration. Rather, it has been my intention that the X-axis covers both of these kinds
of differences, the temporal and the geographic. As mere differences in time and place do
not make a difference in the applicability of classical physical laws, so mere differences
of time and place do not make a difference in the explanatory power of well-wrought
theological speculation. The rather late centering of Thomas Aquinas’s philosophy and
theology in Catholic thought provides compelling evidence that his thought has relevance
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beyond Paris and the thirteenth century—even if it was shaped by historical, cultural,
philosophical, and theological conditions at play there and then. This is precisely the
point. The differences that make a difference are not those of mere time and place, but
differences in the substance of the cultural world in which God has been at work in the
religious life of a community and the reflection of its theologians. Consequently, these
differences may fall along a single axis.
What does the Z-axis coordinate? Though theologies can be coordinated
according to both theorematic and contextual differences, they can also be related as
genetic stages of historical process. They can as such be evaluated according to whether
they amount to progress or decline. Religions, like any element of a culture, can flourish
or they can fester, can grow or stagnate, can emerge or collapse altogether. For Lonergan,
theology becomes methodical when it can yield cumulative and progressive results. Thus,
a theology needs to take stock of religious development and decline and plot it along this
Z-axis. Moreover, a theology must also appropriate its own historical trajectory, working
to contribute to the accumulation and development of theological understanding and
clarify theological confusion. In this way, a theology needs to take a stand on the relative
authenticity of religious practice and understanding, but also on the authenticity of past
scholarly reflection thereupon. This facet of the theological task amounts to a “dialectical
traditionalism” that appropriates its historical position in a religious and/or theological
tradition, but also inveighs “yes” or “no” as to whether elements therein ought to be
carried forward or repudiated. The concrete value of these decisions within a tradition
constitute the inertial transformations in which progress or decline consist. Methodical
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theologians should not avoid coordinating their evaluations along this Z-axis, and they
certainly cannot avoid having their evaluations coordinated by both contemporary and
subsequent theologians in turn. The risk shared by every theology is that these judgments
may be mistaken and so themselves contribute to a trajectory of decline. But if they are
correct, resting upon intelligent inquiry, reasonable reflection, responsible deliberation,
and a loving commitment to the good and its transcendent source, they contribute to the
flourishing, the development, perhaps the recovery of a theological tradition and those
‘others’ with which may be in dialogue.
3. The Demand and Challenge of Theological Cooperation
Once the theoretical (Y-axis), critical (X-axis) and the methodical (Z-axis)
exigencies have been introduced to the theological task by the modern problem of the
supernatural, we come to see that the “great man” theory of theological advancement is
no longer viable. Theology as a discipline has to transcend, through the generation of
cumulative and progressive results, the historicity that conditions the individual
theologians who produce it. To address the modern problem of the supernatural, it has to
take stock of the work of God in the worlds of human culture across geography, society,
and history. Moreover, recognizing now that the theorems guiding theological
speculation are themselves the product of cultural process, theology cannot settle within a
single theoretical horizon. It has to coordinate and analogically communicate between a
diversity of theoretical horizons. Our task demands a “speculative pluralism.”9 Moreover,

9

Thanks to Ryan Hemmer for developing this notion and appellation.
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theology has to wrangle with the work above and its voluminous data in a way that does
not simply catalogue what has gone before, but also takes its own stand on which new
questions need answering, what old answers need revision, and which
accomplishments—past and present—call out for continued attention and appropriation.
On the other hand, “theology” cannot perform the above tasks, but only
theologians—theologians who read, pray, think, and write from their concrete horizons.
Consequently, no single theologian can perform the whole of the theological task. Indeed,
no theologian (even as inestimable a theologian as St. Thomas Aquinas) can provide a
unitary horizon in which all other theologians can then work with the force of his or her
genius at their collective backs. No, theology at the level of our time can only be done in
a decentered way, mediating between a religion and its cultural matrix while at the same
time mediating between cultural matrices and evaluating from its vantage the relative
authenticity of the religion, the cultural matrices, and the theologies at play in both its
contemporary scene and that scene’s effective history. If nothing else, the billowing
clauses of the above sentence should give some sense of the unwieldiness of this task and
the need for a massive, intercultural, intergenerational, interdisciplinary cooperation in
theology. This need is at once essential to theology’s self-realization and also rather
extravagantly beyond its present means.
Consequently, theologians face the temptation to define their task down by
excising one or more of theology’s axes. Perhaps we could forgo the existential risk of
normative evaluation and only concern ourselves with disclosing the decenteredness of
culturally and historically conscious theology? If theology lightens its load in this
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manner, one might expect to encounter a certain decadent post-modern theology that, if it
theorizes at all, theorizes exclusively about the absolute alterity of God and the relative,
but still impenetrable alterity between cultures, times, and even persons. Alternatively,
perhaps theologians can find some refuge from the staggering expanse of cultural
particularity in the logical inferences of theological speculation, laying down our
evaluations insofar as they accord with or contradict our theoretical formulations? But if
the weight of history is removed from the theologian, the dual circumscription of a
speculative theology’s abstractive viewpoint is removed. The material circumscription of
theology’s cultural horizon is occluded, but also the formal circumscription constituted
by the particular valence of its questions. Theological answers become orphaned from
their source in the light of agent intellect. Thus, one encounters a decadent scholasticism
that assumes reality can be rendered entirely transparent by any adequately wrought
metaphysics. But if metaphysics seems, in its airy speculation, too impractical an
approach for theology to put front and center, perhaps theology can put ethics and moral
theory in its place. Perhaps theology can content itself to inveigh for and against religions
and theologies as they accord with or contradict our convictions about what contitutes
moral thought or practice, foregoing the self-doubt that afflicts a liberal preoccupation
with pluralism or the self-indulgent fastidiousness of metaphysical speculation. Such a
theology, however, cannot but face the charge of idolatry, having decided for itself which
God seems fit to worship, begging the question, “whence these moral intuitions and their
criteria?”
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No doubt my readers can call to mind for themselves theologies embodying any
one or more of these strategies for lightening theology’s load. You may have some
opinion about which are more forgivable, which more derisable. I exhort us, instead, to
face the task in its full dimension and, as ever, do what we can with what we have,
having faith that all these things will be added unto us. Recognizing the need and scope
of a theological hermeneutics of culture is trouble enough for today
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